DICAS: Detection, Diagnosis and Isolation of Control Attacks in Sensor Networks

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Author

Issa Khalil, Saurabh Bagchi, Cristina Nina-Rotaru

Entry type

conference

Abstract

Sensor networks enable a wide range of applications in both military and civilian domains. However, the deployment scenarios, the functionality requirements, and the limited capabilities of these networks expose them to a wide-range of attacks against control traffic (such as wormholes, Sybil attacks, rushing attacks, etc). In this paper we propose a lightweight protocol called DICAS that mitigates these attacks by detecting, diagnosing, and isolating the malicious nodes. DICAS uses as a fundamental building block the ability of a node to oversee its neighboring nodesâ€™ communication. On top of DICAS, we build a secure routing protocol, LSR, which in addition supports multiple node-disjoint paths. We analyze the security guarantees of DICAS and use ns-2 simulations to show its effectiveness against three representative attacks. Overhead analysis is conducted to prove the lightweight nature of DICAS.

Date

2005 – 1 – 1

URL

http://csdl2.computer.org/pers ... 0.1109/SECURECOMM.2005.17

Booktitle

First International Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communications Networks (SECURECOMM'05)

Key alpha

Bagchi

Publication Date

2005-01-01

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@Conference{ Bagchi,
	title = "DICAS: Detection, Diagnosis and Isolation of Control Attacks in Sensor Networks",
	author = "Issa Khalil, Saurabh Bagchi, Cristina Nina-Rotaru",
	year = "2005",
	month = "1",
	booktitle = "First International Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communications Networks (SECURECOMM'05)",
	day = "1",
	abstract = "Sensor networks enable a wide range of applications in both military and civilian domains. However, the deployment scenarios, the functionality requirements, and the limited capabilities of these networks expose them to a wide-range of attacks against control traffic (such as wormholes, Sybil attacks, rushing attacks, etc). In this paper we propose a lightweight protocol called DICAS that mitigates these attacks by detecting, diagnosing, and isolating the malicious nodes. DICAS uses as a fundamental building block the ability of a node to oversee its neighboring nodesâ€™ communication. On top of DICAS, we build a secure routing protocol, LSR, which in addition supports multiple node-disjoint paths. We analyze the security guarantees of DICAS and use ns-2 simulations to show its effectiveness against three representative attacks. Overhead analysis is conducted to prove the lightweight nature of DICAS.",
	url = "http://csdl2.computer.org/persagen/DLAbsToc.jsp?resourcePath=/dl/proceedings/&toc;=comp/proceedings/securecomm/2005/2369/00/2369toc.xml&DOI;=10.1109/SECURECOMM.2005.17",
}