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[tags]news, cell phones, reports, security vulnerabilities, hacking, computer crime, research priorities, forensics, wiretaps[/tags]
The Greek Cell Phone Incident
A great story involving computers and software, even though the main hack was against cell phones:
IEEE Spectrum: The Athens Affair. From this we can learn all sorts of lessons about how to conduct a forensic investigation, retention of logs, wiretapping of phones, and more.
Now, imagine VoIP and 802.11 networking and vulnerabilities in routers and.... -- the possibilities get even more interesting. I suspect that there's a lot more eavesdropping going on than most of us imagine, and certainly more than we discover.
NRC Report Released
Last week, the National Research Council announced the release of a new report: Towards a Safer and More Secure Cyberspace. The report is notable in a number of ways, and should be read carefully by anyone interested in cyber security. I think the authors did a great job with the material, and they listened to input from many sources.
There are 2 items I specifically wish to note:
- I really dislike the “Cyber Security Bill of Rights” listed in the report. It isn't that I dislike the goals they represent -- those are great. The problem is that I dislike the “bill of rights” notion attached to them. After all, who says they are “rights”? By what provenance are they granted? And to what extremes do we do to enforce them? I believe the goals are sound, and we should definitely work towards them, but let's not call them “rights.”
- Check out Appendix B. Note all the other studies that have been done in recent years pointing out that we are in for greater and greater problems unless we start making some changes. I've been involved with several of those efforts as an author -- including the PITAC report, the Infosec Research Council Hard Problems list, and the CRA Grand Challenges. Maybe the fact that I had no hand in authoring this report means it will be taken seriously, unlike all the rest. :-) More to the point, people who put off the pain and expense of trying to fix things because “Nothing really terrible has happened yet” do not understand history, human nature, or the increasing drag on the economy and privacy from current problems. The trends are fairly clear in this report: things are not getting better.
Evolution of Computer Crime
Speaking of my alleged expertise at augury, I noted something in the news recently that confirmed a prediction I made nearly 8 years ago at a couple of invited talks: that online criminals would begin to compete for “turf.” The evolution of online crime is such that the “neighborhood” where criminals operate overlaps with others. If you want the exclusive racket on phishing, DDOS extortion, and other such criminal behavior, you need to eliminate (or absorb) the competition in your neighborhood. But what does that imply when your “turf” is the world-wide Internet?
The next step is seeing some of this spill over into the physical world. Some of the criminal element online is backed up by more traditional organized crime in “meat space.” They will have no compunction about threatening -- or disabling -- the competition if they locate them in the real world. And they may well do that because they also have developed sources inside law enforcement agencies and they have financial resources at their disposal. I haven't seen this reported in the news (yet), but I imagine it happening within the next 2-3 years.
Of course, 8 years ago, most of my audiences didn't believe that we'd see significant crime on the net -- they didn't see the possibility. They were more worried about casual hacking and virus writing. As I said above, however, one only needs to study human nature and history, and the inevitability of some things becomes clear, even if the mechanisms aren't yet apparent.
The Irony Department
GAO reported a little over a week ago that DHS had over 800 attacks on their computers in two years. I note that the report is of detected attacks. I had one top person in DC (who will remain nameless) refer to DHS as “A train wreck crossed with a nightmare, run by inexperienced political hacks” when referring to things like TSA, the DHS cyber operations, and other notable problems. For years I (and many others) have been telling people in government that they need to set an example for the rest of the country when it comes to cyber security. It seems they've been listening, and we've been negligent. From now on, we need to stress that they need to set a good example.
[posted with ecto]
End-to-end security
[tags]biometrics,USB,encryption,hacking[/tags]
One of our students who works in biometrics passed along two interesting article links. This article describes how a password-protected, supposedly very secure USB memory stick was almost trivially hacked. This second article by the same author describes how a USB stick protected by a biometric was also trivially hacked. I'm not in a position to recreate the procedure described on those pages, so I can't say for certain that the reality is as presented. (NB: simply because something is on the WWW doesn't mean it is true, accurate, or complete. The rumor earlier this week about a delay in the iPhone release is a good example.) However, the details certainly ring true.
We have a lot of people who are “security experts” or who are marketing security-related products who really don't understand what security is all about. Security is about reducing risk of untoward events in a given system. To make this work, one needs to actually understand all the risks, the likelihood of them occurring, and the resultant losses. Securing one component against obvious attacks is not sufficient. Furthermore, failing to think about relatively trivial physical attacks is a huge loophole -- theft, loss or damage of devices is simple, and the skills to disassemble something to get at the components inside is certainly not a restricted “black art.” Consider the rash of losses and thefts of disks (and enclosing laptops) we have seen over the last year or two, with this one being one of the most recent.
Good security takes into account people, events, environment, and the physical world. Poor security is usually easy to circumvent by attacking one of those avenues. Despite publicity to the contrary, not all security problems are caused by weak encryption and buffer overflows!
[posted with ecto]
Stuck in a Rut—Still
[tags]security marketplace, firewalls, IDS, security practices, RSA conference[/tags]
As I've written here before, I believe that most of what is being marketed for system security is misguided and less than sufficient. This has been the theme of several of my invited lectures over the last couple of years, too. Unless we come to realize that current “defenses” are really attempts to patch fundamentally faulty designs, we will continue to fail and suffer losses. Unfortunately, the business community is too fixated on the idea that there are quick fixes to really investigate (or support) the kinds of long-term, systemic R&D that is needed to really address the problems.
Thus, I found the RSA conference and exhibition earlier this month to be (again) discouraging this year. The speakers basically kept to a theme that (their) current solutions would work if they were consistently applied. The exhibition had hundreds of companies displaying wares that were often indistinguishable except for the color of their T-shirts -- anti-virus, firewalls (wireless or wired), authentication and access control, IDS/IPS, and vulnerability scanning. There were a couple of companies that had software testing tools, but only 3 of those, and none marketing suites of software engineering tools. A few companies had more novel solutions -- I was particular impressed by a few that I saw, such as the policy and measurement-based offerings by CoreTrace, ProofSpace, and SignaCert. (In the interest of full disclosure, SignaCert is based around one of my research ideas and I am an advisor to the company.) There were also a few companies with some slick packaging of older ideas (Yoggie being one such example) that still don't fix underlying problems, but that make it simpler to apply some of the older, known technologies.
I wasn't the only one who felt that RSA didn't have much new to offer this year, either.
When there is a vendor-oriented conference that has several companies marketing secure software development suites that other companies are using (not merely programs to find flaws in C and Java code), when there are booths dedicated to secured mini-OS systems for dedicated tasks, and when there are talks scheduled about how to think about limiting functionality of future offerings so as to minimize new threats, then I will have a sense that the market is beginning to move in the direction of maturity. Until then, there are too many companies selling snake oil and talismans -- and too many consumers who will continue to buy those solutions because they don't want to give up their comfortable but dangerous behaviors. And any “security” conference that has Bill Gates as keynote speaker -- renowned security expert that he is -- should be a clue about what is more important for the conference attendees: real security, or marketing.
Think I am too cynical? Watch the rush into VoIP technologies continue, and a few years from now look at the amount of phishing, fraud, extortion and voice-spam we will have over VoIP, and how the market will support VoIP-enabled versions of some of the same solutions that were in Moscone Center this year. Or count the number of people who will continue to mail around Word documents, despite the growing number of zero-day and unpatched exploits in Word. Or any of several dozen current and predictable dangers that aren't “glitches” -- they are the norm. if you really pay attention to what happens, then maybe you'll become cynical, too.
If not, there's always next year's RSA Conference.
VMworld 2006: Teaching (security) using virtual labs
OSCON 2006: Where’s the Security?
OSCON 2006 was a lot of fun for a lot of reasons, and was overall a very positive experience. There were a few things that bugged me, though.
I met a lot of cool people at OSCON. There are too many folks to list here without either getting really boring or forgetting someone, but I was happy to put a lot of faces to names and exchange ideas with some Very Smart People. The PHP Security Hoedown BOF that I moderated was especially good in that respect, I thought. There were also a lot of good sessions, especially Theo Schlossnagle's Big Bad PostgreSQL: A Case Study, Chris Shiflett's PHP Security Testing, and the PHP Lightning Talks ("PHP-Nuke is a honeypot" - thank you for the best quote of the convention, Zak Greant).
On the other hand, I was very surprised that the Security track at OSCON was almost nonexistent. There were four sessions and one tutorial, and for a 5-day event with lots of sessions going on at the same time, that seems like a really poor showing. The only other tracks that has security-related sessions were:
- Linux (including one shared with the Security track)
- PHP
- Business
- Databases
- Desktop Apps
- Emerging Topics
- Java
- JavaScript/Ajax
- Perl
- Products and Services
- Programming
- Python
- Ruby
- Web Apps
- Windows


