2012 Symposium Posters

Project Members
John Ross Wallrabenstein, Chris Clifton

Leon Walras' theory of general equilibrium put forth the notion of tatonnement as a process by which equilibrium prices are determined. Recently, Cole and Fleischer provided tatonnement algorithms for both the classic One-Time and Ongoing Markets with guaranteed bounds for convergence to equilibrium prices. However, in order to reach equilibrium, trade must occur outside of equilibrium prices, which violates the underlying Walrasian Auction model. We propose a privacy preserving protocol for the One-Time Market that follows naturally from the algorithms of Cole and Fleischer, allowing buyers and sellers to jointly compute the equilibrium prices by simulating trade outside of equilibrium. The protocol keeps utility functions of all parties private, revealing only the equilibrium price. Finally, we show that our protocol is inherently incentive compatible, such that no party has an incentive to lie about their inputs.