Back Channels Can Be Useful!- Layering Authentication Channels to Provide Covert Communication

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Author

Mohammed H. Almeshekah, Mikhail J. Atallah, Eugene H. Spafford

Entry type

article

Abstract

This paper argues the need for providing a covert back-channel communication mechanism in authentication protocols, discusses various practical uses for such a channel, and desirable features for its design and deployment. Such a mechanism would leverage the current authentication channel to carry out the covert communication rather than introducing a separate one. The communication would need to be oblivious to an adversary observing it, possibly as a man-in-the-middle. We discuss the properties that such channels would need to have for the various scenarios in which they would be used. Also, we show their potential for mitigating the effects of a number of security breaches currently occurring in these scenarios.

Date

2013 – 1 – 1

URL

http://link.springer.com/chapt ... 1007/978-3-642-41717-7_22

Institution

CERIAS

Key alpha

Spafford

School

Purdue University

Publication Date

2013-01-01

BibTex-formatted data

To refer to this entry, you may select and copy the text below and paste it into your BibTex document. Note that the text may not contain all macros that BibTex supports.

@Article{ Spafford,
	title = "Back Channels Can Be Useful!- Layering Authentication Channels to Provide Covert Communication",
	author = "Mohammed H. Almeshekah, Mikhail J. Atallah, Eugene H. Spafford",
	year = "2013",
	month = "1",
	institution = "CERIAS",
	school = "Purdue University",
	day = "1",
	abstract = "This paper argues the need for providing a covert back-channel communication mechanism in authentication protocols, discusses various practical uses for such a channel, and desirable features for its design and deployment. Such a mechanism would leverage the current authentication channel to carry out the covert communication rather than introducing a separate one. The communication would need to be oblivious to an adversary observing it, possibly as a man-in-the-middle. We discuss the properties that such channels would need to have for the various scenarios in which they would be used. Also, we show their potential for mitigating the effects of a number of security breaches currently occurring in these scenarios.",
	url = "http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-41717-7_22",
}