



2008 - A50-1E7 - Solicitation Token Authenticated Mail Protocol - Kurt Ackermann - IA


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Solicitation Token Authenticated Mail Protocol

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Problem

Unsolicited mail threatens to grind email productivity to a halt, costing billions



annually. Users have no access control over their inbox once their email address


is leaked.



First hop MTA email with MUA HMACs message with T_{P.U}

message via SMTP **T_{P.U}**, accepts message authenticated for delivery email

Solicitation



- 1. Both parties exchange email addresses out of band
- 2. Both enter them into the contact list in their email client, which configures the local mail server for token exchange

- Server-side solution to provide token-based, user-grain email message authentication
- Distribution of token is protected from adversaries
- Treacherous contacts and email leaks are identified and revoked immediately at the receiver-side
- Phases: Solicitation, Authentication, and Revocation

Authentication

- Sender's server appends message HMAC to message using token as key
- 3. Sender's server sends an authenticated Token Request message
- 4. The receiver-side server responds with a Token Reply message, including the encrypted token that will be used to authenticate messages between them.

Revocation

- The sender of all spam received can be identified by dereferencing the authenticating token
- Revocation is immediate on the receiver's local mail server

Directional trust Bidirectional rust --- Transitive trust Mailing List 🖌 Entity with Server 7 trust level N (b) Websites and (a) Transitive (c) Transitive × Revocation mailing lists revocation trust

• Recipient server validates HMAC by recomputing it with the secret token


Transitive Trust Model

- Trusted contacts can extend their token to third parties
- Auditing chains are maintained for accountability
- Transitive revocation is granular to transitive degree

Experimental Results 7000 STAMP -----STAMP ----SpamAssassinX SpamAssassin ·····×···· (sec) STAMP - naive attacker ·····×···· (sec) (ms) 5000 atency atency time 200 4000 150 90

Conclusions

1. STAMP authentication is more efficient than Bayesian content filtering by orders of magnitude



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