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Another Round on Passwords
[tags]passwords, security practices[/tags]
The EDUCAUSE security mailing list has yet (another) discussion on password policies. I've blogged about this general issue several times in the past, but maybe it is worth revisiting.
Someone on the list wrote:
Here is my question - does anyone have the data on how many times a hack (attack) has occurred associated to breaking the “launch codes” from outside of the organization? The last information I gleaned from the FBI reports (several years ago) indicated that 70 percent of hackings (attacks) were internal.
My most recent experience with intrusions has had nothing to do with a compromised password, rather an exploit of some vunerability in the OS, database, or application.
I replied:
I track these things, and I cannot recall the last time I saw any report of an incident caused by a guessed password. Most common incidents are phishing, trojans, snooping, physical theft of sensitive media, and remote exploitation of bugs.
People devote huge amounts of effort to passwords because it is one of the few things they think they can control.
Picking stronger passwords won't stop phishing. It won't stop users downloading trojans. It won't stop capture of sensitive transmissions. It won't bring back a stolen laptop (although if the laptop has proper encryption it *might* protect the data). And passwords won't ensure that patches are in place but flaws aren't.
Creating and forcing strong password policies is akin to being the bosun ensuring that everyone on the Titanic has locked their staterooms before they abandon ship. It doesn't stop the ship from sinking or save any lives, but it sure does make him look like he's doing something important.....
That isn't to say that we should be cavalier about setting passwords. It is important to try to set strong passwords, but once reasonably good ones are set in most environments the attacks are going to come from other places -- password sniffing, exploitation of bugs in the software, and implantation of trojan software.
As a field, we spend waaaaay too much time and resources on palliative measures rather than fundamental cures. In most cases, fiddling with password rules is a prime example. A few weeks ago, I blogged about a related issue.
Security should be based on sound risk assessment, and in most environments weak passwords don't present the most significant risk.
What did you really expect?
[tags]reformed hackers[/tags]
A news story that hit the wires last week was that someone with a history of breaking into systems, who had “reformed” and acted as a security consultant, was arrested for new criminal behavior. The press and blogosphere seemed to treat this as surprising. They shouldn't have.
I have been speaking and writing for nearly two decades on this general issue, as have others (William Hugh Murray, a pioneer and thought leader in security, is one who comes to mind). Firms that hire “reformed” hackers to audit or guard their systems are not acting prudently any more than if they hired a “reformed” pedophile to babysit their kids. First of all, the ability to hack into a system involves a skill set that is not identical to that required to design a secure system or to perform an audit. Considering how weak many systems are, and how many attack tools are available, “hackers” have not necessarily been particularly skilled. (The same is true of “experts” who discover attacks and weaknesses in existing systems and then publish exploits, by the way -- that behavior does not establish the bona fides for real expertise. If anything, it establishes a disregard for the community it endangers.)
More importantly, people who demonstrate a questionable level of trustworthiness and judgement at any point by committing criminal acts present a risk later on. Certainly it is possible that they will learn the error of their ways and reform. However, it is also the case that they may slip later and revert to their old ways. Putting some of them in situations of trust with access to items of value is almost certainly too much temptation. This has been established time and again in studies of criminals of all types, especially those who commit fraud. So, why would a prudent manager take a risk when better alternatives are available?
Even worse, circulating stories of criminals who end up as highly-paid consultants are counterproductive, even if they are rarely true. That is the kind of story that may tempt some without strong ethics to commit crimes as a shortcut to fame and riches. Additionally, it is insulting to the individuals who work hard, study intently, and maintain a high standard of conduct in their careers -- hiring criminals basically states that the honest, hardworking real experts are fools. Is that the message we really want to put forward?
Luckily, most responsible managers now understand, even if the press and general public don't, that criminals are simply that -- criminals. They may have served their sentences, which now makes them former criminals...but not innocent. Pursuing criminal activity is not -- and should not be -- a job qualification or career path in civilized society. There are many, many historical examples we can turn to for examples, including those of hiring pirates as privateers and train robbers as train guards. Some took the opportunity to go straight, but the instances of those who abused trust and made off with what they were protecting illustrate that it is a big risk to take. It also is something we have learned to avoid. We are long past the point where those of us in computing should get with the program.
So, what of the argument that there aren't enough real experts, or they cost too much to hire? Well, what is their real value? If society wants highly-trained and trustworthy people to work in security, then society needs to devote more resources to support the development of curriculum and professional standards. And it needs to provide reasonable salaries to those people, both to encourage and reward their behavior and expertise. We're seeing more of that now than a dozen years ago, but it is still the case that too many managers (and government officials) want security on the cheap, and then act surprised when they get hacked. I suppose they also buy their Rolex and Breitling watches for $50 from some guy in a parking lot and then act surprised and violated when the watch stops a week later. What were they really expecting?
Fun with Internet Video
[tags]network crime, internet video, extortion, streaming video[/tags]
Here's an interesting story about what people can do if they gain access to streaming video at a poorly-protected site. If someone on the other end of the phone is really convincing, what could she get the victims to do?
FBI: Strip Or Get Bombed Threat Spreads - Local News Story - KPHO Phoenix:
Items In the news
[tags]news, cell phones, reports, security vulnerabilities, hacking, computer crime, research priorities, forensics, wiretaps[/tags]
The Greek Cell Phone Incident
A great story involving computers and software, even though the main hack was against cell phones:
IEEE Spectrum: The Athens Affair. From this we can learn all sorts of lessons about how to conduct a forensic investigation, retention of logs, wiretapping of phones, and more.
Now, imagine VoIP and 802.11 networking and vulnerabilities in routers and.... -- the possibilities get even more interesting. I suspect that there's a lot more eavesdropping going on than most of us imagine, and certainly more than we discover.
NRC Report Released
Last week, the National Research Council announced the release of a new report: Towards a Safer and More Secure Cyberspace. The report is notable in a number of ways, and should be read carefully by anyone interested in cyber security. I think the authors did a great job with the material, and they listened to input from many sources.
There are 2 items I specifically wish to note:
- I really dislike the “Cyber Security Bill of Rights” listed in the report. It isn't that I dislike the goals they represent -- those are great. The problem is that I dislike the “bill of rights” notion attached to them. After all, who says they are “rights”? By what provenance are they granted? And to what extremes do we do to enforce them? I believe the goals are sound, and we should definitely work towards them, but let's not call them “rights.”
- Check out Appendix B. Note all the other studies that have been done in recent years pointing out that we are in for greater and greater problems unless we start making some changes. I've been involved with several of those efforts as an author -- including the PITAC report, the Infosec Research Council Hard Problems list, and the CRA Grand Challenges. Maybe the fact that I had no hand in authoring this report means it will be taken seriously, unlike all the rest. :-) More to the point, people who put off the pain and expense of trying to fix things because “Nothing really terrible has happened yet” do not understand history, human nature, or the increasing drag on the economy and privacy from current problems. The trends are fairly clear in this report: things are not getting better.
Evolution of Computer Crime
Speaking of my alleged expertise at augury, I noted something in the news recently that confirmed a prediction I made nearly 8 years ago at a couple of invited talks: that online criminals would begin to compete for “turf.” The evolution of online crime is such that the “neighborhood” where criminals operate overlaps with others. If you want the exclusive racket on phishing, DDOS extortion, and other such criminal behavior, you need to eliminate (or absorb) the competition in your neighborhood. But what does that imply when your “turf” is the world-wide Internet?
The next step is seeing some of this spill over into the physical world. Some of the criminal element online is backed up by more traditional organized crime in “meat space.” They will have no compunction about threatening -- or disabling -- the competition if they locate them in the real world. And they may well do that because they also have developed sources inside law enforcement agencies and they have financial resources at their disposal. I haven't seen this reported in the news (yet), but I imagine it happening within the next 2-3 years.
Of course, 8 years ago, most of my audiences didn't believe that we'd see significant crime on the net -- they didn't see the possibility. They were more worried about casual hacking and virus writing. As I said above, however, one only needs to study human nature and history, and the inevitability of some things becomes clear, even if the mechanisms aren't yet apparent.
The Irony Department
GAO reported a little over a week ago that DHS had over 800 attacks on their computers in two years. I note that the report is of detected attacks. I had one top person in DC (who will remain nameless) refer to DHS as “A train wreck crossed with a nightmare, run by inexperienced political hacks” when referring to things like TSA, the DHS cyber operations, and other notable problems. For years I (and many others) have been telling people in government that they need to set an example for the rest of the country when it comes to cyber security. It seems they've been listening, and we've been negligent. From now on, we need to stress that they need to set a good example.
[posted with ecto]
Diversity
[tags]diversity, complexity, monocultures[/tags]
In my last post, I wrote about the problems brought about by complexity. Clearly, one should not take the mantra of “simplification” too far, and end up with a situation where everything is uniform, simple, and (perhaps) inefficient. In particular, simplification shouldn't be taken to the point where diversity is sacrificed for simple uniformity.
Nature penalizes monocultures in biological systems. Monocultures are devastated by disease and predators because they have insufficient diversity to resist. The irish potato famine, the emerald ash borer, and the decimation of the Aztecs by smallpox are all examples of what happens when diversity is not present. Nature naturally promotes diversity to ensure a robust population.
We all practice diversity in our everyday lives. Diversity of motor vehicles, for instance supports fitness for purpose -- a Camero, is not useful for hauling dozens of large boxes of materials. For that, we use a truck. However, for one person to get from point A to point B in an economical fashion, a truck is not the best choice. It might be cheaper and require less training to use the same vehicle for everything, but there are advantages to diversity. Or tableware -- we have (perhaps) too many forks and spoon types in a formal placesetting, but try eating soup with a fork and you discover that some differentiation is useful!
In computing, competition has resulted in advances in hardware and software design. Choice among products has kept different approaches moving forward. Competition for research awards from DARPA and NSF has encouraged deeper thought and more focused proposals (and resultant development). Diversity in operating systems and programming languages brought many advancements in the era 1950-2000. However, expenses and attempts to cut staff have led to widespread homogenization of OS, applications, and languages over approximately the last decade.
Despite the many clear benefits of promoting diversity, too many organizations have adopted practices that prevent diversity of software and computing platforms. For example, the OMB/DoD Common Desktop initiative is one example where the government is steering personnel towards a monoculture that is more maintainable day-to-day, but which is probably more vulnerable to zero-day attacks and malware.
Disadvantages of homogeneity:
- greater susceptibility to zero-day vulnerabilities and attacks
- “box canyon” effect of being locked into a vendor for future releases
- reduced competition to improve quality
- reduced competition to reduce price and/or improve services
- reduced number of algorithms and approaches that may be explored
- reduced fitness for particular tasks
- simpler for adversaries to map and understand networks and computer use
- increased likelihood that users will install unauthorized software/hardware from outside sources
Advantages of homogeneity:
- larger volume for purchases
- only one form of tool, training, etc needed for support
- better chance of compatible upgrade path
- interchangeability of users and admins
- more opportunities for reuse of systems
Disadvantages of heterogeneity:
- more complexity so possibly more vulnerabilities
- may not be as interoperable
- may require more training to administer
- may not be reusable to the same extent as homogeneous systems
Advantages of heterogeneity:
- when at a sufficient level greater resistance to malware
- highly unlikely that all systems will be vulnerable to a single new attack
- increased competition among vendors to improve price, quality and performance
- greater choice of algorithms and tools for particular tasks
- more emphasis on standards for interoperability
- greater likelihood of customization and optimization for particular tasking
- greater capability for replacement systems if a vendor discontinues a product or support
Reviewing the above lists makes clear that entities concerned with self-continuation and operation will promote diversity, despite some extra expense and effort. The potential disadvantages of diversity are all things that can be countered with planning or budget. The downsides of monocultures, however, cannot be so easily addressed.
Dan Geer wrote an interesting article for Queue Magazine about diversity, recently. It is worth a read.
The simplified conclusion: diversity is good to have.


