# CERAS

The Center for Education and Research in Information Assurance and Security




Automatic Attack Discovery in Large-Scale Distributed Systems - Hyojeong

## Gatling: Automatic Attack Discovery in Large-Scale Distributed Systems

### Hyojeong Lee, Jeff Seibert, Charles Killian and Cristina Nita-Rotaru

Department of Computer Science and CERIAS, Purdue University



- To gain confidence that an implementation is bug-free: use automated test techniques
- Model checker
- Symbolic execution
- To gain confidence that the system will work under attack?
- -Think about possible attacks
- -Manually implement to verify the attack

We need an automated technique to find attacks

### Problem

### We want to find automatically:

- Performance attacks conducted through messages by insiders
- •In large-scale distributed systems
- Using real implementations
- Minimal input from developer

### Challenges

- Malicious Implementation
- -Lying message is protocol dependent
- -Random bit-flipping is not effective
- Space Space Explosion
- -Too many possible actions and combinations
- Fuzzy Metric
- -Unlucky run vs. successful attack?

### **Event-based** simulator:

steady performance

### Fault injector:

injects malicious actions to mimic malicious implementation



### Modelchecker:

model checker style exploration + greedy algorithm to build up attack



Time 1504 B9 43 ...  $n_3$ 95 A2 ... 1515  $n_1$ 1527 A8 1D ...  $n_2$ 1534 4E 74 ... 1540 52 F6 ...  $n_{2}$ 

Message

**Delivery Action** 

– Drop Dup Delay Divert

 $n_4$  $n_3$ Message Lying Action –Zero

– Min and max -Spanning

– Scaling Random

### (1) Execution path Greedy (3) Take a Action benign branch B, execute for Selection $t_w$ seconds **Procedure** (4) Find the benign baseline

S = perf(B)

(2) A malicious node sends a message of type  $m_1$ 


> (5) For every malicious action  $a_i$  take a branch  $B_i$  execute protocol for  $t_w$  seconds

(6) Evaluate  $S_i =$  $perf(B_i)$ , choose the worst performance  $S_i$ and update the tally for malicious action  $a_i$ 

Performance Tally

### Malicious actions (faults)

- Message delivery actions are applied to a particular message
- Message lying actions are applied to a particular field inside the message



m<sub>1</sub> Greedy selection is tallied and Gatling Gatling output: builds up an attack by combining results

m 2

<m<sub>1</sub>, Delay; m<sub>2</sub>, Lie>

### **Summary of Result**

Target	
Systems	
BulletPrime	
Vivaldi	
Chord	
DHT	
ESM	
Scribe	

Attack Types 17 lying 12 drop 6 delay 5 duplicate 1 divert

Number of **Attacks Previously** 20 Reported Newly 21 Found 41 Total Each attack took a few minutes to a few hours to discover

No Attack — 1400 Dup Parent 🔫 1200 Throughput (kbps) 1000 600

Simulation Time (s)

(Example threshold: 3)

### **Attacks found in ESM**

- -No Attack: baseline
- -Dup Parent: Malicious node duplicates and diverts parent accept message and drops data later
- -Lie Latency/Lie Bandwidth: Malicious node lies about its performance and drops data later





3/19/2012 2:55:12 PM