Posts in General
Page Content
Passing of a Pioneer
On November 18, 2007, noted computer pioneer James P. Anderson, Jr., died at his home in Pennsylvania. Jim, 77, had finally retired in August.
Jim, born in Easton, Pennsylvania, graduated from Penn State with a degree in Meteorology. From 1953 to 1956 he served in the U.S. Navy as a Gunnery Officer and later as a Radio Officer. This later service sparked his initial interest in cryptography and information security.
Jim was unaware in 1956, when he took his first job at Univac Corporation, that his career in computers had begun. Hired by John Mauchly to program meteorological data, Dr. Mauchly soon became a family friend and mentor. In 1959, Jim went to Burroughs Corporation as manager of the Advanced Systems Technology Department in the Research Division, where he explored issues of compilation, parallel computing, and computer security. While there, he conceived of and was one of the patent holders of one of the first multiprocessor systems, the D-825. After being manager of Systems Development at Auerbach Corporation from 1964 to 1966, Jim formed an independent consulting firm, James P. Anderson Company, which he maintained until his retirement.
Jim's contributions to information security involved both the abstract and the practical. He is generally credited with the invention and explication of the reference monitor (in 1972) and audit trail-based intrusion detection (in 1980). He was involved in many broad studies in information security needs and vulnerabilities. This included participation on the 1968 Defense Science Board Task Force on Computer Security that produced the "Ware Report", defining the technical challenges of computer security. He was then the deputy chair and editor of a follow-on report to the U.S. Air Force in 1972. That report, widely known as "The Anderson Report", defined the research agenda in information security for well over a decade. Jim was also deeply involved in the development of a number of other seminal standards, policies and over 200 reports including BLACKER, the TCSEC (aka "The Orange Book"), TNI, and other documents in "The Rainbow Series".
Jim consulted for major corporations and government agencies, conducting reviews of security policy and practice. He had long- standing consulting arrangements with computer companies, defense and intelligence agencies and telecommunication firms. He was a mentor and advisor to many in the community who went on to prominence in the field of cyber security. Jim is well remembered for his very practical and straightforward analyses, especially in his insights about how operational security lapses could negate strong computing safeguards, and about the poor quality design and coding of most software products.
Jim eschewed public recognition of his many accomplishments, preferring that his work speak for itself. His accomplishments have long been known within the community, and in 1990 he was honored with the NIST/NCSC (NSA) National Computer Systems Security Award, generally considered the most prestigious award in the field. In his acceptance remarks Jim observed that success in computer security design would be when its results were used with equal ease and confidence by average people as well as security professionals - a state we have yet to achieve.
Jim had broad interests, deep concerns, great insight and a rare willingness to operate out of the spotlight. His sense of humor and patience with those earnestly seeking knowledge were greatly admired, as were his candid responses to the clueless and self-important.
With the passing of Jim Anderson the community has lost a friend, mentor and colleague, and the field of cyber security has lost one of its founding fathers.
Jim is survived by his wife, Patty, his son Jay, daughter Beth and three grandchildren. In lieu of other recognition, people may make donations to their favorite charities in memory of Jim.
[Update 01/03/2008 from Peter Denning:]
I noted a comment that Jim is credited with the reference monitor. He told me once that he credits that to a paper I wrote with Scott Graham for the 1972 SJCC and said that paper was the first he'd seen using the actual term. I told him that I got the concept (not the term) from Jack Dennis at MIT. Jack probably got it from the ongoing Project MAC discussions. Where it came from before that, I do not know. It might be better to say that Jim recognized the fundamental importance of reference monitor for computer security practice and stumped endlessly for its adoption.
Computer Security Outlook
- An increasing level and sophistication of nation-state sponsored espionage and (some) sabotage.
- An increasing sophistication in criminal threats to individuals and businesses
- An increasing market for exploits and attack methods
[posted with ecto]
Another Round on Passwords
[tags]passwords, security practices[/tags]
The EDUCAUSE security mailing list has yet (another) discussion on password policies. I've blogged about this general issue several times in the past, but maybe it is worth revisiting.
Someone on the list wrote:
Here is my question - does anyone have the data on how many times a hack (attack) has occurred associated to breaking the “launch codes” from outside of the organization? The last information I gleaned from the FBI reports (several years ago) indicated that 70 percent of hackings (attacks) were internal.
My most recent experience with intrusions has had nothing to do with a compromised password, rather an exploit of some vunerability in the OS, database, or application.
I replied:
I track these things, and I cannot recall the last time I saw any report of an incident caused by a guessed password. Most common incidents are phishing, trojans, snooping, physical theft of sensitive media, and remote exploitation of bugs.
People devote huge amounts of effort to passwords because it is one of the few things they think they can control.
Picking stronger passwords won't stop phishing. It won't stop users downloading trojans. It won't stop capture of sensitive transmissions. It won't bring back a stolen laptop (although if the laptop has proper encryption it *might* protect the data). And passwords won't ensure that patches are in place but flaws aren't.
Creating and forcing strong password policies is akin to being the bosun ensuring that everyone on the Titanic has locked their staterooms before they abandon ship. It doesn't stop the ship from sinking or save any lives, but it sure does make him look like he's doing something important.....
That isn't to say that we should be cavalier about setting passwords. It is important to try to set strong passwords, but once reasonably good ones are set in most environments the attacks are going to come from other places -- password sniffing, exploitation of bugs in the software, and implantation of trojan software.
As a field, we spend waaaaay too much time and resources on palliative measures rather than fundamental cures. In most cases, fiddling with password rules is a prime example. A few weeks ago, I blogged about a related issue.
Security should be based on sound risk assessment, and in most environments weak passwords don't present the most significant risk.
Gazing in the Crystal Ball
[tags]future technology, cyber security predictions, malware, bots, privacy, cyber crime[/tags]
Four times in the last month I have been contacted by people asking my predictions for future cyber security threats and protections. One of those instances will be as I serve on a panel at the Information Security Decisions Conference in Chicago next week; we'll be talking about the future of infosec.
Another instance when I was contacted was by the people at Information Security magazine for their upcoming 10th anniversary issue. I was interviewed back in 2002, and my comments were summarized in a “crystal ball” article. Some of those predictions were more like trend predictions, but I think I did pretty well. Most happened, and a couple may yet come to pass (I didn't say they would all happen in 5 years!). I had a conversation with one of the reporters for the Nov 2007 issue, and provided some more observations looking forward.
After answering several of these requests, I thought it might be worthwhile to validate my views. So, I wrote up a list of things I see happening in security as we go forward. Then I polled (what I thought) was a small set of colleagues; thru an accident of mail aliases, a larger group of experts got my query. (The mailer issue may be fodder for a future blog post.) I got about 20 thoughtful replies from some real experts and deep thinkers in the field.
What was interesting is that while reading the replies, I found only a few minor differences from what I had already written! Either that means I have a pretty good view of what's coming, or else the people I asked are all suffering under the same delusions.
Of course, none of us made predictions as are found in supermarket tabloids, along the lines of “Dick Cheney will hack into computers running unpatched Windows XP at the Vatican in February in an attempt to impress Britney Spears.” Although we might generate some specific predictions like that, I don't think our crystal balls have quite the necessary resolution. Plus, I'm sure the Veep's plans along those lines are classified, and we might end up in Gitmo for revealing them. Nonetheless, I'd like to predict that I will win the Powerball Lottery, but will be delayed collecting the payout because Adriana Lima has become so infatuated with me, she has abducted me. Yes, I'd like to predict that, but I think the Cheney prediction might be more likely....
But seriously, here are some of my predictions/observations of where we're headed with cyber security. (I'm not going to name the people who responded to my poll, because when I polled them I said nothing about attributing their views in public; I value my friends' privacy as much or more than their insights! However, my thanks again to those who responded.)
If all of these seem obvious to you, then you are probably working in cyber security or have your own crystal ball.
Threats
Expect attack software to be the dominant threat in the coming few years. As a trend, we will continue to see fewer overt viruses and worm programs as attacks, but continuing threats that hijack machines with bots, trojans, and browser subversion. Threats that self-modify to avoid detection, and threats that attack back against defenders will make the situation even more challenging. It will eventually be too difficult to tell if a system is compromised and disinfect it -- the standard protocol will be to reformat and reinstall upon any question.
Spam, pop-up ads, and further related advertising abuses will grow worse (as difficult as that is to believe), and will continue to mask more serious threats. The ties between spam and malware will increase. Organized crime will become more heavily involved in both because of the money to be made coupled with the low probability of prosecution.
Extortion based on threats to integrity, availability, or exposure of information will become more common as systems are invaded and controlled remotely. Extortion of government entities may be threatened based on potential attacks against infrastructure controls. These kinds of losses will infrequently be revealed to the public.
Theft of proprietary information will increase as a lucrative criminal activity. Particularly targeted will be trade secret formulations and designs, customer lists, and supply chain details. The insider threat will grow here, too.
Expect attacks against governmental systems, and especially law enforcement systems, as criminals seek to remove or damage information about themselves and their activities.
Protections
Fads will continue and will seem useful to early adopters, but as greater roll-out occurs, deficiencies will be found that will make them less effective -- or possibly even worse than what they replace. Examples include overconfident use of biometrics and over-reliance on virtualization to protect systems. Mistaken reliance on encryption as a solution will also be a repeated theme.
We will continue to see huge expenditures on R&D to retrofit security onto fundamentally broken technologies rather than on re-engineering systems according to sound security principles. Governments and many companies will continue to stress the search for “new” ideas without adequately applying older, proven techniques that might be somewhat inconvenient even though effective.
There will be continued development of protection technologies out of proportion to technologies that will enable us to identify and punish the criminals. It will be a while before the majority of people catch on that passive defense alone is not enough and begin to appropriately capitalize investigation and law enforcement. We will see more investment in scattered private actions well before we see governments stepping up.
White-listing and integrity management solutions will become widely used by informed security professionals as they become aware of how impossible it is to detect all bad software and behavior (blacklisting). Meanwhile, because of increasing stealth and sophistication of attacks, many victims will not realize that their traditional IDS/anti-virus solutions based on blacklists have failed to protect them.
White-listing will also obviate the competition among some vendors to buy vulnerabilities, and solve the difficulty of identifying zero-day attacks, because it is not designed to trigger on those items. However, it may be slow to be adopted because so much has been invested in traditional blacklist technologies: firewalls, IDS/NIDS/IPS, antivirus, etc.
Greater emphasis will be placed on positive identity management, both online and in the physical world. Coupled with access control, this will provide some solutions but further erode privacy. Thus, it is uncertain how widely these technologies will be embraced. TSA and too much of the general public will still believe that showing a picture ID somehow improves security, so the way ahead in authentication/identification is uncertain.
Personnel
We will continue to see more people using sensitive systems, but not enough people trained in cyber protection. This will continue some current trends such as people with questionable qualifications calling themselves “experts,” and more pressure for certifications and qualifications to demonstrate competence (and more promotion of questionable certifications to meet that need).
Many nations will face difficulties finding appropriately educated and vetted experts who are also capable of getting national-level clearances. Industry may also find it difficult to find enough trained individuals without criminal records, which will lead to greater reliance on outsourcing. It will also mean that we will continue to see instances where poorly-informed individuals mistakenly think that single technologies will solve all all their problems -- with firewalls and encryption being two prime examples.
Personnel for after-the-fact investigations (both law enforcement and civil) will be in high demand and short supply.
Much greater emphasis needs to be placed on educating the end-user population about security and privacy, but this will not receive sufficient support or attention.
The insider threat will become more pronounced because systems are mostly still being designed and deployed with perimeter defenses.
Milieu
Crime, identity theft, and violations of privacy will increasingly become part of public consciousness. This will likely result in reduction of trust in on-line services. This may also negatively impact development of new services and products, but there will still be great adoption of new technologies despite their unknown risk models; VoIP is an example.
Some countries will become known as havens for computer criminals. International pressure will increase on those countries to become “team players” in catching the criminals. This will not work well in those countries where the government has financial ties to the criminals or has a political agenda in encouraging them. Watch for the first international action (financial embargo?) on this issue within the next five years.
We will see greater connectivity, more embedded systems, and less obvious perimeters. This will require a change in how we think about security (push it into the devices and away from network core, limit functionality), but the changes will be slow in coming. Advertisers and vendors will resist these changes because some of their revenue models would be negatively impacted.
Compliance rules and laws will drive some significant upgrades and changes, but not all will be appropriate as the technology changes. Some compliance requirements may actually expose organizations to attack. Related to compliance, the enforcement of external rights (e.g., copyright using DRM) will lead to greater complexity in systems, more legal wrangling, and increased user dissatisfaction with some IT products.
More will be spent in the US on DRM enforcement and attempts to restrict access to online pictures of naked people than is likely to be spent on cybersecurity research. More money will be spent by the US government ensuring that people don't take toothpaste in carry-on luggage on airplanes than will be spent on investigating and prosecuting computer fraud and violation of spam laws.
Government officials will continue to turn to industry for “expert advice” -- listening to the same people who have built multinational behemoths by marketing the unsafe products that got us into this mess already. (It's the same reason they consult the oil executives on how to solve global warming.) Not surprisingly, the recommendations will all be for strongly worded statements and encouragement, but not real change in behavior.
We will see growing realization that massive data stores, mirroring, RAID, backups and more mean that data never really goes away. This will be a boon to some law enforcement activities, a terrible burden for companies in civil lawsuits, and a continuing threat to individual privacy. It will also present a growing challenge to reconcile different versions of the same data in some meaningful way. Purposeful pollution of the data stores around the world will be conducted by some individuals to make the collected data so conflicted and ambiguous that it cannot be used.
Overall Bottom line: things are going to get worse before they get better, and it may be a while before things get better.
[posted with ecto]


