Well, we’re all pretty beat from this year’s Symposium, but things went off pretty well. Along with lots of running around to make sure posters showed up and stuff, I was able to give a presentation called Web Application Security - The New Battlefront. People must like ridiculous titles like that, because turnout was pretty good. Anyway, I covered the current trend away from OS attacks/vandalism and towards application attacks for financial gain, which includes web apps. We went over the major types of attacks, and I introduced a brief summary of what I feel needs to be done in the education, tool development, and app auditing areas to improve the rather poor state of affairs. I’ll expand on these topics more in the future, but you can see my slides and watch the video for now:
Mozilla’s Firefox browser claims to provide a safer browsing experience out of the box, but some of the best security features of Firefox are only available as extensions. Here’s a roundup of some of the more useful ones I’ve found.
- Add n’ Edit Cookies This might be more of a web developer tool, but being able to view in detail the cookies that various sites set on your visits can be an eye-opening experience. This extension not only shows you all the details, but lets you modify them too. You’ll be surprised at how many web apps do foolish things like saving your password in the cookie.
- Dr. Web Anti-Virus Link Checker This is an interesting idea—scanning files for viruses before you download them. Basically, this extension adds an option to the link context menu that allows you to pass the link to the Dr. Web AV service. I haven’t rigorously tested this or anything, but it’s an interesting concept that could be part of an effective multilayer personal security model.
- FormFox This extension doesn’t do a whole lot, but what it does is important—showing a tooltip when you roll over a form submission button of the form action URL. Extending this further to visually differentiate submission buttons that submit to SSL URLs would be really nice (as suggested by Chris Shiflett).
- LiveHTTPHeaders & Header Monitor LiveHTTPHeaders is an incredibly useful too for web developers, displaying all of the header traffic between the client and server. Header Monitor is basically an add-on for LiveHTTPHeaders that displays a chosen header in Firefox’s status bar. They’re not really specifically security tools, but they do offer a lot of info on what’s really going on when you’re browsing, and an educated user is a safer user.
- ShowIP This is another tool that isn’t aimed at security per se, but offers a lot of useful information. ShowIP drops the IP address of the current site in your status bar. Clicking on it brings up a menu of lookup options for the IP, like whois and DNS info. You can add additional web lookups if you like, as well as passing the IP to a local program. Handy stuff.
- SpoofStick The idea with this extension is to make it easier to catch spoofing attempts by displaying a very large, brightly colored “You’re on ” in the toolbar. For folks who know what they’re doing this isn’t wildly useful, but it could be just the ticket for less savvy users. It requires a bit too much setup for them, though, and in the end I think this is something the browser itself should be handling.
- Tamper Data Much like LiveHTTPHeaders, Tamper Data is a very useful extension for web devs that lets the user view HTTP headers and POST data passed between the client and server. In addition, Tamper Data makes it easy for the user to alter the data being sent to the server, which is enormously useful for doing security testing against web apps. I also like how the data is presented in TD a bit better than LiveHTTPHeaders: it’s easier to see at a glance all of the traffic and get an overall feel of what’s going on, but you can still drill down and get as much detail as you like.
Got more Firefox security extensions? Leave a comment and I’ll collect them in an upcoming post.
This story at the NYT web site (registration might be required—it seems kind of random to me) about the prevalence of “piggybacking” on open wireless networks. Most of the article deals with the theft of bandwidth, although there are a couple quotes from David Cole of Symantec about other dangers of people getting into your LAN and accessing the Internet through it.Â Something that really struck me, though, was the following section about a woman who approached a man with a laptop camped outside her condo building:
When Ms. Ramirez asked the man what he was doing, he said he was stealing a wireless Internet connection because he did not have one at home. She was amused but later had an unsettling thought: “Oh my God. He could be stealing my signal.”
Yet some six months later, Ms. Ramirez still has not secured her network.
There are two problems highlighted here, I think:
- We haven’t done enough to make it clear why encrypting your wireless network is important.
- More importantly, wireless routers need to be secure out of the box.Â Users will not change their behavior unless the barrier for wireless network security is lowered as far as possible, and that includes shipping routers with:
- WPA encryption enabled
- a unique shared key
- a unique router admin password (the fact that millions of routers ship with the same default admin password is embarassing)
- a unique SSID
- SSID broadcast disabled
Think about it: if you purchased a car that came with non-functioning locks and keys, and it was your responsibility to get keys cut and locks programmed, would you be satisfied with purchase?Â Would it be realistic to expect most consumers to do this on their own?Â I think it’s not.Â But that’s what the manufacturers of consumer wireless equipment (and related products, like operating systems) ask of the average consumer. With expectations like that, is it really a surprise that most users choose not to bother, even when they know better?
As a web developer, Usability News from the Software Usability Research Lab at Wichita State is one of my favorite sites. Design for web apps can seem pretty arbitrary, but UN presents hard numbers to identify best practices, which comes in handy when you’re trying to explain to your boss why the search box shouldn’t be stuck at the bottom of the page (not that this has ever happened at CERIAS, mind you).
The Feb 2006 issue has lots of good bits, but particularly interesting from an infosec perspective are the results of a study on the gulf between what online users know about good password practice, and what they practice.
“It would seem to be a logical assumption that the practices and behaviors users engage in would be related to what they think they should do in order to create secure passwords. This does not seem to be the case as participants in the current study were able to identify many of the recommended practices, despite the fact that they did not use the practices themselves.”
Some interesting points from the study:
- More than half of users do not vary the complexity of passwords depending on the nature of the data it protects
- More than half of users never change passwords if the system does not force them to do so. Nearly 3/4 of the users stated that they should change their passwords every 3 to 6 months, though
- Half of users believe they should use “special” characters in their passwords (like “&” and “$”), but only 5% do so
Games refuse to install in unprivileged accounts, so they can run their own integrity checkers with spyware qualities with full privileges (e.g., WoW, but others do the same, e.g., Lineage II), that in turn can even deny you the capability to terminate (kill) the game if it hangs (e.g., Lineage II). This is done supposedly to prevent cheating, but allows the game companies full access and control of your machine, which is objectionable. On top of that those games are networked applications, meaning that any vulnerability in them could result in a complete (i.e., root, LocalSystem) compromise.
It is common knowledge that if a worm like MyTob compromises your system, you need to wipe the drive and reinstall everything. This is in part because these worms are so hard to remove, as they attack security software and will prevent firewalls and virus scanners from functioning properly. However there is also a trust issue—a rootkit could have been installed, so you can’t trust that computer anymore. So, if you do any sensitive work or are just afraid of losing your work in progress, you need a dedicated gaming or internet PC. Or do you?
After experiencing this, I am left to wonder, why aren’t all applications like a VMWare “appliance” image, and the operating system like VMWare player? They should be. Efforts to engineer software security have obviously failed to contain the growth of vulnerabilities and security problems. Applying the same solutions the same problems will keep resulting in failures. I’m not giving up on secure programming and secure software engineering, as I can see promising languages, development methods and technologies appearing, but at the same time I can’t trust my personal computers, and I need to compartmentalize by buying separate machines. This is expensive and inconvenient. Virtual machines provide us with an alternative. In the past, storing entire images of operating systems for each application was unthinkable. Nowadays, storage is so cheap and abundant that the size of “appliance” images is no longer an issue. It is time to virtualize the entire machine; all I now require from the base operating system is to manage a file system and be able to launch VMWare player, with at least a browser appliance to bootstrap… Well, not quite. Isolated appliances are not so useful; I want to be able to transfer documents from appliance to appliance. This is easily accomplished with a USB memory stick, or perhaps a virtual drive that I can mount when needed. This shared storage could become a new propagation vector for viruses, but it would be very limited in scope.
Virtual machine appliances, anyone?
Note (March13, 2006): Virtual machines can’t defend against cross-site scripting vulnerabilities (XSS), so they are not a solution for all security problems.
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