Principal Investigator: Christina Garman
While cryptographic techniques such as homomorphic encryption and secure multiparty computation have the potential to enable (potentially distrusting) parties to collaborate in fundamentally new ways, this potential has not been fully realized for several reasons. First, the performance overhead (e.g., bandwidth, latency, computation) associated with many of these cryptographic
techniques can be quite large. Second, each of these categories of protocols and primitives has their own tradeoffs in terms of what security guarantees they provide, what settings they are effective in, and, crucially, what performance properties they have. Finally, building a provably secure and performant cryptographic application on top of these primitives often requires extensive domain knowledge spanning multiple different areas of cryptography.
To address these challenges, there has been significant recent work in developing abstractions, and even languages, to allow programmers to write applications in a more natural style while compiling them down to the low-level primitives that implement the necessary secure protocols. However, we note that these approaches still leave several remaining
challenges that hinder their use for writing effective, efficient, scalable, secure applications.
In this project, we propose High-Assurance Compositional Cryptography: Languages and Environments, or HACCLE. HACCLE will provide programming languages and the attendant verification, optimization, and execution tools to address the challenges outlined above. Our ultimate aim is to allow programmers to write distributed, secure applications with minimum effort and maximum performance.
Other PIs: Milind Kulkarni (Purdue) Aniket Kate (Purdue) Jeremiah Blocki (Purdue) Hemanta K. Maji (Purdue) Tiark Rompf (Purdue) Benjamin Delaware (Purdue) Roopsha Samanta (Purdue) Benoit Meister (Reservoir) Jonathan Springer (Reservoir)
Students: Alex Seto