


# CERIAS

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
## A Serious Form of Attack: SN2K - Software-based Need-to-Know Attacks

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### Existing Programming Models: Insecure



### Example



### SN2K Attacks: Types

<b>Depth Attack (1)</b>	at least one field in a composite parameter
<b>Breadth Attack (2)</b>	at least one parameter
<b>Aggregate-function Attack (3)</b>	at least one parameter/field declared by an aggregate, but used only by a component function

not necessary for the service offered

### Formal Semantics:


Function  $f: R = \{p \mid p = (T, x)\}$ , field  $f \in T$ ,  $T_1 = T - \{f\}$ .

(1)  $R' = R \cup (T_1, x) - \{p\}$   $[f]R' = [f]R$

(2)  $R'' = R - \{p\}$ ,  $[f]R'' = [f]R$

(3) Combination of (1) and (2) in aggregate functions/services.

### Attack Tree for SN2K: Force client to send extra sensitive data



### Feasibility of Attack

Simple
Efficient
Asymmetric cost to client (more) and to attacker (very less)

### Language Mechanisms for Attack

Polymorphism: depth attack
Aliasing: fake use
Undecidability: fake use

### Sources of Attack

Malicious service providers
Software evolution
Automatic/Dynamic service composition
Malicious insider

### Dimensions of a Solution

Type-safety
Static or dynamic typing
Alias analysis
Static program analysis
Dynamic program analysis
Semantic analysis

### Detecting an Attack and Certification

Input: Function  $f: \text{signature } (S)$ , implementation  $(I)$   
Signature:  $\text{RetType } f(T_1: X_1, T_2: X_2, \dots, T_n: X_n)$

- Alias analysis: determine aliases in  $I$
- Dead code elimination on  $I$ : generate  $I'$  with no dead code
- Type-inferencing on  $I'$ 
  - 1. detect parameters used in **depth attack** and **breadth attack**
  - 2. **prune** these parameters to generate  $S'$  from  $S$
- Forward slicing from  $S'$  over  $I'$ : params affecting result
- Interprocedural semantic analysis on  $I'$ : program properties, invariants, **aggregation-function attack**
- Prune** params/computations that do not affect result (4, 5):  $I''$
- Carry out dynamic analysis, to remove **fake use**, if any detected:  $S'''$ ,  $I'''$
- Certify**  $S'''$  and  $I'''$ : **signed-hash**( $S'''$ , **binary of**  $I'''$ ).

### Future directions: non-monopolistic programming model.

Reference: Software-based Need-to-know attacks (SN2K attacks), Ashish Kundu, to be submitted.