

The Center for Education and Research in Information Assurance and Security

# Securing Contrastive mmWave-based Human Activity Recognition against Adversarial Label Flipping

Amit Singha, Ziqian Bi, Tao Li (Purdue University) {singha3, bi32, li4270}@purdue.edu Yimin Chen (University of Massachusetts Lowell) ian\_chen@uml.edu Yanchao Zhang (Arizona State University) yczhang@asu.edu

The objective of this research is to identify vulnerabilities within mmWave-based Human Activity Recognition (HAR) systems to adversarial label poisoning attacks under supervised contrastive learning (SCL) frameworks. We identify three types of label poisoning attacks on contrastive mmWave-based HAR systems and propose a corresponding defense termed selective supervised contrastive learning (Sel-CL).


Confident

**Pairs** 


**Poisoned** 

Selection

### Heatmaps of two activities



## A basic mmWave-based HAR system



**Attacks** 

- Adversary Model: Attackers aim to degrade HAR system performance by manipulating activity labels in the training dataset. This can be done through intentional data mislabeling, acquiring mislabeled data, or outsourcing training to a malicious third party.
- Random Attacks: Randomly alter labels in the training dataset to other arbitrary labels.
- Across Trajectory Attacks: Modify labels of activities to those of other activities with different trajectories.
- Inner Trajectory Attacks: Involve altering the labels of activities to those of other activities with similar trajectories, aiming to hide malicious tampering.

#### **DRAI** Poisoned Labels Inputs $\mathcal{D} = \{(\boldsymbol{x}_i, \tilde{y}_i)\}_{i=1}^n$ Clean Examples Mislabeled Examples **Backbone Unchosen Examples Formed Pairs** High Dimensional Feature Vectors $v_{i}$ Projection Linear Lower Prediction $\hat{p}(x_i)$ Dimension $z_i$ Cross Entropy SCL Loss

**Defenses** 


#### Results

Representation

**Similarity** 

Class2Simi

Sel-CL is highly effective against label flipping attacks, outperforming traditional SL and SCL.







Confident

**Examples** 

Poisoned

**Examples** 

0 0

Selection