Detection and protection from denial of service attacks in grids by accountability agents
Wonjun Lee - Purdue University
Mar 03, 2010Size: 450.8MB
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AbstractBy exploiting existing vulnerabilities, malicious parties can take advantage of resources made available by grid systems to attack mission critical websites or the grid itself. In this paper, we present two approaches for protecting against attacks aiming at targets located outside or inside the grid. Our approach is based on special-purpose software agents, referred to as accountability agents that collect provenance and resource usage data in order to perform detection and protection. We show the effectiveness of our approach and the performance of the accountability agent based system by conducting various experiments on a grid-emulated testbed.
About the SpeakerI am a Ph.D candidate at School of Electrical & Computer Engineering. My research interests are in security issues related to authentication, authorization, accountability, and identity management in distributed computing systems such as grid, cloud. Currently I am working on the distributed denial of service attacks induced from grid resources, and the accountability policies. My research advisor is Professor Elisa Bertino in Computer Science. I am originally from South Korea.
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