

The Center for Education and Research in Information Assurance and Security

# Snooping Pay-over-the-Phone Transactions over Encrypted 5G/4G Voice Calls

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
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## **Attack Overview**


### Snooping Pay-over-the-phone (PoP) transactions in the air

- Normal use scenario: UE (say, a mobile phone) calls an Interactive Voice Response (IVR) system and makes a credit/debit card transaction to pay a bill.
- Attack: deploy a radio sniffer only to infer such sensitive and confidential payment transactions




### Not far from real threats ...


- 100% contactless, ready to launch now
  - No access, comprise or malwares on UE, 5G/4G NET, IVR
  - Many attack scenarios:
    - Snooping students, staffs and professors @LWSN
    - Snooping neighbors @home
    - Snooping customers @mall/Starbucks ...
    - •
- Unexpected, despite encryption protection in 5G/4G
  - Authentication and key agreement (AKA)
  - Layer 2: ciphered by PDCP
  - Layer 3: encrypted by IPSEC ...



### **Attack Solution**




- Detecting 5G/4G voice calls over encrypted traffic
  - Tiny packets (≤13 bytes) only in voice, not other traffic
    - Ironically, due to 5G/4G enhancement techniques
      - Adaptive speech codec (AWR): lower rate for noise
      - Comfort Noise (CN): background noise in the silence to make the other party hear something and avoid call termination
      - Robust Header Compression (RoHC): compress very small PDCP packets that carry voice calls
- Detecting IVR calls using IVR-specific fingerprinting
  - <u>DTMF-like tone</u>: very brief, different from human speech
  - Primarily one-way traffic: IVR talks and human listens
  - Purpose-specific call patterns: depending on IVR menu



- Detecting PoP transactions over payment-specific patterns
  - Credit/Debit Card Number (15 -- 16 digits)
  - Expiry Date (4 digits)
  - Security Code (CVV) (3 4 digits)
  - Zip Code (5 9 digits)

Note: each digit creates one DTMF tone (one key touch)


# Controller Auxiliary Audio Cable (AUX) Stereo Sound Adapter



(a) Training (data collection) (b) Launching the attack

### **Attack Evaluation**

- Ethics: all in controlled experiment (victims all owed by us )
- 1000 radio traces from 30 companies
  - LSTM + CNN: >93% accuracy (except cut-off)







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Know more about the MSSN Lab (Mobile System, Security and Networking)



