2014 Symposium Posters

Project Members
Mohammed Almeshekah, Mikhail Atallah and Eugene Spafford

In this paper we develop a novel taxonomy of methods and techniques that can be used to protect digital information. We explore complex relationships among these protection techniques grouped into four categories. We present analysis of these relationships and discuss how can they be applied at different scales within organizations. We map these protection techniques against the cyber kill-chain model and discuss some findings. Moreover, we identify the use of deceit as a useful protection technique that can significantly enhance the security of computer systems. We posit how the well-known Kerckhoffs’s principle has been misinterpreted to drive the security community away from deception-based mechanisms. We examine advantages these techniques can have when protecting our information in addition to traditional methods of denial and hardening. We show that by intelligently introducing deceit in information systems, we not only lead attackers astray, but also give organizations the ability to detect leakage; create doubt and uncertainty in leaked data; add risk at the adversaries’ side to using the leaked information; and significantly enhance our abilities to attribute adversaries. We discuss how to overcome some of the challenges that hinder the adoption of deception-based techniques. How