I am a big fan of the Monty Python troupe. Their silly take on several topics helped point out the absurd and pompous, and still do, but sometimes were simply lunatic in their own right.

One of their sketches, about a group of sailors stuck in a lifeboat came to mind as I was thinking about this post. The sketch starts (several times) with the line "Still no sign of land." The sketch then proceeds to a discussion of how they are so desperate that they may have to resort to cannibalism.

So why did that come to mind?

We still do not have a national Cyber Cheerleader in the Executive Office of the President. On May 29th, the President announced that he would appoint one – that cyber security was a national priority.

Three months later – nada.

Admittedly, there are other things going on: health care reform, a worsening insurgency problem in Afghanistan, hesitancy in the economic recovery, and yet more things going on that require attention from the White House. Still, cyber continues to be a problem area with huge issues. See some of the recent news to see that there is no shortage of problems – identity theft, cyber war questions, critical infrastructure vulnerability, supply chain issues, and more.

Rumor has it that several people have been approached for the Cheerleader position, but all have turned it down. This isn't overly surprising – the position has been set up as basically one where blame can be placed when something goes wrong rather than as a position to support real change. There is no budget authority, seniority, or leverage over Federal agencies where the problems occur, so there is no surprise that it is not wanted. Anyone qualified for a high-level position in this area should recognize what I described 20 years ago in "Spaf's First Law":

If you have responsibility for security but have no authority to set rules or punish violators, your own role in the organization is to take the blame when something big goes wrong.

I wonder how many false starts it will take before it is noticed that there is something wrong with the position if good people don't want it? And will that be enough to result in a change in the way the position is structured?

Meanwhile, we are losing good people from what senior leadership exists. Melissa Hathaway has resigned from the temporary position at the NSC from which she led the 60-day study, and Mischel Kwon has stepped down from leadership of US-CERT. Both were huge assets to the government and the public, and we have all lost as a result of their departure.

The crew of the lifeboat is dwindling. Gee, what next? Well, funny you should mention that.

Last week, I attended the "Cyber Leap Year Summit," which I have variously described to people who have asked as "An interesting chance to network" to "Two clowns short of a circus." (NB. I was there, so it was not three clowns short.)

The implied premise of the Summit, that bringing together a group of disparate academics and practitioners can somehow lead to a breakthrough is not a bad idea in itself. However, when you bring together far too many of them under a facilitation protocol that most of them have not heard of coupled with a forced schedule, it shouldn't be a surprise if the result in much other than some frustration. At least, that is what I heard from most of the participants I spoke with. It remains to be seen if the reporters from the various sections are able to glean something useful from the ideas that were so briefly discussed. (Trying to winnow "the best" idea from 40 suggestions given only 75 minutes and 40 type A personalities is not a fun time.)

There was also the question of "best" being brought together. In my session, there were people present who had no idea about basic security topics or history. Some of us made mention of well-known results or systems, and they went completely over the heads of the people present. Sometimes, they would point this out, and we lost time explaining. As the session progressed, the parties involved seemed to simply assume that if they hadn't heard about it, it couldn't be important, so they ignored the comments.

Here are three absurdities that seem particularly prominent to me about the whole event:

1. Using "game change" as the fundamental theme is counter-productive to the issue. Referring to cyber security and privacy protection as a "game" trivializes it, and if nothing substantial occurs, it suggests that we simply haven't won the "game" yet. But in truth, these problems are something fundamental to the functioning of society, the economy, national defense, and even the rule of law. We cannot afford to "not win" this. We should not trivialize it by calling it a "game."
2. Putting an arbitrary 60-90 day timeline on the proposed solutions exacerbates the problems. There was no interest in discussing the spectrum of solutions, but only talking about things that could be done right away. Unfortunately, this tends to result in people talking about more patches rather than looking at fundamental issues. It also means that potential solutions that require time (such as phasing in some product liability for bad software) are outside the scope of both discussion and consideration, and this continues to perpetuate the idea that quick fixes are somehow the solution.
3. Suggesting that all that is needed is for the government to sponsor some group-think, feel-good meeting to come up with solutions is inane. Some of us have been looking at the problem set for decades, and we know some of what is needed. It will take sustained effort and some sacrifice to make a difference. Other parts of the problem are going to require sustained investigation and data gathering. There is no political will for either. Some of the approaches were even brought up in our sessions; in the one I was in, which had many economists and people from industry, the ideas were basically voted down (or derided, contrary to the protocol of the meeting) and dropped. This is part of the issue: the parties most responsible for the problem do not want to bear any responsibility for the fixes.
   

I raised the first two issues as the first comments in the public Q&A session on Day 1. Aneesh Chopra, the Federal Chief Technology Officer (CTO), and Susan Alexander, the Chief Technology Officer for Information and Identity Assurance at DoD, were on the panel to which I addressed the questions. I was basically told not to ask those kinds of questions, and to sit down. although the response was phrased somewhat less forcefully than that. Afterwards, no less than 22 people told me that they wanted to ask the same questions (I started counting after #5). Clearly, I was not alone in questioning the formulation of the meeting.

Do I seem discouraged? A bit. I had hoped that we would see a little more careful thought involved. There were many government observers present, and in private, one-on-one discussions with them, it was clear they were equally discouraged with what they were hearing, although they couldn't state that publicly.

However, this is yet another in long line of meetings and reports with which I have had involvement, where the good results are ignored, and the "captains of industry and government" have focused on the wrong things. But by holding continuing workshops like this one, at least it appears that the government is doing something. If nothing comes of it, they can blame the participants in some way for not coming up with good enough ideas rather than take responsibility for not asking the right questions or being willing to accept answers that are difficult to execute.

Too cynical? Perhaps. But I will continue to participate because this is NOT a "game," and the consequences of continuing to fail are not something we want to face — even with "...white wine sauce with shallots, mushrooms and garlic."