Posts tagged mcafee

Page Content

Unsecured Economies, and Overly-secured Reports

The Report

Over the last few months, CERIAS faculty members Jackie Rees and Karthik Kannan have been busy analyzing data collected from IT executives around the world, and have been interviewing a variety of experts in cybercrime and corporate strategy. The results of their labors were published yesterday by the McAfee Corporation (a CERIAS Tier II partner) as the report Unsecured Economies: Protecting Vital Information.

The conclusions of the report are somewhat pessimistic about prospects for cyber security in the coming few years. The combination of economic pressures, weak efforts at law enforcement, international differences in perceptions of privacy and security, and the continuing challenges of providing secured computing are combining to place vast amounts of valuable intellectual property (IP) at risk. The report presents estimates that IP worth billions of dollars (US) was stolen or damaged last year, and we can only expect the losses to increase.

Additionally, the report details five general conclusions derived from the data:

  • The recession will put intellectual property at risk
  • There is considerable international variation in the commitment (management and resources) to protect cyber
  • Intellectual property is now an "international currency" that is as much a target as actual currency
  • Employees steal intellectual property for financial gain and competitive advantage
  • Geopolitical aspects present differing risk profiles for information stored "offshore" from "home" countries.

None of these should be a big surprise to anyone who has been watching the field or listening to those of us who are working in it. What is interesting about the report is the presented magnitude and distribution of the issues. This is the first truely global study of these issues, and thus provides an important step forward in understanding the scope of these issues.

I will repeat here some of what I wrote for the conclusion of the report; I have been saying these same things for many years, and the report simply underscores the importance of this advice:

“Information security has transformed from simply ’preventing bad things from happening ’into a fundamental business component.' C-level executives must recognize this change. This includes viewing cybersecurity as a critical business enabler rather than as a simple cost center that can be trimmed without obvious impact on the corporate bottom line; not all of the impact will be immediately and directly noticeable. In some cases, the only impact of degraded cybersecurity will be going from ‘Doing okay’ to ‘Completely ruined’ with no warning before the change.

Cybersecurity fills multiple roles in a company, and all are important for organizational health.

  • First, cybersecurity provides positive control over resources that provide the company a competitive advantage: intellectual property, customer information, trends and projections,financial and personnel records and so on. Poor security puts these resources at risk.
  • Second, good security provides executives with confidence that the data they are seeing is accurate and true, thus leading to sound decisions and appropriate compliance with regulation and policy
  • Third, strong cybersecurity supports businesses taking new risks and entering new markets with confidence in their ability to respond appropriately to change
  • And fourth, good cybersecurity is necessary to build and maintain a reputation for reliability and sound behavior, which in turn are necessary to attract and retain customers and partners.
  • This study clearly shows that some customers are unwilling to do business with entities they consider poorly secured. Given massive market failures, significant fraud and increasing threats of government oversight and regulation, companies with strong controls, transparent recordkeeping, agile infrastructures and sterling reputations are clearly at an advantage -- and strong cybersecurity is a fundamental component of all four. Executives who understand this will be able to employ cybersecurity as an organic element of company (and government) survival -- and growth.“

We are grateful to McAfee, Inc. for their support and assistance in putting this report together.

Getting the Report

Update: You can now download the report sans-registration from CERIAS.

Report cover The report is available at no charge and the PDF can be downloaded (click on the image of the report cover to the left, or here). Note that to download the report requires registration.

Some of you may be opposed to providing your contact information to obtain the report, especially as that information may be used in marketing. Personally, I believe that the registration should be optional. However, the McAfee corporation paid for the report, and they control the distribution.

As such, those of us at CERIAS will honor their decision.

However, I will observe that many other people object to these kinds of registration requirements (the NY Times is another notable example of a registration-required site). As a result, they have developed WWW applications, such as BugMeNot, which are freely available for others to use to bypass these requirements. Others respond to these requests by identifying company personnel from information on corporate sites and then using that information to register -- both to avoid giving out their own information and to add some noise to the data being collected.

None of us here at CERIAS are suggesting that you use one of the above-described methods. We do, however, encourage you to get the report, and to do so in an appropriate manner. We hope you will find it informative.

Computer Security Outlook

Recently, the McAfee Corporation released their latest Virtual Criminology Report.  Personnel from CERIAS helped provide some of the research for the report.
The report makes interesting reading, and you might want to download a copy.  You will have to register to get a copy, however (that’s McAfee, not CERIAS).

The editors concluded that there are 3 major trends in computer security and computer crime:

  1. An increasing level and sophistication of nation-state sponsored espionage and (some) sabotage.
  2. An increasing sophistication in criminal threats to individuals and businesses
  3. An increasing market for exploits and attack methods

Certainly, anyone following the news and listening to what we’ve been saying here will recognize these trends.  All are natural consequences of increased connectivity and increased presence of valued information and resources online, coupled with weak security and largely ineffectual law enforcement.  If value is present and there is little or no protection, and if there is also little risk of being caught and punished, then there is going to be a steady increase in system abuse.

I’ve posted links on my tumble log to a number of recent news articles on computer crime and espionage.  It’s clear that there is a lot of misuse occurring, and that we aren’t seeing it all.

[posted with ecto]

Thoughts on Virtualization, Security and Singularity

The “VMM Detection Myths and Realities” paper has been heavily reported and discussed before.  It considers whether a theoretical piece of software could detect if it is running inside a Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM).  An undetectable VMM would be “transparent”.  Many arguments are made against the practicality or the commercial viability of a VMM that could provide performance, stealth and reproducible, consistent timings.  The arguments are interesting and reasonably convincing that it is currently infeasible to absolutely guarantee undetectability. 

However, I note that the authors are arguing from essentially the same position as atheists arguing that there is no God.  They argue that the existence of a fully transparent VMM is unlikely, impractical or would require an absurd amount of resources, both physical and in software development efforts.  This is reasonable because the VMM has to fail only once in preventing detection and there are many ways in which it can fail, and preventing each kind of detection is complex.  However, this is not an hermetic, formal proof that it is impossible and cannot exist;  a new breakthrough technology or an “alien science-fiction” god-like technology might make it possible. 

Then the authors argue that with the spread of virtualization, it will become a moot point for malware to try to detect if it is running inside a virtual machine.  One might be tempted to remark, doesn’t this argument also work in the other way, making it a moot point for an operating system or a security tool to try to detect if it is running inside a malicious VMM? 

McAfee’s “secure virtualization”
The security seminar by George Heron answers some of the questions I was asking at last year’s VMworld conference, and elaborates on what I had in mind then.  The idea is to integrate security functions within the virtual machine monitor.  Malware nowadays prevents the installation of security tools and interferes with them as much as possible.  If malware is successfully confined inside a virtual machine, and the security tools are operating from outside that scope, this could make it impossible for an attacker to disable security tools.  I really like that idea. 
The security tools could reasonably expect to run directly on the hardware or with an unvirtualized host OS.  Because of this, VMM detection isn’t a moot point for the defender.  However, the presentation did not discuss whether the McAfee security suite would attempt to detect if the VMM itself had been virtualized by an attacker.  Also, would it be possible to detect a “bad” VMM if the McAfee security tools themselves run inside a virtualized environment on top of the “good” VMM?  Perhaps it would need more hooks into the VMM to do this.  Many, in fact, to attempt to catch any of all the possible ways in which a malicious VMM can fail to hide itself properly.  What is the cost of all these detection attempts, which must be executed regularly?  Aren’t they prohibitive, therefore making strong malicious VMM detection impractical?  In the end, I believe this may be yet another race depending on how much effort each side is willing to put into cloaking and detection.  Practical detection is almost as hard as practical hiding, and the detection cost has to be paid everywhere on every machine, all the time.

Which Singularity?
Microsoft’s Singularity project attempts to create an OS and execution environment that is secure by design and simpler.  What strikes me is how it resembles the “white list” approach I’ve been talking about.  “Singularity” is about constructing secure systems with statements (“manifests”) in a provable manner.  It states what processes do and what may happen, instead of focusing on what must not happen. 

Last year I thought that virtualization and security could provide a revolution;  now I think it’s more of the same “keep building defective systems and defend them vigorously”, just somewhat stronger.  Even if I find the name somewhat arrogant, “Singularity” suggests a future for security that is more attractive and fundamentally stable than yet another arms race.  In the meantime, though, “secure virtualization” should help, and expect lots of marketing about it.