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Do Open Source Devs Get Web App Security? Does Anybody?
A colleague of mine who is dealing with Plone, a CMS system built atop Zope, pointed me to a rather disturbing document in the Plone Documentation system, one that I feel is indicative of a much larger problem in the web app dev community.
The first describes a hole (subsequently patched) in Plone that allowed users to upload arbitrary JavaScript. Apparently no input or output filtering was being done. Certainly anyone familiar with XSS attacks can see the potential for stealing cookie data, but the article seems to imply this is simply a spam issue:
Is this a security hole? No. This is somebody logging in to your site (if you allow them to create their own users) and adding content that can redirect people to a different web site. Your server, site and content security is not compromised in any way. It's just a slightly more sophisticated version of comment spam. If you open up your site to untrusted users, there will always be a certain risk that people add content that is not approved. It's annoying, but it's not a security hole.
Well, yes, actually, it is a security hole. If one can place JavaScript on your site that redirects the user to another page, they can certainly place JavaScript on your site that grabs a user's cookie data and redirects that to another site. Whether or not they'll get something useful from the data varies from app to app, of course. What's worrisome is that it appears as if one of Plone's founders (the byline on this document is for Alexander Limi, whose user page describes him as “one of Plone's original founders.”) doesn't seem to think this is a security issue. After getting feedback from Alexander Limi, it seems clear that he does understand the user-level security implications of the vulnerability, but was trying to make the distinction that there was no security risk to the Plone site itself. Still, the language of the document is (unintentionally) misleading, and it's very reminiscent of the kinds of misunderstandings and excuses I see all the time in open-source web app development.
The point here is (believe it or not) not to pick on Plone. This is a problem prevalent in most open source development (and in closed source dev, from my experience). People who simply shouldn't be doing coding are doing the coding -- and the implementation and maintenance.
Let's be blunt: A web developer is not qualified to do the job if he or she does not have a good understanding of web application security concepts and techniques. Leaders of development teams must stop allowing developers who are weak on security techniques to contribute to their products, and managers need to stop hiring candidates who do not demonstrate a solid secure programming background. If they continue to do so, they demonstrate a lack of concern for the safety of their customers.
Educational initiatives must be stepped up to address this, both on the traditional academic level and in continuing education/training programs. Students in web development curriculums at the undergrad level need to be taught the importance of security and effective secure programming techniques. Developers in the workforce today need to have access to materials and programs that will do the same. And the managerial level needs to be brought up to speed on what to look for in the developers they hire, so that under-qualifed and unqualified developers are no longer the norm on most web dev teams.
Vulnerability disclosure grace period needs to be short, too short for patches
| Grace Period | Probability |
|---|---|
| 1 month | 0.9998 |
| 1 week | 0.37 |
| 1 day | 0.01 |
Let's assume that in any given year, there are twice as many vulnerabilities to be found than there are reported vulnerabilities. If we make N = 2X and fix the grace period to one week, what was the probability of collision in different years? The formula becomes 1- exp(-(X/52(X/52-1))/4X), where we take the ceiling of X/52.
| Year | Vulnerabilities Reported | Probability |
|---|---|---|
| 1988-1996 | 0 | |
| 1997 | 252 | 0.02 |
| 1998 | 246 | 0.02 |
| 1999 | 918 | 0.08 |
| 2000 | 1018 | 0.09 |
| 2001 | 1672 | 0.15 |
| 2002 | 1959 | 0.16 |
| 2003 | 1281 | 0.11 |
| 2004 | 2363 | 0.20 |
| 2005 | 4876 | 0.36 |
| 2006 | 6560 | 0.46 |
In any case, we can't afford, as a matter of national and international cyber-security, to let vendors idly waste time before producing patches; vendors need to take responsibility, even if the vulnerability is not publicly known. This exercise also illustrates why a patch-it-later attitude could have seemed almost excusable years ago, but not now. These figures are a serious problem for managing security with patches, as opposed to secure coding from the start: I believe that it is not feasible anymore for traditional software development processes to issue patches before the threat of malicious disclosure and exploits becomes significant. Finally, the grace period that we can afford to give vendors may be too short for them to issue patches, but that doesn't mean it should be zero. Note: the astute reader will remark that the above statistics is for any two vulnerabilities to match, whereas for patching we are talking about a specific vulnerability being discovered independently. The odds of that specific ocurrence are much smaller. However, we need to consider all vulnerabilities in a systematic management by patches, which reverts to the above calculations.
Security Vigilantes Becoming Small-Time Terrorists
A few comments on errors
Reporting Vulnerabilities is for the Brave
- If you find strange behaviors that may indicate that a web site is vulnerable, don't try to confirm if it's actually vulnerable.
- Try to avoid using that system as much as is reasonable.
- Don't tell anyone (including me), don't try to impress anyone, don't brag that you're smart because you found an issue, and don't make innuendos. However much I wish I could, I can't keep your anonymity and protect you from police questioning (where you may incriminate yourself), a police investigation gone awry and miscarriages of justice. We all want to do the right thing, and help people we perceive as in danger. However, you shouldn't help when it puts you at the same or greater risk. The risk of being accused of felonies and having to defend yourself in court (as if you had the money to hire a lawyer -- you're a student!) is just too high. Moreover, this is a web site, an application; real people are not in physical danger. Forget about it.
- Delete any evidence that you knew about this problem. You are not responsible for that web site, it's not your problem -- you have no reason to keep any such evidence. Go on with your life.
- If you decide to report it against my advice, don't tell or ask me anything about it. I've exhausted my limited pool of bravery -- as other people would put it, I've experienced a chilling effect. Despite the possible benefits to the university and society at large, I'm intimidated by the possible consequences to my career, bank account and sanity. I agree with HD Moore, as far as production web sites are concerned: "There is no way to report a vulnerability safely".
Edit (5/24/06): Most of the comments below are interesting, and I'm glad you took the time to respond. After an email exchange with CERT/CC, I believe that they can genuinely help by shielding you from having to answer questions from and directly deal with law enforcement, as well as from the pressures of an employer. There is a limit to the protection that they can provide, and past that limit you may be in trouble, but it is a valuable service.


