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## Sustained Space and Cumulative Complexity Trade-offs for Data-Dependent Memory-Hard Functions

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#### Motivation

- Billions of user accounts have been affected by password breaches
  - An attacker who obtains hashes of user passwords launches a brute force attack to guess the users' passwords
  - The attacker must evaluate the hash function millions or billions of times
  - Specialized hardware allows attackers to evaluate these functions



orders of magnitude faster than standard hardware, but memory cost is relatively uniform across different types of hardware.

- Memory Hard Functions (MHFs) are functions that have high memory cost
- Leaked passwords hashed with MHFs are robust against offline brute-force attacks
- Measures of memory hardness:
  - **Cumulative Complexity (CC):** The sum (over all steps in the computation) of the memory required to compute the MHF
  - *s*-Sustained Space Complexity (*s*-SSC): The number of steps required to sustain *s* bits of memory to computer the MHF.
- Data-dependent MHFs (dMHFs) are a broad class of MHFs which trade sidechannel resistance for easy constructions and asymptotically stronger CC
- In general, MHFs have weak SSC Guarantees; Can dMHFs perform better?

### Contribution

- dMHFs have much stronger SSC guarantees.
- We analyze four dMHFs of varying practicality:
  - **Dynamic EGS:** asymptotically maximal SSC, but very impractical
  - **Dynamic DRSample:** practical MHF candidate with almost maximal SSC
  - Argon2id: already deployed and widely used, but much weaker SSC than the others
    Our Construction: a theoretical construction with maximal tradeoff with constant indegree

#### **Our Construction**

- **Dynamic pebbling graphs:** a node v can have a random edge from some prior node r(v) which is only visible to the pebbler once v's predecessor is pebbled
- **ST-Robust graphs:** *N* inputs/outputs with high connectivity between them
- Our construction:  $\mathbb{G}_D^N$  (pictured above)
  - ST robust graph with N inputs and N outputs
  - Pebbling graph *D* overlayed onto the inputs
  - Line graph at the end with random edges to outputs
- Intuition: high connectivity between inputs and outputs
  - If a pebbling strategy uses relatively few pebbles, then (with high probability) they need to repebble many inputs
- The inputs have high CC, so the strategy incurs high cost **Results**

#### Methods

- Instead analyze pebbling games on graphs
- Each round, pebbles can be placed on any (and all) nodes whose parents are all pebbled
- Goal: place a pebble on the sink



- Pebbling:  $P_1 = \{1\}, P_2 = \{2,3\}, P_3 = \{3,4\}, \text{ and } P_4 = \{5\}$
- cc(P) = 1 + 2 + 2 + 1 = 6
- 2-ssc(P) = 0 + 1 + 1 + 0 = 2

- Results of the following form:
  - A pebbling strategy either sustains s pebbles for  $\Omega(N)$  steps, or has CC at least C
  - Every graph has CC at most  $N^2/2$ , so the goal is to require CC  $\omega(N^2)$  while keeping s as large as possible
- Graphs with higher than constant indegree lead to MHFs that are Impractical for common applications

Dynamic Graph	Indegree	Sustained Space	Cumulative Cost
Dynamic EGS	$O(\log N)$	$\Omega(N)$	$\Omega(N^3)$
Dynamic DRSample	2	$\Omega\left(\frac{N}{\log N}\right)$	$\Omega\left(\frac{N^{3}}{\log N}\right)$
Argon2id	2	$\Omega(N^{1-\epsilon})$	$\Omega(N^{2+2\epsilon})$
Our Construction	2	$\Omega(N)$	$\Omega(N^{3-\epsilon})$

• **Open Question:** can we use these pebbling arguments on dynamic graphs directly prove similar SSC/CC trade-offs for their corresponding dMHFs?

#### References

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