Original Research Papers on all aspects of the Economics of Information Security are solicited for submission to the Fourth Workshop on the Economics of Information Security. Topics of interest include liability and other legal incentives, game theoretic models, economics of digital rights management, security in open source and free software, cyber-insurance, disaster recovery, trusted computing, reputation economics network effects in security and privacy, security in grid computing,  return on security investment, security and privacy in pervasive computing, risk management, risk perception, economics of trust, virus models, vulnerabilities and incentives, economics of malicious code,  identity including PKI, access control, economics of electronic voting security, and economic perspectives on spam.

We invite talks emphasizing economic theory, mathematical modeling, or legal theory.  Past notable work used the tools of economics to offer insights into computer security; offered mathematical models of computer security or economics; detailed potential regulatory solutions to computer security; or clarified the challenges of improving security as implemented in practice.

Important Dates:
Submissions due -  February 25
Notification of acceptance - March 11
Final papers due - April 8
Workshop June 2-4, 2005

For formats and submission instruction please visit: http://www.infosecon.net/workshop/index.html

Chair:
Jean Camp

Committee
Alessandro Acquisti (CMU)
Ross Anderson (Cambridge)
Huseyin Cavusoglu (Tulane)
Larry Gordon (UMD)
Marty Loeb (UMD)
Andrew Odlyzko (U Minnesota)
Stuart Schechter
Bruce Schneier (Counterpane)
Rahul Telang (CMU)
Hal Varian (UC Berkeley)