




CERIAS

The Center for Education and Research in Information Assurance and Security



CheckCBox: Automated and Zero Cost Spatial Memory Safety

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The Never Ending Trend of Spatial Safety Violations

Spatial Safety Violations still are the Major class of vulnerabilities in Low-level system software.

Safe languages

Safe by design: Prevents memory corruption vulnerabilities.




What about **Legacy code**? Not feasible to rewrite.



Retrofitting Techniques

Address Sanitizer (ASan)



Slow ($\geq 50\%$).

Not backward compatible and need runtime changes.

Existing Approaches Have High Overhead (Porting and Performance)

Completely rewriting existing legacy code in Safe languages is not viable.

ASAN and SoftBound CETS High Performance Overhead
No Backward Compatibility and needs runtime changes

Checked C



Fast

Backward compatible

`_Ptr`
`_Array_ptr`
`_Nt_array_ptr`

Name	LOC	LOC%	LOC%	LOC%	LOC%	LOC%
main	100	100	100	100	100	100
efunc	218	84.5	79	80	725	334
global	103	49.4	103	103	103	103
bar	343	97.8	83	23	183	87
baz	303	85.1	81	80	453	20
foo	86	63.1	52	80	49	108
barrier	150	49.2	39	80	239	185
main2	172	62.3	204	43	103	172
tp	99	94.5	103	80	476	146
main3	264	67.6	107	23.6	1046	161
tp2	197	96.5	83	254	183	113
tp3	112	95.4	81	234	103	107
main4	145	51.5	182	493	284	283

Pointers annotated with Checked C types are guaranteed to not have any spatial violations


Can We Automatically Convert C to Checked C?

```
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
    int *b, *c;
    char *str = argv[0];
    b = &global;
    baz(b);
    c = b;
    printf("%d", strlen(str));
    return 0;
}
```

```
int *efunc();
int global;
int baz(int *p) {
    *p = 1;
    return 0;
}
```

```
int bar() {
    int *a = efunc();
    baz(a);
    return 0;
}
```

3C



```
int main(int argc, _Array_ptr<_Nt_array_ptr<char>> argv) {
    _Ptr<int> b;
    _Ptr<int> c;
    _Nt_array_ptr<char> str = argv[0];
    b = &global;
    baz(b);
    c = b;
    printf("%d", strlen(str));
    return 0;
}
```

```
int *efunc();
int global;
int baz(int *p: _Ptr<int>) {
    *p = 1;
    return 0;
}
```

```
int bar() {
    int *a = efunc();
    baz(a);
    return 0;
}
```

Complete Automated Conversion is *not Feasible*
Some regions of code will be still **unchecked**




Checked C to Rescue

RLBox

A C++ library that:

- Abstracts isolation mechanism
 - Sandboxing with chosen isolation mechanism
 - Process, Native Client, WebAssembly, etc.
- Mediates app-sandbox communication
 - APIs for control flow in/out of sandbox
 - tainted types for data flow in/out of sandbox



```
int main(int argc, _Array_ptr<_Nt_array_ptr<char>> argv) {
    _Ptr<int> b;
    _Ptr<int> c;
    _Nt_array_ptr<char> str = argv[0];
    b = &global;
    baz(b);
    c = b;
    printf("%d", strlen(str));
    return 0;
}
```

```
int *efunc();
int global;
int baz(_Ptr<int> p) {
    *p = 1;
    return 0;
}
```

```
int bar() {
    int *a = efunc();
    baz(a);
    return 0;
}
```

CheckCBox: High level Idea

Let's use RLBox to encapsulate unchecked regions and add marshalling between the regions.

Challenges

- Automatically generating marshalling layers - Interaction between checked/unchecked/tainted types
- Handling Callbacks from "unchecked" region to "checked" region

Progress

- We were able to successfully encapsulate unchecked regions using RLBox and create required marshalling stubs
- Working on formalizing Checked C semantics with RLBox
- [On going] Working on automated encapsulation of unchecked regions into RLBox

Are you Curious?

- Open Source: <https://github.com/purs3lab/CheckC-Box>
- Contact:
 - Arun Kumar (bhattar1@purdue.edu)
 - PurS3 Lab: <https://purs3lab.github.io/>