# CERIAS

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
## Visualization of Network Traffic on Purdue High Performance MaKayla McCartan<sup>1</sup>, Akash Ravi<sup>1</sup>, Erik Gough<sup>2</sup> 1. Computer and Information Technology

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## **Overview**

Purdue University is home to several high performance computing (HPC) resources, including campus computing clusters, storage systems and Anvil, a \$10M NSF funded supercomputer. These HPC resources are connected to a "Science DMZ" (Figure 1) network designed to provide a friction-free path supporting low latency, high-speed data transfer. A Zeek-based intrusion detection system called PULSAR (Purdue Live Security Analyzer) is used for network monitoring of the Science DMZ. The IDS processes and stores JSON logs at a rate of **thousands of events per second**.

The scale and format of the IDS logs makes it almost impossible to manually




investigate traffic trends without a Security and Information Event Management (SIEM) system. A SIEM was built to provide this functionality, where IDS logs are shipped using Filebeats and indexed in ElasticSearch via a log ingest pipeline that enriches the logs with GeoIP data. Kibana provides easy access for traffic filtering and visualization.

In this work, we use the SIEM to produce visualizations of network traffic on the Science DMZ, showing interesting traffic and attack trends for Purdue's HPC resources.


Figure 1. Purdue Research Network Diagram and Science DMZ

### **Visualizations**



**Figures 2 and 3** show port scanning from geographical origin of the scanning host. The data shows where the most port scanning attacks originate from. **Figure 3** specifically shows the countries with the most port scanning origins detected by the IDS.

#### Figure 2. World Map of Port Scanning Origin









Figure 3. Top Countries for Port Scanning Origin

**Figure 4** shows the baseline percentage of port scanning each cluster receives on the Purdue



#### Figure 4. Port Scanning by Cluster in Percentage




Figure 6. Percentage of Login versus Brute-forcing

**Figure 6** shows the percentage of authorized login versus SSH brute-forcing attempts detected by the IDS. Implementation of BoilerKey two-factor authorization minimizes the threat of successful SSH brute-forcing attempts.

#### Figure 5. Different Traffic Types in Percentages




Figure 7. Heatmap of MySQL Source/Destination Connections

**Figure 7** describes the number of connections from source and destination connections to different MySQL database servers on the Research Network. This shows at least two database services that are being accessed on the public Internet.

#### research network.

**Figure 5** shows the different types of network connections that are logged by the IDS. The combination of these graphs demonstrates most of the network connections on the Science DMZ are port scanning attempts.

## **Future Work**

We have shown the SIEM can be used to easily filter, create visualizations and gain insight into network traffic trends on the Purdue Science DMZ. In future work, we plan to implement additional SIEM-based alerting and automated threat mitigation through route filtering of traffic from identified attackers.

## **Acknowledgment**

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