Posts tagged privacy
Take 5 Minutes to Help Privacy Research!
This is from our colleagues at NCSU, and is time-critical. Please take 5 minutes to fill out this (simple) survey. It will help an NSF-funded privacy project.. And “Thank you” from CERIAS, too!
ThePrivacyPlace.Org Privacy Survey is Underway!
Researchers at ThePrivacyPlace.Org are conducting an online survey about privacy policies and user values. The survey is supported by an NSF ITR grant (National Science Foundation Information Technology Research) and was first offered in 2002. We are offering the survey again in 2008 to reveal how user values have changed over the intervening years. The survey results will help organizations ensure their website privacy practices are aligned with current consumer values.
The URL is: http://theprivacyplace.org/currentsurvey
We need to attract several thousand respondents, and would be most appreciative if you would consider helping us get the word out about the survey, which takes about 5 to 10 minutes to complete. The results will be made available via our project website (http://www.theprivacyplace.org/).
Prizes include
$100 Amazon.com gift certificates sponsored by Intel Co.
and
IBM gifts
On behalf of the research staff at ThePrivacyPlace.Org, thank you!
Privacy Survey
I am an advisor to ThePrivacyPlace. They do great work on privacy issues, and this annual survey is valuable—but only with a lot of responses. So, please respond and share the link with others.
The following is their survey announcement.
ThePrivacyPlace.Org Privacy Survey is Underway!
Researchers at ThePrivacyPlace.Org are conducting an online survey about privacy policies and user values. The survey is supported by an NSF ITR grant (National Science Foundation Information Technology Research) and was first offered in 2002. We are offering the survey again in 2008 to reveal how user values have changed over the intervening years. The survey results will help organizations ensure their website privacy practices are aligned with current consumer values.
The URL is: http://theprivacyplace.org/currentsurveyWe need to attract several thousand respondents, and would be most appreciative if you would consider helping us get the word out about the survey, which takes about 5 to 10 minutes to complete. The results will be made available via our project website (http://www.theprivacyplace.org/).
Prizes include
$100 Amazon.com gift certificates sponsored by Intel Co.
and
IBM giftsOn behalf of the research staff at ThePrivacyPlace.Org, thank you!
Gazing in the Crystal Ball
[tags]future technology, cyber security predictions, malware, bots, privacy, cyber crime[/tags]
Four times in the last month I have been contacted by people asking my predictions for future cyber security threats and protections. One of those instances will be as I serve on a panel at the Information Security Decisions Conference in Chicago next week; we’ll be talking about the future of infosec.
Another instance when I was contacted was by the people at Information Security magazine for their upcoming 10th anniversary issue. I was interviewed back in 2002, and my comments were summarized in a “crystal ball” article. Some of those predictions were more like trend predictions, but I think I did pretty well. Most happened, and a couple may yet come to pass (I didn’t say they would all happen in 5 years!). I had a conversation with one of the reporters for the Nov 2007 issue, and provided some more observations looking forward.
After answering several of these requests, I thought it might be worthwhile to validate my views. So, I wrote up a list of things I see happening in security as we go forward. Then I polled (what I thought) was a small set of colleagues; thru an accident of mail aliases, a larger group of experts got my query. (The mailer issue may be fodder for a future blog post.) I got about 20 thoughtful replies from some real experts and deep thinkers in the field.
What was interesting is that while reading the replies, I found only a few minor differences from what I had already written! Either that means I have a pretty good view of what’s coming, or else the people I asked are all suffering under the same delusions.
Of course, none of us made predictions as are found in supermarket tabloids, along the lines of “Dick Cheney will hack into computers running unpatched Windows XP at the Vatican in February in an attempt to impress Britney Spears.” Although we might generate some specific predictions like that, I don’t think our crystal balls have quite the necessary resolution. Plus, I’m sure the Veep’s plans along those lines are classified, and we might end up in Gitmo for revealing them. Nonetheless, I’d like to predict that I will win the Powerball Lottery, but will be delayed collecting the payout because Adriana Lima has become so infatuated with me, she has abducted me. Yes, I’d like to predict that, but I think the Cheney prediction might be more likely....
But seriously, here are some of my predictions/observations of where we’re headed with cyber security. (I’m not going to name the people who responded to my poll, because when I polled them I said nothing about attributing their views in public; I value my friends’ privacy as much or more than their insights! However, my thanks again to those who responded.)
If all of these seem obvious to you, then you are probably working in cyber security or have your own crystal ball.
Threats
Expect attack software to be the dominant threat in the coming few years. As a trend, we will continue to see fewer overt viruses and worm programs as attacks, but continuing threats that hijack machines with bots, trojans, and browser subversion. Threats that self-modify to avoid detection, and threats that attack back against defenders will make the situation even more challenging. It will eventually be too difficult to tell if a system is compromised and disinfect it—the standard protocol will be to reformat and reinstall upon any question.
Spam, pop-up ads, and further related advertising abuses will grow worse (as difficult as that is to believe), and will continue to mask more serious threats. The ties between spam and malware will increase. Organized crime will become more heavily involved in both because of the money to be made coupled with the low probability of prosecution.
Extortion based on threats to integrity, availability, or exposure of information will become more common as systems are invaded and controlled remotely. Extortion of government entities may be threatened based on potential attacks against infrastructure controls. These kinds of losses will infrequently be revealed to the public.
Theft of proprietary information will increase as a lucrative criminal activity. Particularly targeted will be trade secret formulations and designs, customer lists, and supply chain details. The insider threat will grow here, too.
Expect attacks against governmental systems, and especially law enforcement systems, as criminals seek to remove or damage information about themselves and their activities.
Protections
Fads will continue and will seem useful to early adopters, but as greater roll-out occurs, deficiencies will be found that will make them less effective—or possibly even worse than what they replace. Examples include overconfident use of biometrics and over-reliance on virtualization to protect systems. Mistaken reliance on encryption as a solution will also be a repeated theme.
We will continue to see huge expenditures on R&D to retrofit security onto fundamentally broken technologies rather than on re-engineering systems according to sound security principles. Governments and many companies will continue to stress the search for “new” ideas without adequately applying older, proven techniques that might be somewhat inconvenient even though effective.
There will be continued development of protection technologies out of proportion to technologies that will enable us to identify and punish the criminals. It will be a while before the majority of people catch on that passive defense alone is not enough and begin to appropriately capitalize investigation and law enforcement. We will see more investment in scattered private actions well before we see governments stepping up.
White-listing and integrity management solutions will become widely used by informed security professionals as they become aware of how impossible it is to detect all bad software and behavior (blacklisting). Meanwhile, because of increasing stealth and sophistication of attacks, many victims will not realize that their traditional IDS/anti-virus solutions based on blacklists have failed to protect them.
White-listing will also obviate the competition among some vendors to buy vulnerabilities, and solve the difficulty of identifying zero-day attacks, because it is not designed to trigger on those items. However, it may be slow to be adopted because so much has been invested in traditional blacklist technologies: firewalls, IDS/NIDS/IPS, antivirus, etc.
Greater emphasis will be placed on positive identity management, both online and in the physical world. Coupled with access control, this will provide some solutions but further erode privacy. Thus, it is uncertain how widely these technologies will be embraced. TSA and too much of the general public will still believe that showing a picture ID somehow improves security, so the way ahead in authentication/identification is uncertain.
Personnel
We will continue to see more people using sensitive systems, but not enough people trained in cyber protection. This will continue some current trends such as people with questionable qualifications calling themselves “experts,” and more pressure for certifications and qualifications to demonstrate competence (and more promotion of questionable certifications to meet that need).
Many nations will face difficulties finding appropriately educated and vetted experts who are also capable of getting national-level clearances. Industry may also find it difficult to find enough trained individuals without criminal records, which will lead to greater reliance on outsourcing. It will also mean that we will continue to see instances where poorly-informed individuals mistakenly think that single technologies will solve all all their problems—with firewalls and encryption being two prime examples.
Personnel for after-the-fact investigations (both law enforcement and civil) will be in high demand and short supply.
Much greater emphasis needs to be placed on educating the end-user population about security and privacy, but this will not receive sufficient support or attention.
The insider threat will become more pronounced because systems are mostly still being designed and deployed with perimeter defenses.
Milieu
Crime, identity theft, and violations of privacy will increasingly become part of public consciousness. This will likely result in reduction of trust in on-line services. This may also negatively impact development of new services and products, but there will still be great adoption of new technologies despite their unknown risk models; VoIP is an example.
Some countries will become known as havens for computer criminals. International pressure will increase on those countries to become “team players” in catching the criminals. This will not work well in those countries where the government has financial ties to the criminals or has a political agenda in encouraging them. Watch for the first international action (financial embargo?) on this issue within the next five years.
We will see greater connectivity, more embedded systems, and less obvious perimeters. This will require a change in how we think about security (push it into the devices and away from network core, limit functionality), but the changes will be slow in coming. Advertisers and vendors will resist these changes because some of their revenue models would be negatively impacted.
Compliance rules and laws will drive some significant upgrades and changes, but not all will be appropriate as the technology changes. Some compliance requirements may actually expose organizations to attack. Related to compliance, the enforcement of external rights (e.g., copyright using DRM) will lead to greater complexity in systems, more legal wrangling, and increased user dissatisfaction with some IT products.
More will be spent in the US on DRM enforcement and attempts to restrict access to online pictures of naked people than is likely to be spent on cybersecurity research. More money will be spent by the US government ensuring that people don’t take toothpaste in carry-on luggage on airplanes than will be spent on investigating and prosecuting computer fraud and violation of spam laws.
Government officials will continue to turn to industry for “expert advice”—listening to the same people who have built multinational behemoths by marketing the unsafe products that got us into this mess already. (It’s the same reason they consult the oil executives on how to solve global warming.) Not surprisingly, the recommendations will all be for strongly worded statements and encouragement, but not real change in behavior.
We will see growing realization that massive data stores, mirroring, RAID, backups and more mean that data never really goes away. This will be a boon to some law enforcement activities, a terrible burden for companies in civil lawsuits, and a continuing threat to individual privacy. It will also present a growing challenge to reconcile different versions of the same data in some meaningful way. Purposeful pollution of the data stores around the world will be conducted by some individuals to make the collected data so conflicted and ambiguous that it cannot be used.
Overall Bottom line: things are going to get worse before they get better, and it may be a while before things get better.
[posted with ecto]
8 Security Action Items to Beat “Learned Helplessness”
So, you watch for advisories, deploy countermeasures (e.g., change firewall and IDS rules) or shut down vulnerable services, patch applications, restore services. You detect compromises, limit damages, assess the damage, repair, recover, and attempt to prevent them again. Tomorrow you start again, and again, and again. Is it worth it? What difference does it make? Who cares anymore?
If you’re sick of it, you may just be getting fatigued.
If you don’t bother defending anymore because you think there’s no point to this endless threadmill, you may be suffering from learned helplessness. Some people even consider that if you only passively wait for patches to be delivered and applied by software update mechanisms, you’re already in the “learned helplessness category”. On the other hand, tracking every vulnerability in the software you use by reading BugTraq, Full Disclosure, etc..., the moment that they are announced, and running proof of concept code on your systems to test them isn’t for everyone; there are diminishing returns, and one has to balance risk vs energy expenditure, especially when that energy could produce better returns. Of course I believe that using Cassandra is an OK middle ground for many, but I’m biased.
The picture may certainly look bleak, with talk of “perpetual zero-days”. However, there are things you can do (of course, as in all lists not every item applies to everyone):
- Don’t be a victim; don’t surrender to helplessness. If you have limited energy to spend on security (and who doesn’t have limits?), budget a little bit of time on a systematic and regular basis to stay informed and make progress on tasks you identify as important; consider the ones listed below.
- Don’t be a target. Like or hate Windows, running it on a desktop and connecting to the internet is like having big red circles on your forehead and back. Alternatives I feel comfortable with for a laptop or desktop system are Ubuntu Linux and MacOS X (for now; MacOS X may become a greater target in time). If you’re stuck with Windows, consider upgrading to Vista if you haven’t already; the security effort poured into Vista should pay off in the long run. For servers, there is much more choice, and Windows isn’t such a dominant target.
- Reduce your exposure (attack surface) by:
- Browsing the web behind a NAT appliance when at home, in a small business, or whenever there’s no other firewall device to protect you. Don’t rely only on a software firewall; it can become disabled or get misconfigured by malware or bad software, or be too permissive by default (if you can’t or don’t know how to configure it).
- Using the NoScript extension for Firefox (if you’re not using Firefox, consider switching, if only for that reason). JavaScript is a vector of choice for desktop computer attacks (which is why I find the HoneyClient project so interesting, but I digress). JavaScript can be used to violate your privacy* or take control of your browser away from you, and give it to website authors, advertisers on those sites, or to the people who compromised those sites, and you can bet it’s not always done for your benefit (even though JavaScript enables better things as well). NoScript gives you a little control over browser plugins, and which sources are allowed to run scripts in your browser, and attempts to prevent XSS exploits.
- Turning off unneeded features and services (OK, this is old advice, but it’s still good).
- Browsing the web behind a NAT appliance when at home, in a small business, or whenever there’s no other firewall device to protect you. Don’t rely only on a software firewall; it can become disabled or get misconfigured by malware or bad software, or be too permissive by default (if you can’t or don’t know how to configure it).
- Use the CIS benchmarks, and if evaluation tools are available for your platform, run them. These tools give you a score, and even as silly as some people may think this score is (reducing the number of holes in a ship from 100 to 10 may still sink the ship!), it gives you positive feedback as you improve the security stance of your computers. It’s encouraging, and may lift the feeling that you are sinking into helplessness. If you are a Purdue employee, you have access to CIS Scoring Tools with specialized features (see this news release). Ask if your organization also has access and if not consider asking for it (note that this is not necessary to use the benchmarks).
- Use the NIST security checklists (hardening guides and templates). The NIST’s information technology laboratory site has many other interesting security papers to read as well.
- Consider using Thunderbird and the Enigmail plugin for GPG, which make handling signed or encrypted email almost painless. Do turn on SSL or TLS-only options to connect to your server (both SMTP and either IMAP or POP) if it supports it. If not, request these features from your provider. Remember, learned helplessness is not making any requests or any attempts because you believe it’s not ever going to change anything. If you can login to the server, you also have the option of SSH tunneling, but it’s more hassle.
- Watch CERIAS security seminars on subjects that interest you.
- If you’re a software developer or someone who needs to test software, consider using the ReAssure system as a test facility with configurable network environments and collections of VMware images (disclosure: ReAssure is my baby, with lots of help from other CERIAS people like Ed Cates).
Good luck! Feel free to add more ideas as comments.
*A small rant about privacy, which tends to be another area of learned helplessness: Why do they need to know? I tend to consider all information that people gather about me, that they don’t need to know for tasks I want them to do for me, a (perhaps very minor) violation of my privacy, even if it has no measurable effect on my life that I know about (that’s part of the problem—how do I know what effect it has on me?). I like the “on a need to know basis” principle, because you don’t know which selected (and possibly out of context) or outdated information is going to be used against you later. It’s one of the lessons of life that knowledge about you isn’t always used in legal ways, and even if it’s legal, not everything that’s legal is “Good” or ethical, and not all agents of good or legal causes are ethical and impartial or have integrity. I find the “you’ve got nothing to hide, do you?” argument extremely stupid and irritating—and it’s not something that can be explained in a sentence or two to someone saying that to you. I’m not against volunteering information for a good cause, though, and I have done so in the past, but it’s rude to just take it from me without asking and without any explanation, or to subvert my software and computer to do so.
What’s New at CERIAS
I haven’t posted an update lately of new content on our site, so here’s a bit of a make-up post:
CERIAS Reports & Papers
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17 January 2007, 11:00 pm -
17 January 2007, 11:00 pm -
22 January 2007, 11:00 pm
CERIAS Hotlist
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31 January 2007, 7:09 am -
29 January 2007, 9:10 am
CERIAS News
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25 January 2007, 9:32 am -
8 February 2007, 10:22 am -
15 February 2007, 2:40 pm -
19 February 2007, 1:09 pm
CERIAS Security Seminar Podcast
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17 January 2007, 3:30 pm -
24 January 2007, 3:30 pm -
31 January 2007, 3:30 pm
Useful Firefox Security Extensions
Mozilla’s Firefox browser claims to provide a safer browsing experience out of the box, but some of the best security features of Firefox are only available as extensions. Here’s a roundup of some of the more useful ones I’ve found.
- Add n’ Edit Cookies
This might be more of a web developer tool, but being able to view in detail the cookies that various sites set on your visits can be an eye-opening experience. This extension not only shows you all the details, but lets you modify them too. You’ll be surprised at how many web apps do foolish things like saving your password in the cookie. - Dr. Web Anti-Virus Link Checker
This is an interesting idea—scanning files for viruses before you download them. Basically, this extension adds an option to the link context menu that allows you to pass the link to the Dr. Web AV service. I haven’t rigorously tested this or anything, but it’s an interesting concept that could be part of an effective multilayer personal security model.
- FormFox
This extension doesn’t do a whole lot, but what it does is important—showing a tooltip when you roll over a form submission button of the form action URL. Extending this further to visually differentiate submission buttons that submit to SSL URLs would be really nice (as suggested by Chris Shiflett).
- FlashBlock
Flash hasn’t been quite as popular an attack vector as Javascript, but it still potentially could be a threat, and it’s often an annoyance. This extension disables all embedded Flash elements by default (score one for securing things by default), allowing you to click to activate a particular one if you like. It lacks the flexibility I’d like (things like whitelists would be very handy), and doesn’t give you much (any?) info about the Flash element before you run it, but it’s still a handy tool. - LiveHTTPHeaders & Header Monitor
LiveHTTPHeaders is an incredibly useful too for web developers, displaying all of the header traffic between the client and server. Header Monitor is basically an add-on for LiveHTTPHeaders that displays a chosen header in Firefox’s status bar. They’re not really specifically security tools, but they do offer a lot of info on what’s really going on when you’re browsing, and an educated user is a safer user. - JavaScript Option
This restores some of the granularity Firefox users used to have over what Javascript can and cannot do. I’d like to see this idea taken farther (see below), but it’s handy regardless. - NoScript
This extension is pretty smooth. Of all the addons for Firefox covered here, this is the one to get. NoScript is a powerful javascript execution whitelisting tool, allowing full user control over what domains allow scripts to run. Notifications of blocked execution and the allowed domain interface are nearly identical to the built-in Firefox popup blocker, so users should find it comfortable to work with. NoScript can also block Flash, Java, and “other plugins;” forbid bookmarklets; block or allow the “ping” attribute of the tag; and attempt to rewrite links that execute javascript to go to their intended donation without triggering the script code.The one thing I’d really like to see from this extension would be more ganularity over what the Javascript engine can access. Now it’s only “on” or “off,” but being able to disable things like cookie access would eliminate a lot of potential security issues while still letting JS power rich web app interfaces. Also read Pascal Meunier’s take on NoScript.
- QuickJava
Places handy little buttons in the status bar that let you quickly enable or disable Java or Javascript support. Note that this will not work with the latest stable Firefox (1.5.0.1). Hopefully a new version will be available soon. - ShowIP
This is another tool that isn’t aimed at security per se, but offers a lot of useful information. ShowIP drops the IP address of the current site in your status bar. Clicking on it brings up a menu of lookup options for the IP, like whois and DNS info. You can add additional web lookups if you like, as well as passing the IP to a local program. Handy stuff.
- SpoofStick
The idea with this extension is to make it easier to catch spoofing attempts by displaying a very large, brightly colored “You’re on “ in the toolbar. For folks who know what they’re doing this isn’t wildly useful, but it could be just the ticket for less savvy users. It requires a bit too much setup for them, though, and in the end I think this is something the browser itself should be handling.
- Tamper Data
Much like LiveHTTPHeaders, Tamper Data is a very useful extension for web devs that lets the user view HTTP headers and POST data passed between the client and server. In addition, Tamper Data makes it easy for the user to alter the data being sent to the server, which is enormously useful for doing security testing against web apps. I also like how the data is presented in TD a bit better than LiveHTTPHeaders: it’s easier to see at a glance all of the traffic and get an overall feel of what’s going on, but you can still drill down and get as much detail as you like.
Got more Firefox security extensions? Leave a comment and I’ll collect them in an upcoming post.
Surveillance Society
This morning, wamu.org : The Diane Rehm Show featured guests Robert O’Harrow, author of “No Place to Hide,” Bruce Schneier, security expert and blogger, and Joe Whitley, the former general counsel of the Department of Homeland Security. The show outlined the current tensions between security and privacy and highlighted the threats to privacy brought about by advances in infomation technology, data minining and even medical technology. While some of these issues may seem a bit tiresome for those who study security and privacy, the guests emphasized an important point: Threats to privacy are not well-understood by the public, which may be a reason for the general lack of concern over the overextension of the NSA’s surveillance powers.
Review: The Limits of Privacy
It has been argued that, since the 1960’s, an emphasis on individualism and personal autonomy have shaped public policy debates, including debates about the right to personal privacy. While many scholars and advocacy groups claim that privacy is under siege, an alternate view of privacy exists, one in which it is weighed against other public interests. In The Limits of Privacy, Amitai Etzioni espouses a communitarian approach to determining the relative value and, as the title suggests, the limits of privacy. Privacy, the author argues, is not an absolute right, but is a right that must be carefully measured against the “common good,” which for Etzioni is defined as public health and safety. At the heart of this book is the question of if and when we are justified in implementing measures that diminish privacy in the service of the common good.
To answer this question and to identify criteria for evaluating the relative trade-offs between privacy and the common good, Etzioni examines several examples in which privacy, depicted as an individual right, is in conflict with societal responsibilities. Five public policy issues--namely the HIV testing of newborn babies, Megan’s Laws, encryption and government wiretapping, biometric national ID cards, and the privacy of medical records--are examined in detail. Through his analysis, Etzioni attempts to prove that, in most cases, champions of privacy have actually done more harm than good by stifling innovation and curbing necessary democratic discussions about privacy. A notable exception is in the case of personal medical records: The author notes that, while “Big Brother” is normally associated with privacy violation, in the case of medical records, unregulated private industry, which Etzioni aptly coins “Big Bucks,” is a pertinent and immediate threat.
Etzioni’s analysis, while flawed in several respects (e.g. Etzioni largely ignores evidence suggesting that national IDs will do more harm than good from a security perspective), results in four criteria that can be used in examining the tension between liberty and the public interest, or in this case privacy and public health and safety. The four criteria are as follows:
- First, society should take steps to limit privacy only if it faces a “well-documented and macroscopic threat” to the common good;
- second that society should identify and try any and all means that do not endanger privacy before restricting privacy;
- third, that privacy intrusions should have minimal impact;
- and fourth, that the undesirable side effects of privacy violations for the common good are treated (i.e. if a patient’s medical record must be digitized and shared, the confidentiality of the record must be guaranteed).
The Limits of Privacy is necessary reading for anyone involved in accepting, shaping, debating, and enacting privacy policies, both at the organizational and public-policy level. While many readers, including this reviewer, disagree with many of Etzioni’s proposed solutions to the problems he examines, his four criteria are useful for anyone attempting to understand the intricacies involved. Likewise, while Etzioni’s views are contrary to many of his peers, whose arguments he credits in his analysis, his arguments for justifiable invasions of privacy are a useful foil for privacy advocates and a useful reminder that privacy issues will always present real and costly trade-offs.


