Survivable routing in wireless ad hoc networks
Cristina Nita-Rotaru - Purdue University
Jan 12, 2005Size: 220.5MB
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AbstractIn an ad hoc wireless network nodes not in direct range communicate
via intermediate nodes. Thus, a significant concern is the ability to
route in the presence of Byzantine failures which include nodes that
drop, fabricate, modify, replay, or mis-route packets in an attempt to
disrupt the routing service.
In this talk we will present ODSBR, our on-demand Byzantine resilient
routing protocol for ad hoc wireless networks. The protocol relies on
an adaptive probing technique that detects a malicious link after $log n$
faults have occurred, where $n$ is the length of the path. Problematic
links are avoided by using a weight-based mechanism that multiplicatively
increases their weights and by using an on-demand route discovery protocol
that finds a least weight path to the destination. Our protocol bounds the
amount of damage that an attacker or a group of colluding attackers can cause
to the network.
We demonstrate through simulation the effectiveness of ODSBR, in mitigating
Byzantine attacks. Our analysis of the impact of these attacks versus the
adversary's effort gives insights into their relative strengths, their
interaction and their importance when designing secure routing
Finally, we show how the technique used by ODSBR can be applied to hybrid
wireless networks consisting of cellular and ad hoc 802.11 wireless networks.
About the SpeakerCristina Nita-Rotaru is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Computer Sciences and a member of CERIAS (Center for Education and Research in Information Assurance and Security) at Purdue University. She conducts her research within the Dependable and Secure Distributed Systems Laboratory (DS2).
Her research interests lie in designing distributed systems, network protocols and applications that are dependable and secure, while maintaining acceptable levels of performance. Current research
* designing intrusion-tolerant architectures for distributed
services that scale to wide-area networks
* investigating survivable routing in wireless ad hoc networks
* providing access control mechanisms for secure group communication.
Her work is funded by the Center for Education and Research in Information Security and Assurance (CERIAS), by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and by the National Science Foundation (NSF).
Cristina Nita-Rotaru holds a Ph.D in Computer Science from Johns Hopkins University and a M Sc. from Politehnica University of Bucharest, Romania.
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