# CERAS

The Center for Education and Research in Information Assurance and Security

# Risk Assessment of Multi-Agent System Under Denial-of-Service Cyberattacks Using Reachable Set Synthesis

Minhyun Cho, Sounghwan Hwang, and Inseok Hwang

(cho515, hwang214, kim4021, ihwang@purdue.edu)

## Motivation

- System Vulnerabilities of Multi-Agent Systems against Cyberattacks
  - Multi-agent systems (MASs) heavily rely on the communication between agents.
  - The heavy reliance of MASs on inter-agent communication can potentially lead to system vulnerabilities to cyber threats that hinder communication.



## Main Results

- Stabilization under DoS attacks
  - From the equations given in the problem formulation section, we can obtain:  $e(k+1) = (I_N \otimes A)e(k) - (\mathcal{L}_{s(k)} \otimes BK)e(k-d(k)) + (I_N \otimes B_w)w(k), \quad (1)$
  - A distributed consensus gain K that stabilizes the error dynamics (1), i.e., yields the bound error of the MAS  $z(k) = (I_N \otimes C)e(k)$  with the bounded disturbance w(k)

$$\lim_{k \to \infty} \frac{\mathbb{E}\left[\sum_{\tau=0}^{k} ||(I_N \otimes C)e(\tau)||^2\right]}{\mathbb{E}\left[\sum_{\tau=0}^{k} ||w(\tau)||^2\right]} \le \gamma^2 \quad (H_{\infty} \text{-criterion})$$

- **Reachable set computation for Markov switching system** 
  - Compute ellipsoidal over-approximated reachable sets of the switching error dynamics (1) following Markov process Project the error ellipsoids to the agents and quantify the risks at the agent and system levels using geometric operations, i.e., the union and intersections



- Limitations of Previous Studies
  - Counterattack strategies have been mainly using reactive approaches.
  - Operators or mission planners should assess associated risks and prevent a system from potential vulnerabilities in a proactive manner rather than naively applying robust control and using reactive strategies.
- Objectives
  - Propose a new proactive method to handle Denial-of-Service (DoS) cyberattacks.
  - Design a consensus control law and quantify the risk of DoS attacks on MASs.

## **Problem Formulation**

#### **Problem Statement**

- DoS attacks can randomly disrupt the communication networks modeled, where the attacks are modeled as the Markovian process, i.e., the network topology randomly switches according to a specified transition probability.
- To make realistic attack scenarios, we assume that the entries of the transition probability matrix,  $\Psi$ , are partially known.
- A virtual leader-following distributed control protocol with bounded but timevarying delay,  $0 < d_1 \leq d(k) \leq d_2$ , is assumed.

## Theorems

**Theorem 1** For given  $d_2 \ge d_1 \in \mathbb{R}^+$ , consider the MAS error dynamics (1) under DoS attacks with time-varying delays. For given  $\gamma \in \mathbb{R}^+$ , if there exist proper matrices  $G \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$ ,  $\hat{K} \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$ ,  $\hat{P}_{\alpha} = \hat{P}_{\alpha}^T \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$  for  $\alpha \in \mathcal{I}_{\mathbb{S}}$ ,  $\mathcal{X}_i, \mathcal{Q}_i, \mathcal{Y}_i \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$  for  $i \in \mathcal{I}_3$ , and  $\mathcal{Z}_i, \mathcal{S}_i, \mathcal{M}_i, \mathcal{U}_i \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$  for  $i \in \mathcal{I}_2$ , such that the following LMIs are satisfied for  $\forall \alpha, \beta \in \mathcal{I}_{\mathbb{S}}$ ; then the distributed controller gain K can be determined, where  $K = \hat{K}G^{-1}$ . Finally, the MAS closed-loop error dynamics is stochastically mean-square stable with the  $H_{\infty}$  criterion.

$$\hat{P}_{\alpha\beta} < 0, \ \hat{P}_{\alpha} > 0, \ and \ \Phi_i > 0, \ \forall i \in \mathcal{I}_3,$$

where descriptions for the matrices are provided in the paper.

**Theorem 2** Let the LMIs from Theorem 1 be satisfied. For given  $d_2 \ge d_1 \in \mathbb{Z}^+$ ,  $\delta > 0$ , and  $\rho \in (0,1)$ , if there exist matrices  $P_{\alpha} \in \mathbb{R}^{Nn \times Nn} > 0 \text{ and } \bar{P}_{\alpha} \in \mathbb{R}^{3Nn \times 3Nn} > 0 \text{ for } \alpha \in \mathcal{C}(=\mathcal{I}_{\mathbb{S}}), Q_{i} \in \mathbb{R}^{Nn \times Nn} > 0 \text{ for } i \in \mathcal{I}_{3}, S_{i} \in \mathbb{R}^{Nn \times Nn} > 0 \text{ and } \bar{P}_{\alpha} \in \mathbb{R}^{Nn \times Nn} > 0 \text{ for } i \in \mathcal{I}_{3}, Z_{i} \in \mathbb{R}^{Nn \times Nn} > 0 \text{ for } i \in \mathcal{I}_{3}, Z_{i} \in \mathbb{R}^{Nn \times Nn} > 0 \text{ and } \bar{P}_{\alpha} \in \mathbb{R}^{Nn \times Nn} = 0 \text{ for } i \in \mathcal{I}_{3}, Z_{i} \in \mathbb{R}^{Nn \times Nn} \text{ for } i \in \mathcal{I}_{3}, Z_{i} \in \mathbb{R}^{Nn \times Nn}, \bar{X} \in \mathbb{R}^{2Nn \times 2Nn}, \Theta \in \mathbb{R}^{2nN \times \kappa N} \text{ and } \bar{M}_{\alpha} \in \mathbb{R}^{\kappa N \times \kappa N}$ such that the following LMIs are satisfied:

$$\begin{split} \bar{\Upsilon}_{1}, \bar{\Upsilon}_{2} < 0, \ \mathcal{R}_{1}, \mathcal{R}_{2} > 0, \ Z_{2} - Z_{3} > 0, \\ W_{P1\alpha}^{T} \bar{P}_{\beta} W_{P1\alpha} - \bar{M}_{\alpha} < 0, \ \forall \alpha \in \mathcal{C}, \forall \beta \in \mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{U}\mathbb{A}}^{\alpha}, \\ \begin{bmatrix} S_{2} & Z_{4} \\ * & S_{2} \end{bmatrix} > 0, \ \bar{P}_{\alpha} - \begin{bmatrix} P_{\alpha} & \mathbf{0} \\ * & \mathbf{0} \end{bmatrix} > 0, \ \kappa = (7n+p)N \end{split}$$

then the reachable set of MAS error dynamics (1) under DoS attacks with the Markovian process is bounded in mean-square sense. The detailed descriptions are provided in the paper.

## Illustrative Example

## Results

- Our method proposes an affordable way to evaluate the risk by using the reachable sets and geometric operations among the sets.
- The union (blue) of the projected over-approximated reachable sets of the DoSattacked case is larger than that of the attack-free case for every time instance.
- In the attack-free case, the summation of the area of the intersection ellipses (red) at t = 18s is computed as  $32.68m^2$ , while that of the attacked case is computed as 72.79m<sup>2</sup>. The intersection reachable sets increase over two times, which reveals an



Figure 2. A schematic showing the structure of the MAS (w/ formulation) and potential risks associated with the MAS under DoS cyberattacks. increased probability of inter-agent collisions.



Fig 3. Trajectory of MAS (top left); network topology change in DoS attack case (top middle); network topologies (top right); over-approximated reachable sets at t = 18s in attack-free case (bottom left) and in DoS attack case (bottom right).

## References

- 1. M., Cho, S., Hwang, I., Hwang, "Risk Assessment of Multi-Agent System Under Denial-of-Service Cyberattacks Using Reachable Set Synthesis", 2024 American Control Conference, Accepted.
- 2. S., Hwang, M., Cho, S., Kim, I., Hwang, "An LMI-based Risk Assessment of Leader-Follower Multi-Agent System under Stealthy Cyberattacks", IEEE Control Systems Letters, 2023.



