

Stepping Through Cybersecurity Risk Management




a systems-thinking approach


February 21, 2024




Introduction




2004




2007




2009




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2010





2012




2019


2024



Enterprise Risk Hierarchy




FrameCyber® simplifies cybersecurity risk management
so you can focus on your cybersecurity risk profile!





[HTTPS://XKCD.COM/927/](https://xkcd.com/927/)


FrameCyber® is not a new standard, it is a *framework* of
Information and Logic for Cybersecurity Decision Support





























Cybersecurity Threats

“If you know the enemy and know yourself,
you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.


If you know yourself but not the enemy,
for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat.

If you know neither the enemy nor yourself,
you will succumb in every battle.”

— Sun Tzu, The Art of War



Threat Intelligence




Threat Intelligence → Threat Catalog Entry



ID:	<input type="text" value="APT-IS"/>	Type:	<input type="text" value="Nation-state"/>	Role:	<input type="text" value="Infrastructure-operator"/>	Level:	<input type="text" value="Innovator"/>
Name:	<input type="text" value="Indrik Spider"/>	Geolocation:	<input type="text" value="Russia"/>	Aliases:	<input type="text" value="Gold Drake, Evil Corp, Manatee Tempe"/>		
Description: Indrik Spider has maintained criminal operations since at least 2014 when it is known to have used phishing techniques to persuade users to download compressed macros that, when activated, retrieved, and installed malware which infiltrated browsers and collected bank login credentials. In 2017, Indrik Spider began to operate ransomware. They exploit a wide variety of Windows vulnerabilities and target the financial industry avoiding detection via multi-stage persistence and installation processes in combination with code-obfuscation.							
Tactics: Among other phishing lures, Indrik Spider delivers fake browser updates to deliver malicious executables that, when activated, phone home with results. Once a foothold is established, it scans and traverses the network in search of an application data folder as a user with sufficient permissions to encrypt accessible file shares, deploying ransomware via PowerShell GPO. It sends a ransom note directing victims to TOR. In the process, it may exfiltrate information that can be directly exploited for financial gain.				Skills: The organization is staffed with phishing, programming, and vulnerability exploitation expertise, as well ransomware programming and packaging in PowerShell and JavaScript. It has demonstrated competence in Windows operating system manipulation, and is also skilled in the used of BitPaymer, Cobalt Strike, Dried, Empire, Mimikatz, PsExec, WastedLocker and wmic. The activities of this threat actor are not limited by technological expertise.			
Goals: Financial gain via credential hijacking or extortion from victims.				Resources: Nationstate budget for this threat operation appears unlimited and its activities constantly add to its resources.			

For each *Threat Actor* known to Threat Intelligence:



An ATT&CK Threat Vector Matrix

Initial Access → Execution → Persistence → Privilege Escalation → Defense Evasion → Credential Access → Discovery → Lateral Movement → Collection → Command and Control → Exfiltration → Impact



Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Valid Accounts		Scheduled Task/Job		Modify Authentication Process		System Service Discovery	Remote Services	Data from Local System	Data Obfuscation	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Data Destruction
Replication Through Removable Media	Windows Management Instrumentation		Valid Accounts		Network Sniffing		Software Deployment Tools	Data from Removable Media	Fallback Channels	Scheduled Transfer	Data Encrypted for Impact
Trusted Relationship	Software Deployment Tools	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Hijack Execution Flow	Direct Volume Access	OS Credential Dumping	Application Window Discovery	Replication Through Removable Media	Input Capture	Application Layer Protocol	Data Transfer Size Limits	Service Stop
Supply Chain Compromise		Create or Modify System Process		Rootkit	Input Capture	System Network	Internal Spearphishing	Data Staged	Proxy	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Defacement
Hardware Additions	Shared Modules	Event Triggered Execution		Obfuscated Files or Information	Brute Force	Configuration Discovery	Use Alternate Authentication Material	Screen Capture	Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	Firmware Corruption
Exploit Public-Facing Application	User Execution	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution	Process Injection		Two-Factor Authentication Interception	System Owner/User Discovery	Lateral Tool Transfer	Email Collection	Web Service	Exfiltration Over Web Service	Resource Hijacking
Phishing	Exploitation for Client Execution	Account Manipulation	Access Token Manipulation		Exploitation for Credential Access	System Network Connections Discovery	Taint Shared Content	Clipboard Data	Ingress Tool Transfer	Exfiltration Over Web Service	Endpoint Denial of Service
External Remote Services	System Services	External Remote Services	Group Policy Modification		Steal Web Session Cookie	Permission Groups Discovery	Exploitation of Remote Services	Automated Collection	Data Encoding	Automated Exfiltration	System Shutdown/Reboot
Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter	Office Application Startup	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism	Indicator Removal on Host	Unsecured Credentials	File and Directory Discovery	Remote Service Session Hijacking	Audio Capture	Traffic Signaling	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Account Access Removal
	Native API	Create Account	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Modify Registry	Credentials from Password Stores	Peripheral Device Discovery		Video Capture	Man in the Browser	Remote Access Software	Disk Wipe
	Inter-Process Communication	Browser Extensions		Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution	Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets	Network Share Discovery		Man in the Browser	Data from Information Repositories	Dynamic Resolution	Data Manipulation
		Traffic Signaling		Traffic Signaling	Forced Authentication	Password Policy Discovery		Man-in-the-Middle	Archive Collected Data	Non-Standard Port	
		BITS Jobs		Signed Script Proxy Execution	Steal Application Access Token	Browser Bookmark Discovery		Man-in-the-Middle	Data from Network Shared Drive	Non-Application Layer Protocol	
		Server Software Component		Rogue Domain Controller	Man-in-the-Middle	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion		Man-in-the-Middle	Data from Cloud Storage Object		
		Pre-OS Boot		Indirect Command Execution		Cloud Service Dashboard					
		Compromise Client Software Binary		BITS Jobs		Software Discovery					
		Implant Container Image		XSL Script Processing		Query Registry					
				Template Injection		Remote System Discovery					
				File and Directory Permissions Modification		Network Service Scanning					
				Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion		Process Discovery					
				Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions		System Information Discovery					
				Use Alternate Authentication Material		Account Discovery					
				Impair Defenses		System Time Discovery					
				Hide Artifacts		Domain Trust Discovery					
				Masquerading		Cloud Service Discovery					
				Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information							
				Signed Binary Proxy Execution							
				Exploitation for Defense Evasion							
				Execution Guardrails							
				Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure							
				Pre-OS Boot							
				Subvert Trust Controls							

Legend


- High Confidence of Detection
- Some Confidence of Detection
- Low Confidence of Detection

Common Attack Vectors


SQL Injection



Hypothetical Events




PHISHING



Hypothetical Events

Also known as *Cybersecurity Scenario Analysis*.



Outages	Minutes	Hour	Min	Avg Payment Fee	# Waived	Goodwill Loss
File Share 1 - Storage Only	21	0	21			
Payment Processing	22	0	22	\$34.00	684	\$23,256.00
General Ledger	823	13	43			
Payment Processing Full Recovery	184	3	4			
Lost Payments Recovered	446	7	26			
Technology Staff Expense				Rate	# Staff	IT Expense
Overtime Level 1	419	6	59	\$50	2	\$698.33
Overtime Level 2	42	0	42	\$100	3	\$210.00
Overtime Level 3	420	7	0	\$200	2	\$2,800.00
Forensics Team	35	0	35	\$600		\$350.00
						\$4,058.33
Total Loss:						\$27,314.33




Controls

Prevent


Respond



Detect



Management Controls



Tone at the Top

CYBERSECURITY IS A MAJOR CONCERN.


**THE ENTERPRISE HAS NO TOLERANCE FOR KNOWN VULNERABILITIES
IN ITS SYSTEMS, NO TOLERANCE FOR DATA BREACHES,
AND LOW TOLERANCE FOR UNKNOWN VULNERABILITIES.**



Tone at the Top

CYBERSECURITY IS A MAJOR CONCERN.

THE ENTERPRISE HAS NO TOLERANCE FOR KNOWN VULNERABILITIES IN ITS SYSTEMS, NO TOLERANCE FOR DATA BREACHES, AND LOW TOLERANCE FOR UNKNOWN VULNERABILITIES.



Section B: Authorized Use

B.1: Business Purpose

All information technology at Firm shall be associated with an "Application." The application is the business purpose of the technology that is recorded in Application Inventory.

B.2: Least Privilege

Where individuals require access to an organization's facilities, operational processes, technology systems, and information ("resources") in order to ensure the success of the enterprise mission, this access shall be:

- (i) limited to least privilege with respect to the individual's function; and
- (ii) provisioned only after receipt of a successful background check approved by Legal that may be customized for that function.

B.2.1: User Classification


Responsibility for determining the minimum possible access requirements for an individual's function is allocated based on user classification. Individuals who do not have a business relationship with the enterprise that falls into a defined user classes shall have no authorized access and all individuals who are granted systems access shall endeavor to ensure that such unclassified individuals are unable to access enterprise resources that are not declared by Legal to be publicly accessible (e.g. advertising and corporate investor websites).

B.2.2: Departmental Responsibility

Tone at the Top

CYBERSECURITY IS A MAJOR CONCERN.



THE ENTERPRISE HAS NO TOLERANCE FOR KNOWN VULNERABILITIES
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Tone at the Top


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


**Must also be consistent with legal obligations and contractual requirements!*

Enterprise Security Standards - Example Zero Trust Architecture



Example Enterprise Zero Trust Architecture Method



Example Procedure

The Security Operations Center Analyst:

1. Select the highest priority alert in the queue
2. Ascertain context:
 - 2.a. app or data in alert, search application registry for app/data owner
 - 2.b. device or IP in alert, search asset inventory for device and/or network owner
3. If the priority is “critical”, convene call with supervisor and app/data/device/net owners
4. Use data in alert to distinguish between anomaly and intrusion:
 - 3.a. if intrusion or cannot tell, make a note in the log asking supervisor for instruction
 - 3.b. anomaly, place alert on list for end-of-shift call with app/data/device/net owners



Control Hierarchy



Policy



A. Personally identifiable information is encrypted using AES with 256 bit keys.

Process



B. Personally identifiable information shall stay within the borders of the country.

Standard



C. The first step in responding to a request for permission for file access is to document the request in the incident management system.



Procedure



The second step is to look up the user in the IAM system.

D. Personally identifiable information is collected by customer service, encrypted by application development, and disseminated by compliance

The Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) Equation



Assessments

Risk and Control
Self Assessment

Map to Center for Internet
Security Standard

Objective

business driven

technology driven

Architecture
Review

Scope

technology

process

Map to
ISO 27001
Standard

Constraint

resources

reviewer sphere of influence

Attestation Approach

interviews

technology testing

Penetration
Test

Result

verbal yes or no
answers

formally
published reports

Spot
Check


Audit

Assessment Workpapers

Response	Requirement	Observations	Evidence	Recommendation
ID.AM-1: Meets	Physical devices and systems within the organization are inventoried	Asset inventory is maintained via enterprise workflow wherein procurement, supplier risk management, and technology operations are tightly integrated. Contact: Physical, Phyllis	<i>Cited Controls:</i> ISP:C.4: Physical Security (Policy, Protect) INFSEC:AM: Asset Management (Standard, Identify)	
ID.AM-2: Meets	Software platforms and applications within the organization are inventoried	Software inventory is maintained via technology workflow starting with procurement and maintained via the life of the software asset. Contact: Cio, The	<i>Cited Controls:</i> INFSEC:AM-SW: Software Inventory (Standard, Identify)	
ID.AM-3: Compensates	Organizational communication and data flows are mapped	Although technology notifications are automated and crisis management notifications cover all staff, data flow documentation is partial and procedudres sometimes must be supplemented with call lists. Contact: Opsman, Sec	<i>Cited Controls:</i> ISP:A.4: Communication (Policy, Identify) IPCM:4.D: Communicate (Procedure, Respond) FCSS-CFG:IV-CO.3: Respond Procedures (Procedure, Respond) Files uploaded: CallLists.xlsx	
ID.AM-4: Planned	External information systems are catalogued	Third Party vendors are cataloged and data exchanges logged, but there is no systematic method to ensure that all Third Parties are in the catalog. Contact: Opsofficer, Chief Issue flagged.	<i>Cited Controls:</i> FCSS-CFG:III.4: Third Party Service Logs (Control, Identify)	Charge accounts payable with creating a Third Party vendor record as a precondition of payment.
ID.AM-5: Not Met	Resources (e.g., hardware, devices, data, time, personnel, and software) are prioritized based on their classification, criticality, and business value	Although ranks are assigned to resources based on business criticality and information classification, resources for critical controls such as endpoint security are not prioritized accordingly. Contact: Techrisk, Tammy Issue flagged.	<i>Cited Controls:</i> ISP:A.2: Information Classification (Policy, Identify) FCSS-CFG:V.2: Asset Rank (Standard, Identify)	Establish security support tiers by rank and prioritize resources for security services accordingly.
ID.AM-6: Meets	Cybersecurity roles and responsibilities for the entire workforce and third-party stakeholders (e.g., suppliers, customers, partners) are established	Security policy assigns responsibility for least privilege. Contact: Ciso, The	<i>Cited Controls:</i> ISP:B.2.1: User Classification (Control, Identify) ISP:B.2.2: Departmental Responsibility (Control, Identify)	



NIST CSF Assessment Results



Not Met (5)

ID.AM-5: Resources (e.g., hardware, devices, data, time, personnel, and software) are prioritized based on their classification, criticality, and business value

ID.SC-5 Response and recovery planning and testing are conducted with suppliers and third-party providers

PR.PT-2: Removable media is protected and its use restricted according to policy

DE.CM-3: Personnel activity is monitored to detect potential cybersecurity events



DE.CM-6: External service provider activity is monitored to detect potential cybersecurity events

Type:	Not set	Priority:	Not set	Status:	Draft	Source:	Other	Org:	CISO
	Application		Critical		Draft		Assessment		CFO
	Cloud		Significant		Open		Audit		CISO
	Information		Important		Closed		Event		CS
	Infrastructure						External		ERM
	Supplier						Legal		FC
	Threat						Regulatory		
	Vulnerability						Self-Identified		

Risk Issues

Cybersecurity Risk


- |---**APT Advanced Persistent Threat**
- |---CFG Misconfigurations
- |---**DL Data Breach**
- | |---DL.C Lost or Stolen Credentials
- | |---**DL.P Personal Record Exposure**
- |---**IT Insider Threat**
- | |---IT.A Accidental Insider Threat
- | |---**IT.I Intentional Insider Threat**
- | |---**IT.P Phishing Email**
- |---**MW Malware Infection**
- | |---**MW.KEV Known Exploited Vulnerabilities**
- | |--- MW.ZD Zero Day Attacks
- |---SI Service Interruption
- | |---SI.N Distributed Denial of Service
- | |---SI.O Technology Outages





Issue	Summary	Source/Criteria	Remediation
I5 Open Significant 2024-02-06	NIST-CSF requirement: ID.AM-3 Type: Infrastructure	Assessment (A000002-ID.AM-3) Criteria: Does not Meet NIST-CSF assessment requirement: Organizational communication and data flows are mapped Linked Risks: CS.APT: Advanced Persistent Threat - Activities of well-organized and funded adversaries with long-term plans to achieve goals that negatively impact the firm.	Enginir, Simrin FC 2024-10-31
I2 Open Important 2024-04-12	Malware event, impact Moderate: End Point Security Desktop apt malware scanning files on all shares for PII Type: Infrastructure	Event (Event-SIRT4753) Criteria: Known exploited vulnerability to threat vector: Phishing -- breach of risk appetite for PII Linked Risks: CS.MW: Malware Infection - Execution of malicious software on a firm systems.	Opsman, Sec CISO No Target




From Measures to Metrics




Key Risk Indicators: Trends in Patching Effectiveness



Key Risk Indicators: Trends in Incident Time to Close



Risk Tolerance



Risk Measurement

Cyber:CS Cybersecurity **100%**

|---Cyber:CS.IT Insider Threat (90%)

| |---Cyber:CS.IT-A Accidental Insider Threat (20%)

| |---Cyber:CS.IT-I Intentional Insider Threat (20%)

| |---Cyber:CS.IT-P Phishing Email (90%)

|---Cyber:CS.SI Service Interruption (20%)

| |---Cyber:CS.SI-N Distributed Denial of Service (10%)

| |---Cyber:CS.SI-O Technology Outages (20%)

|---Cyber:CS.MW Malware Infection **100%**

| |---Cyber:CS.MW.ZD Zero Day Attacks (70%)

| |---Cyber:CS.MW-KEV Known Exploited Vulnerabilities **100%**



|---Cyber:CS.APT Advanced Persistent Threat (70%)

|---Cyber:CS.CFG Misconfigurations (20%)


|---Cyber:CS.DL Data Leaks (80%)

|---Cyber:CS.DL-P Loss of Personal Records (80%)

|---Cyber:CS.DL-C Lost or Stolen Credentials (10%)



Risk Hierarchy



Questions/Discussion?



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