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PHPSecInfo talk at OSCON 2008
If you're at OSCON, and you love security, you may or may not enjoy my talk on PHPSecInfo, a security auditing tool for the PHP environment. I'm actually going to try to show some new code, so if you've seen it before, you can see it again – for the first time.
The talk is at 1:45pm Thursday, 07/24/2008.
Virtualization Is Successful Because Operating Systems Are Weak
- Availability
- Minimized downtime for patching OSes and applications
- Restart a crashed OS or server
- Scalability
- More or different images as demand changes
- Isolation and compartmentalization
- Better hardware utilization
- Hardware abstraction for OSes
- Support legacy platforms
- Availability
- Minimized downtime for patching applications
- Restart crashed applications
- Scalability
- More or different processes as demand changes
- Isolation and compartmentalization
- Protected memory
- Accounts, capabilities
- Better hardware utilization (with processes)
- Hardware abstraction for applications
VMWare ESX Server runs its own OS with drivers. Xen and offerings based on it have a full, general purpose OS in domain 0, in control and command of the VMM (notwithstanding disaggregation). Microsoft's "Hyper-V" requires a full-blown Windows operating system to run it. So what we're doing is really exchanging an untrusted OS for another, that we should trust more for some reason. This other OS also needs patches, configuration and maintenance. Now we have multiple OSes to maintain! What did we gain? We don't trust OSes but we trust "virtualization" that depends on more OSes? At least ESX is "only" 50 MB, simpler and smaller than the others, but the number of defects/MB of binary code as measured by patches issued is not convincing.
I'm now not convinced that a virtualization solution + guest OS is significantly more secure or functional than just one well-designed OS could be, in theory. Defense in depth is good, but the extent of the spread of virtualization may be an admission that we don't trust operating systems enough to let them stand on their own. The practice of wiping and reinstalling an OS after an application or an account is compromised, or deploying a new image by default suggests that there is little trust in the depth provided by current OSes.
As for ease of management and availability vs patching, I don't see why operating systems would be unable to be managed in a smart manner just like ESX is, migrating applications as necessary. ESX is an operating system anyway... I believe that all the special things that a virtualization solution does for functionality and security, as well as the "new" opportunities being researched, could be done as well by a trustworthy, properly designed OS; there may be a thesis or two in figuring out how to implement them back in an operating system.
What virtualization vendors are really doing is a clever way to smoothly replace one operating system with another. This may be how an OS monopoly could be dislodged, and perhaps would explain the virtualization-unfriendly clauses in the licensing options for Vista: virtualization could become a threat to the dominance of Windows, if application developers started coding for the underlying OS instead of the guest. Of course, even with a better OS we'd still need virtualization for testbeds like ReAssure, and for legacy applications. Perhaps ReAssure could help test new, better operating systems.
(This text is the essence of my presentation in the panel on virtualization at the 2008 CERIAS symposium).
Related reading:
Heiser G et al. (2007) Towards trustworthy computing systems: Taking microkernels to the next level. ACM Operating Systems Review, 41
Tanenbaum AS, Herder JN and Bos H (2006) Can we make operating systems reliable and secure? Computer, 39
Another Round on Passwords
[tags]passwords, security practices[/tags]
The EDUCAUSE security mailing list has yet (another) discussion on password policies. I've blogged about this general issue several times in the past, but maybe it is worth revisiting.
Someone on the list wrote:
Here is my question - does anyone have the data on how many times a hack (attack) has occurred associated to breaking the “launch codes” from outside of the organization? The last information I gleaned from the FBI reports (several years ago) indicated that 70 percent of hackings (attacks) were internal.
My most recent experience with intrusions has had nothing to do with a compromised password, rather an exploit of some vunerability in the OS, database, or application.
I replied:
I track these things, and I cannot recall the last time I saw any report of an incident caused by a guessed password. Most common incidents are phishing, trojans, snooping, physical theft of sensitive media, and remote exploitation of bugs.
People devote huge amounts of effort to passwords because it is one of the few things they think they can control.
Picking stronger passwords won't stop phishing. It won't stop users downloading trojans. It won't stop capture of sensitive transmissions. It won't bring back a stolen laptop (although if the laptop has proper encryption it *might* protect the data). And passwords won't ensure that patches are in place but flaws aren't.
Creating and forcing strong password policies is akin to being the bosun ensuring that everyone on the Titanic has locked their staterooms before they abandon ship. It doesn't stop the ship from sinking or save any lives, but it sure does make him look like he's doing something important.....
That isn't to say that we should be cavalier about setting passwords. It is important to try to set strong passwords, but once reasonably good ones are set in most environments the attacks are going to come from other places -- password sniffing, exploitation of bugs in the software, and implantation of trojan software.
As a field, we spend waaaaay too much time and resources on palliative measures rather than fundamental cures. In most cases, fiddling with password rules is a prime example. A few weeks ago, I blogged about a related issue.
Security should be based on sound risk assessment, and in most environments weak passwords don't present the most significant risk.
What did you really expect?
[tags]reformed hackers[/tags]
A news story that hit the wires last week was that someone with a history of breaking into systems, who had “reformed” and acted as a security consultant, was arrested for new criminal behavior. The press and blogosphere seemed to treat this as surprising. They shouldn't have.
I have been speaking and writing for nearly two decades on this general issue, as have others (William Hugh Murray, a pioneer and thought leader in security, is one who comes to mind). Firms that hire “reformed” hackers to audit or guard their systems are not acting prudently any more than if they hired a “reformed” pedophile to babysit their kids. First of all, the ability to hack into a system involves a skill set that is not identical to that required to design a secure system or to perform an audit. Considering how weak many systems are, and how many attack tools are available, “hackers” have not necessarily been particularly skilled. (The same is true of “experts” who discover attacks and weaknesses in existing systems and then publish exploits, by the way -- that behavior does not establish the bona fides for real expertise. If anything, it establishes a disregard for the community it endangers.)
More importantly, people who demonstrate a questionable level of trustworthiness and judgement at any point by committing criminal acts present a risk later on. Certainly it is possible that they will learn the error of their ways and reform. However, it is also the case that they may slip later and revert to their old ways. Putting some of them in situations of trust with access to items of value is almost certainly too much temptation. This has been established time and again in studies of criminals of all types, especially those who commit fraud. So, why would a prudent manager take a risk when better alternatives are available?
Even worse, circulating stories of criminals who end up as highly-paid consultants are counterproductive, even if they are rarely true. That is the kind of story that may tempt some without strong ethics to commit crimes as a shortcut to fame and riches. Additionally, it is insulting to the individuals who work hard, study intently, and maintain a high standard of conduct in their careers -- hiring criminals basically states that the honest, hardworking real experts are fools. Is that the message we really want to put forward?
Luckily, most responsible managers now understand, even if the press and general public don't, that criminals are simply that -- criminals. They may have served their sentences, which now makes them former criminals...but not innocent. Pursuing criminal activity is not -- and should not be -- a job qualification or career path in civilized society. There are many, many historical examples we can turn to for examples, including those of hiring pirates as privateers and train robbers as train guards. Some took the opportunity to go straight, but the instances of those who abused trust and made off with what they were protecting illustrate that it is a big risk to take. It also is something we have learned to avoid. We are long past the point where those of us in computing should get with the program.
So, what of the argument that there aren't enough real experts, or they cost too much to hire? Well, what is their real value? If society wants highly-trained and trustworthy people to work in security, then society needs to devote more resources to support the development of curriculum and professional standards. And it needs to provide reasonable salaries to those people, both to encourage and reward their behavior and expertise. We're seeing more of that now than a dozen years ago, but it is still the case that too many managers (and government officials) want security on the cheap, and then act surprised when they get hacked. I suppose they also buy their Rolex and Breitling watches for $50 from some guy in a parking lot and then act surprised and violated when the watch stops a week later. What were they really expecting?
Fun with Internet Video
[tags]network crime, internet video, extortion, streaming video[/tags]
Here's an interesting story about what people can do if they gain access to streaming video at a poorly-protected site. If someone on the other end of the phone is really convincing, what could she get the victims to do?
FBI: Strip Or Get Bombed Threat Spreads - Local News Story - KPHO Phoenix:



