Information Targeting and Coordination: An Experimental Study
Principal Investigator: Karthik Kannan
We explore the role of information targeting and its effect on coordination in a multi-threshold public goods game. We consider four treatments, three in which we give feedback about other member's contributions to a subsample of group members, and another treatment in which feedback is not provided at all. Our three information treatments vary in whom receives the information, which can be given randomly, to those whose contributions are below the average of their group, or to those whose contributions are above the average of their group. Results show improvements in coordination when information targeting is used, leading to an increased contribution to the public good. In contrast, providing information randomly does not improve coordination. Moreover, our random information treatment approximates strategies currently used in practice for educating consumers about business problems such as digital piracy. Thus, our findings provide insights that may be used in practice to enhance education and marketing strategies for reducing the digital piracy problem. The implications of this research may also be employed by management in other contexts where positively or negatively affecting coordination between consumers is of interest.
Other Faculty: Matthew Hashim (The University of Arizona) Sandra Maximiano