

Beyond Proof-of-compliance: Security Analysis in Trust Management

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Trust management is a form of distributed access control that allows one principal to delegate some access decisions to other principals. While this makes trust management more flexible than the access matrix model, it makes safety and security analysis more important. We show that in contrast to the undecidability of classical HRU safety properties, our primary security properties are decidable. In particular, most safety properties we study are decidable in polynomial time. The computational complexity of containment analysis, the most complicated security property we study, forms a complexity hierarchy based on the expressive power of the trust management language.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Access control techniques, which govern whether one party can access resources and objects controlled by another party, are useful in protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information. Traditional access control schemes make authorization decisions based on the identity of the requester. However, in decentralized or multicentric environments, the resource owner and the requester often are unknown to one another, making access control based on identity ineffective. For example, although a certificate authority may assert that the requester's name is John Q. Smith, if this name is unknown to

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the access mediator, the name itself does not aid in making an authorization decision. What is needed is information about the rights, qualifications, responsibilities and other characteristics assigned to John Q. Smith by one or more authorities, as well as trust information about the authorities themselves.

Trust management [Blaze et al. 1996; Blaze et al. 1999a; 1999b; Rivest and Lampson 1996; Ellison et al. 1999; Clarke et al. 2001; Gunter and Jim 2000; Jim 2001; Li et al. 2003; Li et al. 2003; Li et al. 2002; Li and Mitchell 2003; Weeks 2001] is an approach to access control in decentralized distributed systems with access control decisions based on policy statements made by multiple principals. In trust management systems, statements that are maintained in a distributed manner are often digitally signed to ensure their authenticity and integrity; such statements are called *credentials* or *certificates*. A key aspect of trust management is delegation: a principal may transfer limited authority over one or more resources to other principals. While the use of delegation greatly enhances flexibility and scalability, it may also reduce the control that a principal has over the resources it owns. Since delegation gives a certain degree of control to a principal that may be only partially trusted, a natural security concern is whether a resource owner nonetheless has some guarantees about who can access their resources. If we think of the union of all policies of all principals as the state of a TM system, then a state may change as the result of a single step that adds or removes a policy statement, or as the result of a finite sequence of such steps. A resource owner generally has control over some part of the state, but cannot control all possible changes. In this paper, we consider the *security analysis* problem, which asks what accesses may be allowed or prevented by prospective changes in the state of a TM system.

A few definitions are useful for stating the security analysis problem more precisely. In general, a TM language has a syntax for specifying *policy statements* and *queries*, together with an entailment relation \vdash . We call a set \mathcal{P} of policy statements a *state* of a TM system. Given a state \mathcal{P} and a query Q , the relation $\mathcal{P} \vdash Q$ means that Q is true in \mathcal{P} . When Q arises from an access request, $\mathcal{P} \vdash Q$ means that access Q is allowed in \mathcal{P} ; a proof demonstrating $\mathcal{P} \vdash Q$ is then called a *proof-of-compliance*.

Recognizing that a principal or a coalition of cooperating principals may control only a part of the global state, we assume there is a *restriction rule*, \mathcal{R} , that defines how states may be changed. For example, the principal in question may consider the part of the state controlled by fully trusted principals to be fixed, while considering that other principals may remove some policy statements and/or add new ones. Given a state \mathcal{P} and a restriction rule \mathcal{R} , we write $\mathcal{P} \mapsto_{\mathcal{R}} \mathcal{P}'$ if the change from \mathcal{P} to \mathcal{P}' is allowed by \mathcal{R} , and $\mathcal{P} \mapsto^*_{\mathcal{R}} \mathcal{P}'$ if a sequence of zero or more allowed changes leads from \mathcal{P} to \mathcal{P}' . If $\mathcal{P} \mapsto^*_{\mathcal{R}} \mathcal{P}'$, we say that \mathcal{P}' is *\mathcal{R} -reachable* from \mathcal{P} , or simply \mathcal{P}' is *reachable*, when \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{R} are clear from context.

DEFINITION 1. Let \mathcal{P} be a state, \mathcal{R} a restriction rule, and Q a query. *Existential security analysis* takes the form: Does there exist \mathcal{P}' such that $\mathcal{P} \mapsto^*_{\mathcal{R}} \mathcal{P}'$ and $\mathcal{P}' \vdash Q$? When the answer is affirmative, we say Q is *possible* given \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{R} . *Universal security analysis* takes the form: For every \mathcal{P}' such that $\mathcal{P} \mapsto^*_{\mathcal{R}} \mathcal{P}'$, does $\mathcal{P}' \vdash Q$? If so, we say Q is *necessary* given \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{R} .

Here are some motivating examples of security analysis problems.

Simple Safety. (Existential) Does there exist a reachable state in which a specific (pre-

sumably untrusted) principal has access to a given resource?

Simple Availability. (Universal) In every reachable state, does a specific (presumably trusted) principal have access to a given resource?

Bounded Safety. (Universal) In every reachable state, is the set of all principals that have access to a given resource bounded by a given set of principals?

Liveness. (Existential) Does there exist a reachable state in which no principal has access to a given resource?

Mutual Exclusion. (Universal) In every reachable state, are two given properties (or two given resources) mutually exclusive, i.e., no principal has both properties (or access to both resources) at the same time?

Containment. (Universal) In every reachable state, does every principal that has one property (e.g., has access to a resource) also have another property (e.g., is an employee)? Containment can express safety or availability (e.g., by interchanging the two example properties in the previous sentence).

Simple safety analysis was first formalized by Harrison et al. [Harrison et al. 1976] in the context of the well-known access matrix model [Lampson 1971; Graham and Denning 1972]. Simple safety analysis was referred to as *safety analysis* since other analysis problems were not considered. The model in [Harrison et al. 1976] is commonly known as the HRU model. In the general HRU model, *safety analysis* is undecidable [Harrison et al. 1976]. A number of protection models were developed to make safety analysis more tractable. Lipton and Snyder introduced the take-grant model [Lipton and Snyder 1977], in which simple safety can be decided in linear time. Sandhu introduced the Schematic Protection Model [Sandhu 1988], and the Typed Access Matrix model [Sandhu 1992]. In these previous works, only simple safety analysis are considered; the other kinds of analysis listed above were not. Since some of the analysis problems are about properties other than safety (e.g., availability), we use the term *security analysis* rather than safety analysis.

To the best of our knowledge, security analysis for TM systems has not been investigated previously as such. In this paper, we define a precise model for security analysis in trust management. The policy languages we consider are languages in the *RT* family of Role-based Trust-management languages [Li et al. 2003; Li et al. 2002; Li and Mitchell 2003]. The *RT* family combines the strengths of Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [Sandhu et al. 1996] and previous trust-management (TM) systems. Semantics for the *RT* family is defined by translating each statement into a logic programming clause. In this paper, we consider four languages in the *RT* family; they are denoted by $RT[\]$, $RT[\cap]$, $RT[\leftarrow]$, and $RT[\leftarrow, \cap]$. $RT[\]$ is the most basic language in the family; it has two types of statements: *simple member* and *simple inclusion*. $RT[\cap]$ adds to $RT[\]$ *intersection inclusion* statements. $RT[\leftarrow]$ adds to $RT[\]$ *linking inclusion* statements, which can be used to express attribute-based delegation. $RT[\leftarrow, \cap]$ has both intersection inclusion and linking inclusion; $RT[\leftarrow, \cap]$ is a slightly simplified (yet expressively equivalent) version of the RT_0 language described in [Li et al. 2003].

All the security analysis problems listed above are considered. While the TM language we are studying supports delegation and is more expressive than the access matrix model in certain ways, and the kinds of analysis problems we consider are more general, somewhat surprisingly, they are decidable. Simple safety, simple availability, bounded safety, liveness, and mutual exclusion analysis for $RT[\leftarrow, \cap]$ (and hence for the other three sub-

languages of $RT[\leftarrow, \cap]$) can all be answered in time polynomial in the size of the state \mathcal{P} . These analysis problems are answered by evaluating queries against logic programs derived from the state \mathcal{P} and the restriction rule \mathcal{R} .

Containment analysis is the most interesting case, both in terms of usefulness and in terms of technical challenge. The computational complexity of containment analysis depends on the language features. In $RT[\]$, the most basic language, containment analysis is in \mathbf{P} . Containment analysis become more complex when additional policy language features are used. Containment analysis is \mathbf{coNP} -complete for $RT[\cap]$, \mathbf{PSPACE} -complete for $RT[\leftarrow]$, and decidable in \mathbf{coNEXP} for $RT[\leftarrow, \cap]$. These complexity properties are proved using techniques and results from logic programming, formal languages, and automata theory. For $RT[\]$, we use logic programs derived from \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{R} to do containment analysis. These logic programs use negation-as-failure in a stratified manner [Apt et al. 1988]. For $RT[\cap]$, we show that containment analysis is essentially equivalent to determining validity of propositional logic formulas. The $RT[\leftarrow]$ language is expressively equivalent to SDSI (Simple Distributed Security Infrastructure) [Rivest and Lampson 1996; Clarke et al. 2001], and is related to a class of string rewriting systems modelled using pushdown systems [Bouajjani et al. 1997]. We show that containment analysis in $RT[\leftarrow]$ can be reduced to determining containment among reachable configurations of pushdown systems, which is again reduced to determining containment of languages accepted by Nondeterministic Finite Automata (NFAs). For the case of $RT[\leftarrow, \cap]$, we show that if a containment does not hold, then there must exist a counter-example state (i.e., a reachable state in which the containment does not hold) of size at most exponential in the size of the input.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define the model we use to study security analysis in TM. In Section 3, we handle simple safety, simple availability, liveness, and mutual exclusion. In Section 4, we present results about containment analysis. We discuss related work in Section 5, and conclude in Section 6. An appendix contains proofs that are not included in the main body.

2. A CONCRETE SECURITY ANALYSIS PROBLEM

The abstract definition of security analysis in Definition 1 has three parameters: the language used to express the state \mathcal{P} , and the form of query \mathcal{Q} and the form of restriction rule \mathcal{R} . In this section, we define concrete security analysis problems by supplying these parameters, discuss our choices, give an example that will be used throughout the paper, and discuss how security analysis can be used in practical situations to achieve security objectives.

2.1 Syntax of The TM Language

The policy languages we consider are in the *RT* family of Role-based Trust-management languages. More specifically, we consider $RT[\leftarrow, \cap]$ and its three sub-languages: $RT[\]$, $RT[\leftarrow]$, and $RT[\cap]$. The basic constructs of $RT[\leftarrow, \cap]$ include *principals* and *role names*. In this paper, we use A, B, D, E, F, X, Y , and Z , sometimes with subscripts, to denote principals. A role name is a word over some given standard alphabet. We use r, u , and w , sometimes with subscripts, to denote role names. A *role* takes the form of a principal followed by a role name, separated by a dot, e.g., $A.r$ and $X.u$. A *role* defines a set of principals that are members of this role. Each principal A has the authority to designate the members of each role of the form $A.r$. An access control permission is represented as

a role as well; for example, that B is a member of the role of $A.r$ may represent that B has the permission to do action r on the object A .

There are four types of policy statements in $RT[\leftarrow, \cap]$, each corresponding to a different way of defining role membership:

— *Simple Member:* $A.r \leftarrow D$

This statement means that A asserts that D is a member of A 's r role. We read " \leftarrow " as "includes".

— *Simple Inclusion:* $A.r \leftarrow B.r_1$

This statement means that A asserts that its r role includes (all members of) B 's r_1 role. This represents a delegation from A to B , since B may affect who is a member of the role $A.r$ by issuing statements about $B.r_1$.

— *Linking Inclusion:* $A.r \leftarrow A.r_1.r_2$

We call $A.r_1.r_2$ a *linked role*. This statement means that A asserts that $A.r$ includes $B.r_2$ for every B that is a member of $A.r_1$. This represents a delegation from A to all the members of the role $A.r_1$.

— *Intersection Inclusion:* $A.r \leftarrow B_1.r_1 \cap B_2.r_2$

We call $B_1.r_1 \cap B_2.r_2$ an *intersection*. This statement means that A asserts that $A.r$ includes every principal who is a member of both $B_1.r_1$ and $B_2.r_2$. This represents partial delegations from A to B_1 and to B_2 .

A *role expression* is a principal, a role, a linked role, or an intersection. We say that each policy statement *defines* the role $A.r$. Given a set \mathcal{P} of policy statements, we define the following: $\text{Principals}(\mathcal{P})$ is the set of principals in \mathcal{P} , $\text{Names}(\mathcal{P})$ is the set of role names in \mathcal{P} , and $\text{Roles}(\mathcal{P}) = \{A.r \mid A \in \text{Principals}(\mathcal{P}), r \in \text{Names}(\mathcal{P})\}$. $RT[\leftarrow, \cap]$ is a slightly simplified (yet expressively equivalent) version of RT_0 [Li et al. 2003].¹ In this paper, we also consider the following sub-languages of $RT[\leftarrow, \cap]$: $RT[\]$ has only simple member and simple inclusion statements, $RT[\leftarrow]$ adds to $RT[\]$ linking inclusion statements, and $RT[\cap]$ adds to $RT[\]$ intersection inclusion statements.

The four types of statements in $RT[\leftarrow, \cap]$ cover the most common delegation relationships in other TM languages such as SPKI/SDSI [Ellison et al. 1999; Clarke et al. 2001] and KeyNote [Blaze et al. 1999a]. The sub-language $RT[\leftarrow]$ can be viewed as a simplified yet expressively equivalent version of SDSI. SDSI allows long linked names, which, as observed in [Li et al. 2003], can be broken up by introducing new role names and statements. With the exception of thresholds, the delegation relationships (though, not the s-expression-based representation of permission) in SPKI's 5-tuples, can be captured by using simple member statements and a restricted form of simple inclusion statements. A SPKI 5-tuple in which A delegates a permission r to B can be represented as $A.r \leftarrow B$. A SPKI 5-tuple in which A delegates r to B and allows B to further delegate r can be represented as two $RT[\leftarrow, \cap]$ statements: $A.r \leftarrow B$ and $A.r \leftarrow B.r$. Similar analogies can be drawn for KeyNote.

Although $RT[\leftarrow, \cap]$ is limited in that role names are constants, extending role names in $RT[\leftarrow, \cap]$ to have internal structures does not change the nature of security analysis. As we

¹ $RT[\leftarrow, \cap]$ simplifies RT_0 in that intersection inclusion statements in $RT[\leftarrow, \cap]$ allow the intersection of only two roles; in RT_0 , the intersection may contain k components, each can be a principal, a role, or a linked role. RT_0 statements using such intersections can be equivalently expressed in $RT[\leftarrow, \cap]$ by introducing new intermediate roles and additional statements. This simplification helps simplify the proofs in this paper.

will see, security analysis is mostly affected by the structure of the delegation relationships. We believe that many results and techniques developed for $RT[\leftarrow, \cap]$ can be carried over to more expressive languages, e.g., RT_1 [Li et al. 2002], which adds to RT_0 the ability to have parameterized roles, RT_1^C [Li and Mitchell 2003], which further adds constraints to RT_1 , and, to a certain extent, SPKI/SDSI and KeyNote.

The security analysis problem for $RT[\leftarrow, \cap]$ involves new concepts and techniques. Semantics and inference for SDSI, which is essentially the sub-language $RT[\leftarrow]$, has been extensively studied [Abadi 1998; Clarke et al. 2001; Halpern and van der Meyden 2001; Jha and Reps 2002; Li 2000; Li et al. 2003]. Some of these studies only consider answering queries in a fixed state. Some consider universal analysis where no restriction is placed on how the state may grow [Abadi 1998; Halpern and van der Meyden 2001]. However, the most interesting aspect of security analysis, answering queries when restrictions are placed on state changes, has not been addressed in the previous studies.

2.2 Semantics of the TM Language

We give a formal characterization of the meaning of a set \mathcal{P} of policy statements by translating each policy statement into a datalog clause. (Datalog is a restricted form of logic programming (LP) with variables, predicates, and constants, but without function symbols.) We call the resulting program the *semantic program* of \mathcal{P} . We use the LP-based approach to define semantics because we will formulate safety computation rules by using a similar approach, and the LP-based approach generalizes easily to the case in which role names contain parameters (see [Li et al. 2002]).

DEFINITION 2 SEMANTIC PROGRAM. Given a set \mathcal{P} of policy statements, the *semantic program*, $SP(\mathcal{P})$, of \mathcal{P} , has one ternary predicate m . Intuitively, $m(A, r, D)$ means that D is a member of the role $A.r$. The program $SP(\mathcal{P})$ is the set of all datalog clauses produced from policy statements in \mathcal{P} as follows, where symbols that start with “?” represent logical variables:

For each $A.r \leftarrow D$ in \mathcal{P} , add

$$m(A, r, D) \tag{m1}$$

For each $A.r \leftarrow B.r_1$ in \mathcal{P} , add

$$m(A, r, ?Z) :- m(B, r_1, ?Z) \tag{m2}$$

For each $A.r \leftarrow A.r_1.r_2$ in \mathcal{P} , add

$$m(A, r, ?Z) :- m(A, r_1, ?Y), m(?Y, r_2, ?Z) \tag{m3}$$

For each $A.r \leftarrow B_1.r_1 \cap B_2.r_2$ in \mathcal{P} , add

$$m(A, r, ?Z) :- m(B_1, r_1, ?Z), m(B_2, r_2, ?Z) \tag{m4}$$

In general, a datalog program is a set of datalog clauses. Given a datalog program, \mathcal{DP} , its semantics can be defined through several equivalent approaches. The model-theoretic approach views \mathcal{DP} as a set of first-order sentences and uses the minimal Herbrand model as the semantics. We write $SP(\mathcal{P}) \models m(X, u, Z)$ when $m(X, u, Z)$ is in the minimal Herbrand model of $SP(\mathcal{P})$. This semantics corresponds exactly to the set-theoretic semantics of RT_0 in [Li et al. 2003].

We now summarize a standard fixpoint characterization of the minimal Herbrand model, which we will use in the proofs in this paper. Given a datalog program \mathcal{DP} , let \mathcal{DP}^{inst} be the ground instantiation of \mathcal{DP} using constants in \mathcal{DP} ; the *immediate consequence operator*, $T_{\mathcal{DP}}$, is defined as follows. Given a set K of ground logical atoms, $T_{\mathcal{DP}}(K)$

consists of all logical atoms, a , such that $a : - b_1, \dots, b_n \in \mathcal{DP}^{inst}$, where $n \geq 0$, and either $n = 0$ or $b_j \in K$ for $1 \leq j \leq n$. The least fixpoint of $T_{\mathcal{DP}}$ is given by

$$T_{\mathcal{DP}} \uparrow^\omega = \bigcup_{i=0}^{\infty} T_{\mathcal{DP}} \uparrow^i, \text{ where } T_{\mathcal{DP}} \uparrow^0 = \emptyset \text{ and } T_{\mathcal{DP}} \uparrow^{i+1} = T_{\mathcal{DP}}(T_{\mathcal{DP}} \uparrow^i), i \geq 0$$

The sequence $T_{\mathcal{DP}} \uparrow^i$ is an increasing sequence of subsets of a finite set. Thus there exists an N such that $T_{\mathcal{DP}}(T_{\mathcal{DP}} \uparrow^N) = T_{\mathcal{DP}} \uparrow^N$. $T_{\mathcal{DP}} \uparrow^\omega$ is identical to the minimal Herbrand model of \mathcal{DP} [Lloyd 1987]; therefore, $SP(\mathcal{P}) \models m(X, u, Z)$ if and only if $m(X, u, Z) \in T_{SP(\mathcal{P})} \uparrow^\omega$.

It has been shown that the minimal Herbrand model of \mathcal{DP} can be computed in time linear in the size of \mathcal{DP}^{inst} [Dowling and Gallier 1984]. If the total size of \mathcal{DP} is M , then there are $O(M)$ constants in \mathcal{DP} . Assuming that the number of variables in each clause is bounded by a constant, v , the number of instances of each clause is therefore $O(M^v)$, so the size of \mathcal{DP}^{inst} is $O(M^{v+1})$. Thus, the worst-case complexity of evaluating $SP(\mathcal{P})$ is $O(|\mathcal{P}|^3)$, since $|SP(\mathcal{P})| = O(|\mathcal{P}|)$ and each rule in $SP(\mathcal{P})$ has at most two variables.

2.3 Restriction Rules on State Changes

Before discussing how we model restrictions on changes in policy state, we consider one motivating scenario. Additional discussion of ways that security analysis can be used in practical situations appears in Section 2.6. Suppose that the users within an organization control certain principals, and that these principals delegate partial control to principals outside the organization. In this situation, roles defined by principals within the organization can be viewed as unchanging, since the analysis will be repeated before any future candidate change is made to those roles. Roles defined by principals outside the organization, however, may change in arbitrary ways, since they are beyond the organization's control. By using security analysis, the organization can ensure that delegations to principals outside the organization do not violate desired security properties, which are specified by a collection of security analysis problem instances and the correct answers to them.

To model control over roles, we use restriction rules of the form $\mathcal{R} = (\mathcal{G}_{\mathcal{R}}, \mathcal{S}_{\mathcal{R}})$, which consist of a pair of finite sets of roles. (In the rest of the paper we drop the subscripts from \mathcal{G} and \mathcal{S} , as \mathcal{R} is clear from context.)

- Roles in \mathcal{G} are called *growth-restricted* (or *g-restricted*); no policy statements defining these roles can be added. Roles not in \mathcal{G} are called *growth-unrestricted* (or *g-unrestricted*).
- Roles in \mathcal{S} are called *shrink-restricted* (or *s-restricted*); policy statements defining these roles cannot be removed. Roles not in \mathcal{S} are called *shrink-unrestricted* (or *s-unrestricted*).

One example of \mathcal{R} is (\emptyset, \emptyset) , under which every role is g/s-unrestricted, i.e., both g-unrestricted and s-unrestricted. Another example is $\mathcal{R} = (\emptyset, \text{Roles}(\mathcal{P}))$, i.e., every role may grow without restriction, and no statement defining roles in $\text{Roles}(\mathcal{P})$ can be removed. This models the case of having incomplete knowledge of a fixed policy state. A third example, corresponding to the scenario discussed above, is $\mathcal{R} = (\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{S})$, where $\mathcal{G} = \mathcal{S} = \{X.u \mid X \in \{X_1, \dots, X_k\}, u \in \text{Names}(\mathcal{P})\}$, i.e., X_1, \dots, X_k are trusted (controlled); therefore, every role $X.u$ such that $X \in \{X_1, \dots, X_k\}$ is restricted, all other roles are unrestricted. If a principal X does not appear in \mathcal{R} , then for every role name r , by definition

$X.r$ is *g/s-unrestricted*. This models the fact that the roles of unknown principals may be defined arbitrarily.

We allow some roles controlled by one principal to be g-restricted while other roles controlled by the same principal may be g-unrestricted. This provides more flexibility than simply identifying principals as trusted and untrusted, and permits one in practice to perform security analysis only when changing certain roles. Similarly, we allow a role to be both g-restricted and s-unrestricted, which has the effect of making a safety check necessary when modifying the definition of the role only if adding a new statement.

These restrictions are *static* in the sense that whether or not a state-change step is allowed by \mathcal{R} does not depend on the current state. A dynamic restriction could, for instance, have $B.r_2$ be g-restricted if B is a member of $A.r_1$, which depends on the current state. Security analysis with dynamic restrictions is potentially interesting future work.

2.4 Queries

In this paper, we consider the following three forms of query \mathcal{Q} :

— *Membership:* $A.r \sqsupseteq \{D_1, \dots, D_n\}$

Intuitively, this means that all the principals D_1, \dots, D_n are members of $A.r$. Formally, $\mathcal{P} \vdash A.r \sqsupseteq \{D_1, \dots, D_n\}$ if and only if $\{Z \mid SP(\mathcal{P}) \models m(A, r, Z)\} \supseteq \{D_1, \dots, D_n\}$.

— *Boundedness:* $\{D_1, \dots, D_n\} \sqsupseteq A.r$

Intuitively, this means that the member set of $A.r$ is bounded by the given set of principals. Formally, $\mathcal{P} \vdash A.r \sqsupseteq \{D_1, \dots, D_n\}$ if and only if $\{D_1, \dots, D_n\} \supseteq \{Z \mid SP(\mathcal{P}) \models m(A, r, Z)\}$.

— *Inclusion:* $X.u \sqsupseteq A.r$

Intuitively, this means that all the members of $A.r$ are also members of $X.u$. Formally, $\mathcal{P} \vdash X.u \sqsupseteq A.r$ if and only if $\{Z \mid SP(\mathcal{P}) \models m(X, u, Z)\} \supseteq \{Z \mid SP(\mathcal{P}) \models m(A, r, Z)\}$.

A membership query $A.r \sqsupseteq \{D_1, \dots, D_n\}$ can be translated to an inclusion query $A.r \sqsupseteq B.u$, in which $B.u$ is a new role, by adding $B.u \leftarrow D_1, \dots, B.u \leftarrow D_n$ to \mathcal{P} and making $B.u$ g/s-restricted. Similarly, boundedness queries can be translated to inclusion queries as well. We include membership and bounded queries because they can be answered more efficiently.

Each form of query can be generalized to allow compound role expressions that use linking and intersection. However, these generalized queries can be reduced to the forms above by adding new roles and statements to the policy. For instance, $\{\} \sqsupseteq A.r \cap A_1.r_1.r_2$ can be answered by adding $B.u_1 \leftarrow A.r \cap B.u_2$, $B.u_2 \leftarrow B.u_3.r_2$, and $B.u_3 \leftarrow A_1.r_1$ to \mathcal{P} , in which $B.u_1$, $B.u_2$, and $B.u_3$ are new g/s-restricted roles, and by posing the query $\{\} \sqsupseteq B.u_1$.

The three forms of queries can be varied to consider cardinality of roles rather than exact memberships. A cardinality variant of membership queries has the form “ $|A.r| \geq n$ ”, which means that the number of principals who are members of $A.r$ is no less than n . A cardinality variant of boundedness queries has the form “ $n \geq |A.r|$ ”. Cardinality variants of membership and boundedness queries can be answered similarly to the base queries. We do not consider a cardinality variant of inclusion queries in this paper.

2.5 An Example

EXAMPLE 1. The system administrator of a company, SA, controls access to some resource, which we abstractly denote by SA.access. The company policy is the following: managers always have access to the resource, managers can delegate the access to other principals, but only to employees of the company. HRU is trusted for defining employees and managers. The state \mathcal{P} consists of the following statements:

SA.access \leftarrow SA.manager
 SA.access \leftarrow SA.delegatedAccess \cap HR.employee
 SA.manager \leftarrow HR.manager
 SA.delegatedAccess \leftarrow SA.manager.access
 HR.employee \leftarrow HR.manager
 HR.employee \leftarrow HR.programmer
 HR.manager \leftarrow Alice
 HR.programmer \leftarrow Bob
 HR.programmer \leftarrow Carl
 Alice.access \leftarrow Bob

Given the state \mathcal{P} above, Alice and Bob have access, Carl does not. One possible restriction rule has $\mathcal{G} = \{ \text{SA.access, SA.manager, SA.delegatedAccess, HR.employee} \}$ and $\mathcal{S} = \{ \text{SA.access, SA.manager, SA.delegatedAccess, HR.employee, HR.manager} \}$. We now list some example analysis problem instances, together with the answers:

Simply safety analysis:	Is “SA.access \sqsupseteq {Eve}” possible?	(Yes.)
Simple availability analysis:	Is “SA.access \sqsupseteq {Alice}” necessary?	(Yes.)
Bounded safety analysis:	Is “{Alice, Bob} \sqsupseteq SA.access” necessary.	(No.)
Containment analysis:	Is “HR.employee \sqsupseteq SA.access” necessary?	(Yes.)

2.6 Usage of Security Analysis

Security analysis provides a means to ensure that safety and availability requirements are met and will continue to be met after policy changes are made by autonomous authorities. Security analysis is also useful when the global state of a TM system is fixed, but only partially known. For instance, previously unknown statements may be presented along with new access requests. Thus, although the global state does not change, one’s view of that state is changing. Thus there are many reasons why an individual or organization using a TM system may be unable to determine a fixed state of that system. Whatever that reason, security analysis techniques can be used to ensure that basic safety and availability requirements are not violated by prospective changes one is considering making, before putting those changes into effect. Let us make this more concrete.

A security analysis problem instance is given by a state \mathcal{P} , a query \mathcal{Q} , a quantifier for the query (universal or existential), and a restriction rule \mathcal{R} . Basic security requirements can be formalized as security analysis problem instances, together with answers to them that are acceptable for secure operation. For instance, one safety requirement might be formalized as asking whether anyone outside the organization can access a particular confidential resource, in which case the acceptable answer would be “no.” Once a policy state has been established that leads the analysis to produce no unacceptable answers, if prospective changes to g/s-restricted roles result in any unacceptable answers, the changes are considered to be in violation of the corresponding requirement, and should not be applied.

By definition of the analysis, changes to g/s-unrestricted roles cannot cause unacceptable answers when starting from a policy state that gives none.

One possible usage scenario for this approach is as follows. An organization's System Security Officer (SSO) writes a restriction rule restricting change of some of the roles that are under the control of principals in the organization, as well as a set of analysis-instance/acceptable-answer pairs. The SSO then uses these pairs and obtains the assistance of principals within the organization to bring the current policy into compliance. This is done by changing the policy as needed to make the analysis yield acceptable answers for all the analysis instances. If this cannot be done, the requirements are inconsistent or outside the organization's control, and must be revised. Once the policy has been brought into compliance, principals that control restricted roles are trusted to ensure that subsequent changes to such roles do not lead to unacceptable answers. By restricting only roles controlled within the organization, the SSO may be able to rely on software enforcement and other means to ensure that this trust is justified.

In the above usage, the SSO determines an analysis configuration consisting of a set of analysis-instance/acceptable-answer pairs and a restriction rule. In general, many such configurations can be used, each specified by a different interested party having a different set of principals it is willing to trust to run the analysis and to enforce the analysis-instance/acceptable-answer pairs, and hence having a different restriction rule.

It is significant to note that the usage pattern we are suggesting enables the enforcement of requirements that cannot be enforced by constructs in $RT[\leftarrow, \cap]$, or most other trust management languages. This is because those languages are monotonic in the sense that policies with more statements derive more role membership facts. By contrast, many of the requirements expressible using analysis-instance/acceptable-answer pairs are anti-monotonic, in the sense that adding statements to a policy that satisfies such a requirement can yield a policy that does not. Thus there is no way to enforce such a requirement within the language itself. This is illustrated by the example of mutual exclusion of two roles. Monotonicity makes it impossible to express within $RT[\leftarrow, \cap]$ that a principal cannot be added to both roles. However this is easily prevented through the usage pattern described above.

3. ANSWERING MEMBERSHIP AND BOUNDEDNESS QUERIES

Monotonicity properties of logic programming allow us to derive efficient algorithms for membership and boundedness queries. First, $RT[\leftarrow, \cap]$ and its sub-languages are monotonic in the sense that more statements will derive more role membership facts. This follows from the fact that the semantic program is a positive logic program. Second, membership queries are monotonic; given a membership query Q , if $\mathcal{P} \vdash Q$, then for every \mathcal{P}' such that $\mathcal{P} \subseteq \mathcal{P}'$, $\mathcal{P}' \vdash Q$. Third, boundedness queries are anti-monotonic; given a boundedness query Q , if $\mathcal{P} \vdash Q$, then for every \mathcal{P}' such that $\mathcal{P}' \subseteq \mathcal{P}$, $\mathcal{P}' \vdash Q$.

Intuitively, universal membership (simple availability) analysis and existential boundedness (liveness) analysis can be answered by considering the set of principals that are members of a role in every reachable state. We call this set the *lower bound* of a role. Because the restriction \mathcal{R} is static, there exists a minimal state that is reachable from \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{R} . This is obtained from \mathcal{P} by removing all statements defining s-unrestricted roles. We denote this state by $\mathcal{P}|_{\mathcal{R}}$. Clearly, $\mathcal{P}|_{\mathcal{R}}$ is reachable; furthermore, $\mathcal{P}|_{\mathcal{R}} \subseteq \mathcal{P}'$ for every reachable \mathcal{P}' . Since $RT[\leftarrow, \cap]$ is monotonic, one can compute the lower bound by

computing the role memberships in $\mathcal{P}|_{\mathcal{R}}$.

Similarly, existential membership (simple safety) analysis and universal boundedness (bounded safety) analysis can be answered by computing an “upper bound” of role memberships. The upper bound of a role is the set of principals that could become a member of the role in some reachable state. Intuitively, such bounds can be computed by considering a “maximal reachable state”. However, such a “state” is not well-defined since it would contain an infinite set of policy statements, and we only allow a state to contain a finite set of policy statements. We will show that one can simulate the “maximal reachable state” by a finite state and derive correct answers.

3.1 The Lower Bound

DEFINITION 3 THE LOWER BOUND PROGRAM. Given \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{R} , the *lower bound program* for them, $LB(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R})$, is constructed as follows:

For each $A.r \leftarrow D$ in $\mathcal{P}|_{\mathcal{R}}$, add
 $lb(A, r, D)$ (b1)

For each $A.r \leftarrow B.r_1$ in $\mathcal{P}|_{\mathcal{R}}$, add
 $lb(A, r, ?Z) :- lb(B, r_1, ?Z)$ (b2)

For each $A.r \leftarrow A.r_1.r_2$ in $\mathcal{P}|_{\mathcal{R}}$, add
 $lb(A, r, ?Z) :- lb(A, r_1, ?Y), lb(?Y, r_2, ?Z)$ (b3)

For each $A.r \leftarrow B_1.r_1 \cap B_2.r_2$ in $\mathcal{P}|_{\mathcal{R}}$, add
 $lb(A, r, ?Z) :- lb(B_1, r_1, ?Z), lb(B_2, r_2, ?Z)$ (b4)

The worst-case complexity of evaluating the lower bound program is $O(|\mathcal{P}|^3)$, as noted at the end of Section 2.2.

Observe that the above lower bound program is essentially the same as the semantic program for the minimal state $\mathcal{P}|_{\mathcal{R}}$. They differ in that anywhere $LB(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R})$ uses the predicate lb , $SP(\mathcal{P}|_{\mathcal{R}})$ uses the predicate m . Therefore, we have the following fact.

FACT 3.1. $LB(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}) \models lb(A, r, D)$ if and only if $SP(\mathcal{P}|_{\mathcal{R}}) \models m(A, r, D)$.

PROPOSITION 3.2. $LB(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}) \models lb(A, r, D)$ if and only if for every reachable \mathcal{P}' , $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(A, r, D)$.

PROOF. The “only if” part: If $LB(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}) \models lb(A, r, D)$, then from Fact 3.1, $SP(\mathcal{P}|_{\mathcal{R}}) \models m(A, r, D)$. For every \mathcal{P}' that is reachable, $\mathcal{P}|_{\mathcal{R}} \subseteq \mathcal{P}'$. Furthermore, the language $RT[\leftarrow, \cap]$ is monotonic; therefore, $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(A, r, D)$.

The “if” part: if for every reachable \mathcal{P}' , $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(A, r, D)$, then $SP(\mathcal{P}|_{\mathcal{R}}) \models m(A, r, D)$, since $\mathcal{P}|_{\mathcal{R}}$ is reachable. From Fact 3.1, $LB(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}) \models lb(A, r, D)$. \square

Proposition 3.2 means that the lower bound program can be used to handle universal membership analysis and existential boundedness analysis. This fact is formally stated as the following two corollaries. Cardinality variants of these queries can be answered similarly.

COROLLARY 3.3. Given \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{R} , a membership query $A.r \sqsupseteq \{D_1, \dots, D_n\}$ is necessary if and only if $LB(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}) \models lb(A, r, D_i)$ for every i , $1 \leq i \leq n$.

COROLLARY 3.4. Given \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{R} , a boundedness query $\{D_1, \dots, D_n\} \sqsupseteq A.r$ is possible if and only if $\{D_1, \dots, D_n\} \sqsupseteq \{Z \mid LB(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}) \models lb(A, r, Z)\}$.

PROOF. For the “if” part, we must show that if $\{D_1, \dots, D_n\} \supseteq \{Z \mid LB(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}) \models lb(A, r, Z)\}$, then there exists a reachable \mathcal{P}' such that each D satisfying $\mathcal{P}' \models m(A, r, D)$ also satisfies $D \in \{D_1, \dots, D_n\}$. It is easily seen by using Fact 3.1 that $\mathcal{P}|_{\mathcal{R}}$ is such a \mathcal{P}' .

The “only if” part follows from Proposition 3.2 as follows. Suppose there exists Z such that $LB(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}) \models lb(A, r, Z)$ and $Z \notin \{D_1, \dots, D_n\}$. By Proposition 3.2, for every reachable \mathcal{P}' , $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(A, r, Z)$; therefore, the query is not possible. \square

Consider Example 1. The simple availability analysis instance “is SA.access \sqsupseteq {Alice} necessary” is true when SA.access, SA.manager, and HR.manager are s-restricted, since then the statements “SA.access \longleftarrow SA.manager”, “SA.manager \longleftarrow HR.manager”, and “HR.manager \longleftarrow Alice” exist in the minimal state. On the other hand, it is not necessary that Bob has access, even when SA.delegatedAccess, HR.employee, and HR.programmer are also s-restricted, since Alice could remove her statement “Alice.access \longleftarrow Bob”.

3.2 The Upper Bound

To compute the upper bound of roles, we introduce the following terminology: A role is *g-unbounded* if for every principal Z , there exists a reachable state \mathcal{P}' such that $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(A, r, Z)$. In other words, $A.r$ could have every principal as its member. A g-unrestricted role is clearly g-unbounded. A g-restricted role may also be g-unbounded, as it may include a g-unbounded role.

The following fact about g-unbounded roles says that one only needs to consider one principal that does not occur in \mathcal{P} (instead of every principal) to determine whether a role is g-unbounded.

FACT 3.5. *Given \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R} , a role $A.r$, and a principal E that does not occur in \mathcal{P} , $A.r$ is g-unbounded if and only if there exists a reachable state \mathcal{P}' such that $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(A, r, E)$.*

See Appendix A.1 for the proof. We now show how to compute the upper bound, which simulates an infinite state.

DEFINITION 4 THE UPPER BOUND PROGRAM. Given $\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R} = (\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{S})$, their upper bound program, $UB(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R})$, is constructed as follows. (\top is a special principal symbol not occurring in \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R} , or any query \mathcal{Q} .)

$$\begin{array}{ll}
\text{Add} & ub(\top, ?r, ?Z) & (u) \\
\text{For each } A.r \in \text{Roles}(\mathcal{P}) - \mathcal{G}, \text{ add} & & \\
& ub(A, r, ?Z) & (u0) \\
\text{For each } A.r \longleftarrow D \text{ in } \mathcal{P}, \text{ add} & & \\
& ub(A, r, D) & (u1) \\
\text{For each } A.r \longleftarrow B.r_1 \text{ in } \mathcal{P}, \text{ add} & & \\
& ub(A, r, ?Z) :- ub(B, r_1, ?Z) & (u2) \\
\text{For each } A.r \longleftarrow A.r_1.r_2 \text{ in } \mathcal{P}, \text{ add} & & \\
& ub(A, r, ?Z) :- ub(A, r_1, ?Y), ub(?Y, r_2, ?Z) & (u3) \\
\text{For each } A.r \longleftarrow B_1.r_1 \cap B_2.r_2 \text{ in } \mathcal{P}, \text{ add} & & \\
& ub(A, r, ?Z) :- ub(B_1, r_1, ?Z), ub(B_2, r_2, ?Z) & (u4)
\end{array}$$

As noted at the end of Section 2.2, the computational complexity for evaluating $UB(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R})$ is linear in the size of the ground instantiation of $UB(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R})$. There are $O(|\mathcal{P}|)$ rules in $UB(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R})$ corresponding to (u), (u1), (u2), (u3), and (u4), which have at most two variables per rule; therefore, the ground instantiation of these rules has total size

$O(|\mathcal{P}|^3)$. There are $O(|\mathcal{P}|^2)$ instance rules of $(u0)$, because there are $O(|\mathcal{P}|)$ principals and $O(|\mathcal{P}|)$ role names in \mathcal{P} . However, each such rule has only one variable, and so the ground instantiation of these rules has size $O(|\mathcal{P}|^3)$. Therefore, the computational complexity for evaluating $UB(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R})$ is $O(|\mathcal{P}|^3)$.

PROPOSITION 3.6. *Given any $\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R} = (\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{S}), A.r \in \text{Roles}(\mathcal{P})$, and $Z \in \text{Principals}(\mathcal{P}) \cup \{\top\}$, $UB(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}) \models ub(A, r, Z)$ if and only if there exists a reachable \mathcal{P}' such that $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(A, r, Z)$.*

See Appendix A.1 for the proof. From Fact 3.5 and Proposition 3.6, we have the following corollaries.

COROLLARY 3.7. *A role $A.r$ is g-unbounded if and only if $UB(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}) \models ub(A, r, \top)$.*

COROLLARY 3.8. *Given \mathcal{P} and $\mathcal{R} = (\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{S})$, a membership query $A.r \sqsupseteq \{D_1, \dots, D_n\}$ is possible if and only if one of the following three conditions hold: (1) $A.r \notin \mathcal{G}$, (2) $UB(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}) \models ub(A, r, \top)$, or (3) $UB(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}) \models ub(A, r, D_i)$ for every $i, 1 \leq i \leq n$.*

PROOF. When $A.r \notin \text{Roles}(\mathcal{P})$, the second and the third condition will not hold; the query is possible if and only if $A.r$ is g-unrestricted, i.e., $A.r \notin \mathcal{G}$. When $A.r \in \text{Roles}(\mathcal{P})$, the first condition implies the second condition. Condition (2) or (3) both imply that the query is possible. If none of the three conditions holds, the query is not possible. Condition (2) is needed to deal with the case that some of the D_i 's in the query do not occur in \mathcal{P} . \square

COROLLARY 3.9. *Given \mathcal{P} and $\mathcal{R} = (\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{S})$, a boundedness query $\{D_1, \dots, D_n\} \sqsupseteq A.r$ is necessary if and only if $A.r \in \mathcal{G}$ and $\{D_1, \dots, D_n\} \supseteq \{Z \mid UB(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}) \models ub(A, r, Z)\}$.*

Consider Example 1 again and observe that the policy is not safe according to either the simple safety instance or the bounded safety instance. One reason is that the role HR.manager is g-unrestricted, meaning that new managers may be added. Another reason is that the role HR.programmer is g-unrestricted; therefore, new programmers may be added and access may be delegated to them. However, if the company knows that Eve is an enemy, then the company probably will not hire Eve as a manager or a programmer. In fact, simple safety is quite unnatural: to use it effectively, one has to be able to identify the principals that should never have access, the number of such principals could be arbitrary large. Bounded safety is also unnatural, one does not know, for example, who in the future the company will hire as a manager. A more natural policy is to ensure that, for example, only employees of the company are allowed to access the resource. This can be done by using inclusion queries.

4. CONTAINMENT ANALYSIS: ANSWERING UNIVERSAL INCLUSION QUERIES

Inclusion queries are neither monotonic nor anti-monotonic. Given an inclusion query $X.u \sqsupseteq Z.w$ and three states $\mathcal{P}' \subseteq \mathcal{P} \subseteq \mathcal{P}''$, it is possible that $\mathcal{P} \vdash Q$, but both $\mathcal{P}' \not\vdash Q$ and $\mathcal{P}'' \not\vdash Q$. As a result, the approach taken with membership and boundedness queries is not applicable. We cannot simply look at a specific minimal (or maximal) state and answer the query.

In this paper, we restrict our attention to universal inclusion queries, this is the more interesting case in terms of security properties. We say that a role $X.u$ contains another role $A.r$ if $X.u \sqsupseteq A.r$ is necessary, i.e., $X.u$ includes $A.r$ in every reachable state. We call the problem of determining whether a role contains another *containment analysis*.

The case where one of $X.u$ and $A.r$ is not in $\text{Roles}(\mathcal{P})$ is uninteresting, as follows. If $A.r \notin \text{Roles}(\mathcal{P})$, then $X.u$ contains $A.r$ if and only if $A.r$ is g-restricted. If $A.r \in \text{Roles}(\mathcal{P})$ and $X.u \notin \text{Roles}(\mathcal{P})$, then $X.u$ contains $A.r$ if and only if $A.r$ has an upper bound that is empty. In the rest of this section, we only consider the case that both $X.u$ and $A.r$ are in $\text{Roles}(\mathcal{P})$.

Intuitively, there are two cases in which a role $X.u$ contains a role $A.r$. The first case is that this containment is *forced* by the statements that are in \mathcal{P} . For example, if a statement $X.u \leftarrow A.r$ exists and cannot be removed, then $X.u$ contains $A.r$. A containment may be forced by a chain of statements. Forced containment can be computed by a method similar to role memberships.

In the second case, containment is caused by the nonexistence of statements in \mathcal{P} . In the extreme case, if $A.r$ has no definition and is g-restricted, then $A.r$ is contained in every role, since the member set of $A.r$ is empty in every reachable state. To compute this kind of containment, observe that a g-restricted role $A.r$ is contained in another role $X.u$ if every definition of $A.r$ is contained in $X.u$. If $A.r$ has no definition at all, then it is contained in every role. However, a straightforward translation of this into a positive logic program does not work. Consider the following example: $\mathcal{P} = \{A.r \leftarrow B.r_1, A.r \leftarrow D, B.r_1 \leftarrow A.r, X.u \leftarrow D\}$ and \mathcal{R} is such that $\mathcal{G} = \{A.r, B.r_1\}$ and $\mathcal{S} = \{A.r, B.r_1, X.u\}$. In any \mathcal{P}' that is \mathcal{R} -reachable from \mathcal{P} , the member sets of $A.r$ and $B.r_1$ are always $\{D\}$, and so both roles are contained by $X.u$. A straightforward positive logic program cannot derive this, since $X.u$ contains $A.r$ only if it contains $B.r_1$ and vice versa. As a result, neither containment relationship will be in the minimal model. To deal with this problem, we take the approach to prove non-containment using the minimal model of a logic program, and derive containment using negation-as-failure. Intuitively, $X.u$ contains $A.r$ unless we can find a witness principal E that is a member of $A.r$ in some state but not a member of $X.u$ in the same state.

Intuitively, containment analysis instances that have the flavor of availability should be proven by forced containment. That a manager always has access to a resource should be due to a statement chain forcing this. In Example 1, SA.access contains HR.manager as long as SA.access and SA.manager are s-restricted. On the other hand, policy statements are unlikely to force everyone who has access to a resource to be an employee; the orientation of the forced containment does not naturally correspond to this practical dependency. In Example 1, HR.employee contains SA.access as long as SA.access and SA.manager are g-restricted and HR.employee is s-restricted. This is because, as long as no new rule defining SA.access or SA.manager is added, any member of SA.access is either a member of HR.manager or a member of HR.employee; if furthermore, the statement “HR.employee \leftarrow HR.manager” cannot be removed, then HR.employee contains SA.access.

4.1 Containment Analysis in $\text{RT}[\]$ is in \mathbf{P}

In this section, we give algorithm to do containment analysis in $\text{RT}[\]$ efficiently. Recall that the language $\text{RT}[\]$ has only simple member and simple inclusion statements.

DEFINITION 5. (The Role Containment Program for $\text{RT}[\]$) Given a $\text{RT}[\]$ state \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{R} , the role containment program, $B\text{CP}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R})$, includes the lower bound program $L\text{B}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R})$ in Definition 3. In addition, it defines two 4-ary predicates: fc and nc . An atom $fc(X, u, Z, w)$ means that $X.u$ is forced to contain $Z.w$. An atom $nc(X, u, Z, w)$ means

that $X.u$ does not contain $Z.w$. The program $BCP(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R})$ is derived from $LB(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R})$ as follows. ($\mathcal{P}|_{\mathcal{R}}$ is the minimal state that is \mathcal{R} -reachable from \mathcal{P} .)

Add $fc(?X, ?u, ?X, ?u)$ (c)

For each $A.r \leftarrow B.r_1$ in $\mathcal{P}|_{\mathcal{R}}$, add $fc(A, r, ?Z, ?w) :- fc(B, r_1, ?Z, ?w)$ (c1)

For each $A.r \in \text{Roles}(\mathcal{P}) - \mathcal{G}$, add $nc(?X, ?u, A, r) :- \sim fc(?X, ?u, A, r)$ (n0)

For each $A.r \in \mathcal{G}$, do the following:

For each $A.r \leftarrow D$ in \mathcal{P} , add $nc(?X, ?u, A, r) :- \sim fc(?X, ?u, A, r), \sim lb(?X, ?u, D)$ (n1)

For each $A.r \leftarrow B.r_1$ in \mathcal{P} , add $nc(?X, ?u, A, r) :- \sim fc(?X, ?u, A, r), nc(?X, ?u, B, r_1)$ (n2)

Rule (c) says that every role is forced to contain itself. The intuition behind (c1) is that, if $A.r \leftarrow B.r_1$ exists in every reachable state, then $A.r$ is forced to contain $B.r_1$. The intuition behind (n0) is that for $X.u$ to contain a g-unrestricted role $A.r$, $X.u$ has to be forced to contain $A.r$, since arbitrary new members may be added to $A.r$. The intuition behind (n1) is that, since $A.r$ contains D , if $X.u$'s lower bound does not contain D , then $X.u$ does not contain $A.r$ unless $X.u$ is forced to contain $A.r$. The “ $\sim fc$ ” part is needed, since it may be the case that $A.r \leftarrow D$ can be removed and $X.u \leftarrow A.r$ exists and cannot be removed, in which case D may not be in $X.u$'s lower bound but $X.u$ contains $A.r$ nonetheless. Rule (n2) means that $X.u$ does not contain $A.r$ if it does not contain $B.r_1$ and is not forced to contain $A.r$.

We now discuss the semantics of the logic program $BCP(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R})$, which uses negation-as-failure, but in a stratified manner. Given a logic program \mathcal{DP} , a predicate p (directly) depends on another predicate q if p is defined using q in the body. A predicate p negatively depends on q if $\sim q$ (the negation of q) is used to define p . For example, in $BCP(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R})$, fc depends on itself, nc depends on itself and negatively depends on fc and lb . A program is *stratified* if the predicates defined in it can be classified into strata such that each predicate depends only on predicates in the same or lower strata and negatively depends only on predicates in lower strata. A program without negation is trivially stratified, as no predicate depends negatively on any predicate at all. The program $BCP(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R})$ is also stratified. Predicates in the first stratum are lb and fc , and the only predicate in the second stratum is nc .

Most commonly accepted semantics for logic programming with negation-as-failure agree on stratified programs. Given a stratified datalog program \mathcal{DP} , let $\mathcal{DP}_1 \cup \dots \cup \mathcal{DP}_s$ be a partition of \mathcal{DP}^{Inst} such that \mathcal{DP}_j consists of clauses defining predicates in the j 'th stratum; we call $\mathcal{DP}_1 \cup \dots \cup \mathcal{DP}_s$ a stratification of \mathcal{DP}^{Inst} . The semantics is obtained by first computing the minimal Herbrand model of \mathcal{DP}_1 and then use this model to determine truthfulness of negative literals in \mathcal{DP}_2 while computing a fixpoint for $\mathcal{DP}_1 \cup \mathcal{DP}_2$, and so on. Formally, we define an operator Φ , which is parameterized by a ground logic program \mathcal{DP}' and a set of ground atoms M . Given a set of ground logical atoms K , $\Phi_{\mathcal{DP}', M}(K)$ consists of all ground logic atoms, a , such that $a :- b_1, \dots, b_n, \sim b_{n+1}, \dots, \sim b_{n+m} \in \mathcal{DP}'$ and $b_i \in K$ and $b_{n+j} \notin M$. Given a logic program \mathcal{DP} and $\mathcal{DP}_1 \cup \dots \cup \mathcal{DP}_s$ a stratification of \mathcal{DP}^{Inst} , define $\Gamma_{\mathcal{DP}}^1$ to be $\Phi_{\mathcal{DP}_1, \emptyset} \uparrow^\omega$, i.e., the least fixpoint of $\Phi_{\mathcal{DP}_1, \emptyset}$.

Define $\Gamma_{\mathcal{DP}}^{k+1}$ to be $\Phi_{\mathcal{DP}_1 \cup \dots \cup \mathcal{DP}_{k+1}, \Gamma_{\mathcal{DP}}^k} \uparrow^\omega$ for $1 \leq k \leq s-1$. Then the model of \mathcal{DP} is $\Gamma_{\mathcal{DP}}^s$. Each $\Gamma_{\mathcal{DP}}^i$ can be calculated in polynomial time, so the semantics of a stratified program can also be computed in polynomial time.

The following lemma says that the fc predicate in BCP is always sound for role containment, and it is complete when the second role is g-unrestricted.

LEMMA 4.1. *Given a $RT[\]$ state \mathcal{P} , \mathcal{R} , two roles $X.u$ and $A.r$, if $BCP(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}) \models fc(X, u, A, r)$, then $X.u$ contains $A.r$. If $X.u$ contains $A.r$ and $A.r$ is g-unrestricted, then $BCP(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}) \models fc(X, u, A, r)$.*

See Appendix A.2 for the proof. The following proposition says that role containment in $RT[\]$ can be answered by using the program $BCP(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R})$.

PROPOSITION 4.2. *Given a $RT[\]$ state \mathcal{P} , \mathcal{R} , and two roles $X.u$ and $A.r$ in $\text{Roles}(\mathcal{P})$, $BCP(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}) \models nc(X, u, A, r)$ if and only if $X.u$ does not contain $A.r$.*

See Appendix A.2 for the proof.

4.2 Containment Analysis in $RT[\cap]$ is **coNP**-complete

$RT[\cap]$ adds to $RT[\]$ intersections, which have the effect of conjunction. A role can be defined by multiple statements, which have the effect of disjunction. As a result, $RT[\cap]$ can simulate formulas in propositional logic, and containment analysis subsumes determining validity of propositional formulas, which is **coNP**-complete.

THEOREM 4.3. *Containment analysis in $RT[\cap]$ is **coNP**-complete.*

See Appendix A.3 for the proof. The **coNP**-hard part is by reducing the monotone 3SAT problem, which is **NP**-complete, to the complement of containment analysis in $RT[\cap]$. The reduction does not use s-unrestricted roles, and it is straightforward to change the proof to not use g-unrestricted roles. This shows that containment analysis in $RT[\cap]$ where all roles are g-restricted or where all roles are s-restricted is still **coNP**-complete.

4.3 Containment Analysis in $RT[\leftarrow]$ is **PSPACE**-complete

$RT[\leftarrow]$ adds linked roles to $RT[\]$. We first prove that containment analysis in $RT[\leftarrow]$ without roles that can grow is **coNP**-complete.

THEOREM 4.4. *Containment analysis in $RT[\leftarrow]$ where all roles in $\text{Roles}(\mathcal{P})$ are g-restricted is **coNP**-complete.*

See Appendix A.3 for the proof. The key observation used in the proof is that linked roles, similar to intersection, can simulate logical conjunction. Recall that the semantic rule for linking inclusion statements, (m3), has a conjunction in the body, similar to that for intersection inclusion statements, (m4).

The case in which some roles in $\text{Roles}(\mathcal{P})$ are g-unrestricted is more interesting. The main result of this section is the following theorem.

THEOREM 4.5. *Containment analysis in $RT[\leftarrow]$ where all roles in $\text{Roles}(\mathcal{P})$ are s-restricted is **PSPACE**-complete.*

Theorem 4.5 enables us to establish the exact complexity bound for containment analysis in $RT[\leftarrow]$.

THEOREM 4.6. *Containment analysis in $RT[\leftarrow]$ is **PSPACE**-complete.*

PROOF. Since the cases where all roles in $\text{Roles}(\mathcal{P})$ are s-restricted are special cases of the problems here, **PSPACE**-hardness follows immediately from Theorem 4.5.

Given a containment analysis problem instance: $\text{RT}[\leftarrow]$ state \mathcal{P} , a restriction rule $\mathcal{R} = (\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{S})$, and an inclusion query \mathcal{Q} , use the following algorithm. For each \mathcal{P}' such that $\mathcal{P}' \subseteq \mathcal{P}$ and \mathcal{P}' is \mathcal{R} -reachable from \mathcal{P} , do containment analysis for \mathcal{P}' , $\mathcal{R}' = (\mathcal{G}, \text{Roles}(\mathcal{P}'))$, and \mathcal{Q} . The algorithm answers “no” if there exists a \mathcal{P}' such that containment analysis answers no. Otherwise, the algorithm answers “yes”.

From Theorem 4.5, we know that containment analysis with \mathcal{P}' and \mathcal{R}' takes space polynomial in $n = |\mathcal{P}'| + |\mathcal{R}'|$. Since n is polynomial in $|\mathcal{P}| + |\mathcal{R}|$, this algorithm takes space polynomial in the size of the original input. If the containment does hold, then clearly this algorithm answers “yes”. If the containment does not hold, then there exists a reachable state \mathcal{P}_1 and a principal E such that $SP(\mathcal{P}_1) \models m(A, r, E)$ and $SP(\mathcal{P}') \not\models m(X, u, E)$. Consider $\mathcal{P}_0 = \mathcal{P} \cap \mathcal{P}_1$, \mathcal{P}_0 is reachable; furthermore, \mathcal{P}_1 is \mathcal{R}' -reachable from \mathcal{P}_0 ; therefore, the algorithm answers “no”. \square

In the rest of this section, we prove Theorem 4.5. Our proof uses the relationships between statements in $\text{RT}[\leftarrow]$ and string rewriting systems, which we introduce now.

4.3.1 $\text{RT}[\leftarrow]$ as String Rewriting Systems. Statements in $\text{RT}[\leftarrow]$ can be viewed as rewriting rules. For example, the statement $A.r \leftarrow B.r_1$ can be viewed as the rewriting rule $A.r \mapsto B.r_1$. The alphabet consists of all principals and role names. We only consider rewriting over the set of *name strings*, i.e., strings that have the form of a principal followed by zero or more role names. When rewriting a name string ω using rewriting rules corresponding to statements in $\text{RT}[\leftarrow]$, the rewriting only occurs on the left most, and the resulting string is also a name string.

DEFINITION 6 $\text{RS}[\mathcal{P}]$. Given a set \mathcal{P} of $\text{RT}[\leftarrow]$ statements, let $\text{RS}[\mathcal{P}]$ be the rewriting system generated by viewing each statement in \mathcal{P} as a rewriting rule. Given two name strings ω_1 and ω_2 , we write $\text{RS}[\mathcal{P}] \triangleright \omega_1 \mapsto \omega_2$ if one can rewrite ω_1 into ω_2 in one step using a rewriting rule in $\text{RS}[\mathcal{P}]$. We write $\text{RS}[\mathcal{P}] \triangleright \omega_1 \overset{*}{\mapsto} \omega_2$ if using rewriting rules in $\text{RS}[\mathcal{P}]$, one can rewrite ω_1 into ω_2 in zero or more steps.

We define $\text{str}_{\mathcal{P}}(A.r)$ to denote the set $\{\omega \mid \text{RS}[\mathcal{P}] \triangleright A.r \overset{*}{\mapsto} \omega\}$. We define $\text{mem}_{\mathcal{P}}(A.r)$ to denote the set of principals in $\text{str}_{\mathcal{P}}(A.r)$.

PROPOSITION 4.7. *Given a set \mathcal{P} of $\text{RT}[\leftarrow]$ statements, $SP(\mathcal{P}) \models m(A, r, D)$ if and only if $\text{RS}[\mathcal{P}] \triangleright A.r \overset{*}{\mapsto} D$.*

See Appendix A.4 for the proof.

$\text{RT}[\leftarrow]$ is equivalent to SDSI [Clarke et al. 2001]. Jha and Reps [Jha and Reps 2002] pointed out that SDSI string rewriting systems correspond exactly to the class of string rewriting systems modelled using push-down systems [Bouajjani et al. 1997]. The same applies to the rewriting systems generated by $\text{RT}[\leftarrow]$ statements.

Pushdown systems (PDSs) are similar to pushdown automata; however, unlike pushdown automata they do not have an input alphabet. Thus PDSs should not be viewed as language recognizers, but as mechanisms that specify possibly infinite-state transition systems.

A pushdown system is a triplet (Π, Γ, Δ) , where Π is a finite set of control locations, Γ is a finite stack alphabet, and $\Delta \subseteq (\Pi \times \Gamma) \times (\Pi \times \Gamma^*)$ is a finite set of transition rules. If $((q, \gamma), (q', \omega)) \in \Delta$, then we write it as $\langle q, \gamma \rangle \hookrightarrow \langle q', \omega \rangle$.

A *configuration* of a PDS is a pair $\langle q, \omega \rangle$, where $q \in \Pi$ is a control location and $\omega \in \Gamma^*$ represents the stack contents (from the top of the stack to the bottom of a stack). We say that a configuration $\langle q, \omega_1 \rangle$ can directly reach a configuration $\langle q', \omega_2 \rangle$ if $\langle q, \gamma \rangle \hookrightarrow \langle q', \omega \rangle$, $\omega_1 = \gamma \omega'_1$, and $\omega_2 = \omega \omega'_1$, i.e., there . We then define reachability among configurations in the straightforward manner.

Esparza et al. [Esparza et al. 2000] showed that given a PDS (Π, Γ, Δ) , the set of all configurations reachable from a regular set of configurations that is recognized by an NFA \mathcal{A} is recognized by an NFA that has size polynomial in $n = |\Pi| + |\Gamma| + |\Delta| + |\mathcal{A}|$ and that can be constructed in time polynomial in n .

4.3.2 Containment analysis in $\text{RT}[\leftarrow]$ without shrinking is in PSPACE . The key relationship between an instance of containment analysis and string rewriting lies in the following definition of characteristic sets.

DEFINITION 7 CHARACTERISTIC SET. Given a $\text{RT}[\leftarrow]$ state \mathcal{P} , a restriction rule \mathcal{R} , and a role $A.r$, the characteristic set of $A.r$, denoted by $\chi_{\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}}(A.r)$, is defined to be $\text{str}_{\mathcal{P}}(A.r) \cap \kappa[\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}]$, where

$$\kappa[\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}] = \text{Principals}(\mathcal{P}) \cup \{B.r \gamma \mid B.r \text{ is g-unrestricted and } \gamma \in \text{Names}(\mathcal{P})^*\}$$

The role $X.u$ contains the role $A.r$ if no matter how one adds a principal as a new member to $A.r$, $X.u$ also gets the principal as a member. Intuitively, each string in $\chi_{\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}}(A.r)$ represents a distinct source of adding new members to the role $A.r$. Furthermore, the set $\chi_{\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}}(A.r)$ describes all the ways of adding new members of the role $A.r$. Therefore, one can use characteristic sets to solve containment analysis.

LEMMA 4.8. *Given \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{R} , $X.u$ contains $A.r$ if and only if $\chi_{\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}}(X.u) \supseteq \chi_{\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}}(A.r)$.*

PROOF. We first prove that if $\chi_{\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}}(X.u) \not\supseteq \chi_{\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}}(A.r)$ then $X.u$ does not contain $A.r$. If $\chi_{\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}}(X.u) \not\supseteq \chi_{\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}}(A.r)$, then there exists a string $\omega = B.r_1 \cdots r_k$ such that $\omega \in \chi_{\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}}(A.r)$ and $\omega \notin \chi_{\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}}(X.u)$. Consider $\mathcal{P}' = \mathcal{P} \cup \{B.r_1 \leftarrow C_1, C_1.r_2 \leftarrow C_2, \cdots, C_{k-1}.r_k \leftarrow C_k\}$, where C_1, C_2, \cdots, C_k do not occur in \mathcal{P} or \mathcal{R} . \mathcal{P}' is a reachable state. $\text{RS}[\mathcal{P}'] \triangleright A.r \xrightarrow{*} B.r_1 \cdots r_k \xrightarrow{*} C_k$. From Proposition 4.7, $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(A, r, C_k)$. We now show that $SP(\mathcal{P}') \not\models m(X, u, C_k)$. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(X, u, C_k)$. From Proposition 4.7, $\text{RS}[\mathcal{P}'] \triangleright X.u \xrightarrow{*} C_k$. Consider the rewriting sequence, the rule applied in the last step has to be $C_{k-1}.r_k \mapsto C_k$, since that is the only rule having a C_k on its right hand side. The rule applied in the second to last step has to be $C_{k-2}.r_{k-1} \mapsto C_{k-1}$, since that is the only rule having C_{k-1} on its right-hand side, and so on. Therefore, the rewriting sequence must contains in its middle a sequence rewriting from $X.u$ to $B.r_1 \cdots r_k$. Further observe that the rules in \mathcal{P}' but not in \mathcal{P} cannot be applied in this middle sequence. Therefore, $\text{RS}[\mathcal{P}] \triangleright X.u \xrightarrow{*} \omega$. This contradicts the assumption that $\omega \notin \chi_{\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}}(X.u)$.

We now prove that if $X.u$ does not contain $A.r$ then $\chi_{\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}}(X.u) \not\supseteq \chi_{\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}}(A.r)$. If $X.u$ does not contain $A.r$, then there exists a reachable state \mathcal{P}' and a principal E such that $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(A, r, E)$ and $SP(\mathcal{P}') \not\models m(X, u, E)$. From Proposition 4.7, it follows that $\text{RS}[\mathcal{P}'] \triangleright A.r \xrightarrow{*} E$. Consider the rewriting sequence that rewrites $A.r$ into E ; let the sequence be $A.r \xrightarrow{*} \omega_1 \xrightarrow{*} \omega_2 \xrightarrow{*} E$, such that the step from ω_1 to ω_2 is the first step that uses a statement not in \mathcal{P} . Clearly, $\omega_1 \in \chi_{\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}}(A.r)$ and $\omega_1 \notin \chi_{\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}}(X.u)$. \square

From the above lemma, we know that whether a role contains another can be determined by checking containment among character sets.

PROPOSITION 4.9. *Containment analysis in $\text{RT}[\leftarrow]$ where all roles in $\text{Roles}(\mathcal{P})$ are s -restricted is in **PSPACE**.*

PROOF. Given a $\text{RT}[\leftarrow]$ state \mathcal{P} , a restriction rule \mathcal{R} , to determine whether $X.u$ contains $A.r$, it suffices to check whether $\chi_{\mathcal{P},\mathcal{R}}(X.u) \supseteq \chi_{\mathcal{P},\mathcal{R}}(A.r)$. One can construct an NFA to recognize $\chi_{\mathcal{P},\mathcal{R}}(A.r)$ in time polynomial in $|\mathcal{P}| + |\mathcal{R}|$, and the NFA has size polynomial in $|\mathcal{P}| + |\mathcal{R}|$. This is because $\chi_{\mathcal{P},\mathcal{R}}(A.r) = \text{str}_{\mathcal{P}}(A.r) \cap \kappa[\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}]$, and both $\text{str}_{\mathcal{P}}(A.r)$ and $\kappa[\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}]$ are recognized by NFAs that can be constructed in time polynomial in $|\mathcal{P}| + |\mathcal{R}|$. Similarly, one can construct a poly-size NFA to recognize $\chi_{\mathcal{P},\mathcal{R}}(X.u)$. It is known that determining containment of languages accepted by NFAs is in **PSPACE** [Hunt et al. 1976]. \square

4.3.3 Containment Analysis in $\text{RT}[\leftarrow]$ is **PSPACE-hard.** It is known that containment among regular languages that are represented using NFAs is **PSPACE**-complete, even when the alphabet has just two elements. (When regular languages are described using DFAs, the complexity is **NLOGSPACE**-complete.) We consider empty-string-free regular languages over $\{0, 1\}$. They can be represented by a form of right linear grammars such that each production rule has one of the following two forms: $N_1 ::= N_2 b$, and $N_1 ::= b$, where N_1 and N_2 are nonterminals and $b \in \{0, 1\}$.

PROPOSITION 4.10. *Containment Analysis in $\text{RT}[\leftarrow]$ where all roles in $\text{Roles}(\mathcal{P})$ are s -restricted is **PSPACE-hard**.*

PROOF. Given two empty-string free regular languages over $\{0, 1\}$, L_1 and L_2 . They can be represented using one set G of production rules, but with different start symbols S_1 and S_2 . For any nonterminal N in G , we write $L_G(N)$ to denote the language generated by G when using N as the start symbol.

We now reduce the problem of determining whether $L_G(S_1) \supseteq L_G(S_2)$ to a containment analysis problem. We use two principals A, B , two role names u_0 and u_1 , and one role name r_N for each nonterminal N . We define \mathcal{P}_G to have the following statements. For each production $N ::= N'b$ in G , \mathcal{P}_G has $A.r_N \leftarrow A.r_{N'}.u_b$. For each production $N ::= b$, introduce a statement $A.r_N \leftarrow B.u_b$. We define \mathcal{R}_G to be such that all roles started with A are g/s -restricted, and all roles started with B are g -unrestricted.

It is not hard to see that a string $b_1 b_2 \cdots b_k \in L(N)$ if and only if $\text{RS}[\mathcal{P}_G] \triangleright A.r_N \xrightarrow{*} B.u_{b_1}.u_{b_2} \cdots u_{b_k}$. One can further verify that there exists a one-to-one mapping from strings in $L_G(N)$ to $\chi_{\mathcal{P}_G, \mathcal{R}_G}(A.r_N)$ such that $L_G(N_1) \supseteq L_G(N_2)$ if and only if $\chi_{\mathcal{P}_G, \mathcal{R}_G}(A.r_{N_1}) \supseteq \chi_{\mathcal{P}_G, \mathcal{R}_G}(A.r_{N_2})$. From Lemma 4.8, it follows that $L_G(N_1) \supseteq L_G(N_2)$ if and only if $A.r_{N_1}$ contains $A.r_{N_2}$.

\square

4.4 Containment Analysis for $\text{RT}[\leftarrow, \sqcap]$ is in **coNEXP**

THEOREM 4.11. *Containment analysis in $\text{RT}[\leftarrow, \sqcap]$ is in **coNEXP**.*

See Appendix A.5 for the proof. The proof shows that if there exists a counter example to the containment relation, i.e., there exists a reachable state in which the inclusion does not hold, then there exists such a reachable state of size at most exponential in the input size.

We have shown that containment analysis for $RT[\leftarrow, \cap]$ is **PSPACE**-hard (from Theorem 4.5) and is in **coNEXP**. The exact complexity is still unknown. We tried applying the approach for $RT[\leftarrow]$ to the case of $RT[\leftarrow, \cap]$, and we now discuss the difficulties of this approach. There is a natural mapping between $RT[\leftarrow]$ and pushdown systems. $RT[\leftarrow, \cap]$, which adds to $RT[\leftarrow]$ intersection inclusion statements, can be mapped to alternating pushdown systems. An alternating pushdown system (APDS for short) is a triplet (Π, Γ, Δ) , where Π and Γ are the same as for PDSs, and Δ is a function that assigns to each element of $(\Pi \times \Gamma)$ a negation-free boolean formula over elements of $\Pi \times \Gamma^*$. If $\Delta(q, \gamma) = (q_1, \omega_1) \wedge (q_2, \omega_2)$, then for every $\omega \in \Gamma^*$, the immediate successor of $\langle q, \gamma\omega \rangle$ is the set $\{\langle q_1, \omega_1\omega \rangle, \langle q_2, \omega_2\omega \rangle\}$. Intuitively, at the configuration $\langle q, \gamma\omega \rangle$ the APDS forks into two copies in the configurations $\langle q_1, \omega_1\omega \rangle$ and $\langle q_2, \omega_2\omega \rangle$. Because of the mapping from $RT[\leftarrow, \cap]$ to APDSs, the $RT[\leftarrow, \cap]$ containment analysis problem is reduced to determining containment of the reachable frontiers of two APDSs. Each frontier is a set of configurations of a set of PDSs. Unfortunately, in this case the reduction does not currently assist us in determining a tighter upper bound than the one we have already. In particular, it is not clear how to encode all the reachable frontiers (a set of sets of strings) succinctly.²

5. DISCUSSIONS AND RELATED WORK

We have shown that containment analysis is intractable in $RT[\cap]$, $RT[\leftarrow]$, and $RT[\leftarrow, \cap]$. This means that it is extremely unlikely that we will find an algorithm that is both sound and complete, and also has a worst-case polynomial time complexity. However, heuristic approaches are still possible. For example, it is not difficult to extend our LP-based approach for containment analysis in $RT[\cap]$ to the case of $RT[\leftarrow]$ and $RT[\leftarrow, \cap]$, such that containment relationships in Example 1 can be proved correctly. A possible approach is to use a sound but incomplete method and a complete but unsound method together to approximate the exact answer. Such a heuristic approach may be useful in practice, as it can give an exact answer in most cases. How to evaluate the effectiveness of such methods is interesting future work.

On the other hand, we have shown that in our TM model, simple safety analysis can be solved efficiently. As discussed in Section 1, security analysis in the form of simple safety analysis has been studied in the HRU model [Harrison et al. 1976], and shown to be undecidable there. In this section we study the relationships between the two models, arguing informally that the HRU model does not include our TM model as a special case, and showing that there is an intuitive reason why security analysis in our model is decidable. We also seek to clarify the relationship between how trusted users are modelled in the two approaches. After this discussion of related work in safety analysis, we go on to discuss related work in trust management.

5.1 Comparison with the HRU Access Matrix Model

In the HRU model [Harrison et al. 1976], a *protection system* has a finite set of rights and a finite set of commands. A *configuration* of a protection system is an access control matrix, with rows corresponding to subjects, and columns corresponding to objects; each cell in the matrix is a set of rights. A command takes the form of “if a list of conditions hold, execute a sequence of primitive operations.” Each condition tests whether a right exists in

²The difficulty of encoding such a set of frontiers was pointed out to us by Ahmed Bouajjani in personal communication.

a cell in the matrix. There are six kinds of primitive operations: enter a right into a specific cell in the matrix, delete a right from a cell in the matrix, create a new subject, create a new object, destroy an existing subject, and destroy an existing object. A command may be parameterized, with parameters being subjects or objects. In [Harrison et al. 1976], Harrison et al. proved that for the HRU model, the safety question is undecidable, by showing that any Turing machine can be simulated by a protection system. For a fixed set of mono-operational commands, safety can be determined in time polynomial in the size of the access control matrix. However, if commands are a parameter to the problem, the safety problem is **NP**-complete.

In our model, given a state \mathcal{P} , the minimal Herbrand model of $SP(\mathcal{P})$ is a set of ground logical atoms. An atom $m(A, r, D)$ means that D is a member of A 's r role. When A represents a resource, this can be viewed as D having the right r over A . Therefore, one can view principals as both subjects and objects and view role names as rights. This defines a straightforward mapping between the semantics of \mathcal{P} and an access matrix. If all we have are simple member statements, then adding (or removing) $A.r \leftarrow D$ corresponds to adding (or removing) r to the cell on row D and column A . Adding a simple inclusion statement $A.r \leftarrow B.r_1$ can be viewed as adding a trigger program, which for each row D , use parameters A, B, D to execute the following command: “ $a2(x, y, z)$ { if r_1 in cell (y, z) , add r to cell (x, z) }”. Note that this trigger program needs to be executed whenever the matrix changes. For example, if after $A.r \leftarrow B.r_1$ is added, adding $B.r_1 \leftarrow E$ will need to result in r being added to the cell (A, E) . The statement $A.r \leftarrow B.r_1$ gives B the power to add things to A 's column, which represents a delegation. Similarly, adding a linking inclusion statement $A.r \leftarrow A.r_1.r_2$ can be viewed as adding a trigger program that executes the following command with parameters A, D, E for every D and E : “ $a3(x, y, z)$ { if r_1 in cell (x, y) , and r_2 in cell (y, z) , add r to cell (x, z) }”. Adding intersection inclusion statement can be viewed in a similar manner. It is not clear how to model removing a statement using this approach.

There might be other ways of encoding our TM model in the HRU access matrix model, but the above encoding seems quite natural. From it, we make the following observations.

It seems unlikely that the HRU model subsumes the TM model as a special case. First, in the TM model, creating and removing principals are implicit. A principal can be viewed as created if it is used. A principal is considered removed if no statement mentions it. One could view the matrix as having an infinite number of rows and columns; however, only finitely many cells are nonempty. Second, one step of change in the TM model corresponds to executing many (one for every object when adding a simple inclusion or an intersection inclusion statement, or one for every pair of objects when adding a linking inclusion statement) simple commands in the HRU model. Third, triggers need to be used in order to achieve the effect of propagation. The last two are the main power of the TM model, and they do not exist in the HRU model.

That our TM model cannot subsume the HRU model is immediate from the complexity bounds. The underlying reason is that the HRU commands we use to partially simulate our TM model have fixed schemas, instead of being arbitrary programs. As a result, we can exploit the properties of these fixed schemas. This seems to be the main reason that safety analysis, or the even more powerful containment analysis, is decidable in our model, but not in the HRU model.

Handling Trusted Subjects. Intuitively, a specific protection system is “safe” if access to resources without concurrence of the owner is impossible. However, protection systems often allow the owner to share rights to the resources. In that sense, they are not safe; the HRU model uses a weaker notion of safety: a user should be able to tell whether what he is about to do can lead to the further leakage of that right to untrusted subjects. The following is quoted from [Harrison et al. 1976].

To avoid a trivial “unsafe” answer because s himself can confer generic right r , we should in most circumstances delete s itself from the matrix. It might also make sense to delete from the matrix any other “reliable” subjects who could grant r , but whom s “trusts” will not do so. It is only by using the hypothetical safety test in this manner, with “reliable” subjects deleted, that the ability to test whether a right can be leaked has a useful meaning in terms of whether it is safe to grant a right to a subject.

Note that deleting a “reliable” subject from the matrix is stronger than stopping it from granting a right. Deleting a subject from the matrix will prevent the analysis from successfully simulating the execution of commands that check rights in the row or column corresponding the subject. However, it is inappropriate to ignore such commands: they may add undesirable rights and they may be initiated by “unreliable” subjects. In such cases, a system that is safe after the “reliable” subjects are removed is not safe in the actual system, even if “reliable” subjects do not initiate any command.

In our TM model, the restriction rule R represents the intuitive notion that certain principals are trusted. In practice, principals are controlled by users. When principals represent resources, the controller is the subject who controls access to the resource. When principals represent public keys, the controller is the user who knows the private key.

5.2 Related Work in Trust Management

To our knowledge, no prior work investigates security analysis for trust management systems in the sense of verifying security properties that consider state changes in which (parametric) restrictions are placed on allowed changes. In [Chander et al. 2001], a state transition model is used for comparing the expressive power of different access control mechanisms such as access control lists and trust management. There, security analysis is not the purpose. The language $RT[\leftarrow, \cap]$ is closely related to SDSI, whose semantics and evaluation has been the subject of many previous works [Abadi 1998; Clarke et al. 2001; Halpern and van der Meyden 2001; Jha and Reps 2002; Li 2000; Li et al. 2003]. One main difference our work has is that we consider restricted state changes. We now list some similarities. The semantic approach we use is very similar to the semantics in [Halpern and van der Meyden 2001]. Both [Abadi 1998] and [Halpern and van der Meyden 2001] consider inclusion queries in addition to membership queries. In some sense, they try to answer queries that hold when arbitrary new statements could be added, i.e., every role is g -unrestricted and s -restricted; the case that some roles are g -restricted is not considered. In [Jha and Reps 2002], evaluating queries given a set of SDSI statements is reduced to model checking pushdown systems; there, only a fixed set of SDSI statements is considered, which are encoded as transition rules in the automata. Other works [Clarke et al. 2001; Li 2000; Li et al. 2003] do not handle inclusion queries or consider restricted state changes.

6. CONCLUSION

Trust management systems such as RT allow independent principals to delegate partial authority over resources. While this is useful in many situations, delegation also raises the possibility of unanticipated and undesirable access. If Alice delegates access to her friend Bob, how can she be sure that Bob does not give permissions to her enemy Carol? We address this question by studying several forms of safety and availability properties, including general containment analysis that capture both safety and availability.

Although the trust management primitives we consider are more expressive than some aspects of the HRU model [Harrison et al. 1976], our main results show that persistence of nontrivial safety and availability properties may be algorithmically tractable. Specifically, membership queries and boundedness queries, both involving containment between a role and a fixed set of principals, can be answered using datalog programs that run in polynomial time. For general inclusion queries, we look at several cases involving different policy sub-languages. For $RT[\]$, which only allows membership and delegation policy statements, containment for all reachable states is computable by a stratified datalog program with negation in polynomial time. For $RT[\cap]$, which is $RT[\]$ plus intersection, the problem becomes **coNP**-complete. Intuitively, the reason is that multiple statements about a role represent disjunction, while intersection of roles provides a corresponding form of conjunction. For $RT[\leftarrow]$, which is $RT[\]$ plus role linking, role containment for all reachable policy states is **PSPACE**-complete. For $RT[\leftarrow, \cap]$, which includes role linking, the problem remains decidable; our current upper bound is **coNEXP** (or double-exponential time) and lower bound is **PSPACE**-hard.

We believe that security analysis is a critical problem for trust management. While combining policy statements from independent principals has practical appeal, the flexibility of distributed policy comes at a price. An individual or organization that owns a resource no longer has a direct way to determine who may be able to access the resource in the future. The key to providing assurance to trust management users is to develop security analysis methods. The present paper identifies and solves certain security analysis problems, but additional work remains. Exact complexity bound for containment analysis in $RT[\leftarrow, \cap]$ is still open. Although containment analysis has no efficient algorithm in the worst case, there may be tractable subcases or useful heuristics. We also leave open for future work the consequences of more intricate restriction on policy changes. For example, it may be useful to impose restrictions that depend on the current policy, possibly formulated as policy invariants in some specification language.

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A. PROOFS

A.1 Proofs of Fact 3.5 and Proposition 3.6

Fact 3.5: *Given \mathcal{P} , \mathcal{R} , a role $A.r$, and a principal E that does not occur in \mathcal{P} , $A.r$ is g-unbounded if and only if there exists a reachable state \mathcal{P}' such that $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(A, r, E)$.*

PROOF. The “only if” part follows from the definition of g-unbounded roles.

In the “if” part, because $RT[\leftarrow, \cap]$ is monotonic, we can assume without loss of generality that \mathcal{P}' is derived from \mathcal{P} by adding some statements; let $\mathcal{P}' = \mathcal{P} \cup \mathcal{P}_1$. Given any principal Z , one can replace with Z all occurrence of E in the bodies of statements in \mathcal{P}_1 , obtaining a new set of statements, \mathcal{P}_2 . Let $\mathcal{P}'' = \mathcal{P}' \cup \mathcal{P}_2$. \mathcal{P}'' is reachable from \mathcal{P} because it modifies the definitions of the same roles as does \mathcal{P}' . We show that $SP(\mathcal{P}'') \models m(A, r, Z)$ by using induction on i to show that for all $A.r$, if $m(A, r, E) \in T_{SP(\mathcal{P}')} \uparrow^i$, then $SP(\mathcal{P}'') \models m(A, r, Z)$. The basis is trivially satisfied because $T_{SP(\mathcal{P}')} \uparrow^0 = \emptyset$. In the step, $m(A, r, E) \in T_{SP(\mathcal{P}')} \uparrow^{i+1}$. This must be due to one of the four rules in $SP(\mathcal{P}')$, (m1), (m2), (m3), or (m4), which gives us the four following cases:

Case (m1): $A.r \leftarrow E \in \mathcal{P}'$. By construction of \mathcal{P}'' , $A.r \leftarrow Z \in \mathcal{P}''$. $SP(\mathcal{P}'') \models m(A, r, Z)$ follows from (m1).

Case (m2): $A.r \leftarrow B.r_1 \in \mathcal{P}'$ and $m(B, r_1, E) \in T_{SP(\mathcal{P}')} \uparrow^i$. The induction hypothesis now gives us $SP(\mathcal{P}'') \models m(B, r_1, Z)$, from which $SP(\mathcal{P}'') \models m(A, r, Z)$ follows by (m2).

Case (m3): $A.r \leftarrow A.r_1.r_2 \in \mathcal{P}'$ and $m(A, r_1, B), m(B, r_2, E) \in T_{SP(\mathcal{P}')} \uparrow^i$ for some B . The induction hypothesis now gives us $SP(\mathcal{P}'') \models m(B, r_2, Z)$. From $m(A, r_1, B) \in T_{SP(\mathcal{P}')} \uparrow^i$, we have $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(A, r_1, B)$, which gives us $SP(\mathcal{P}'') \models m(A, r_1, B)$ by monotonicity of $RT[\leftarrow, \cap]$. We now have $SP(\mathcal{P}'') \models m(A, r, Z)$ by (m3).

Case (m4): $A.r \leftarrow B_1.r_1 \cap B_2.r_2 \in \mathcal{P}'$ and $m(B_1, r_1, E), m(B_2, r_2, E) \in T_{SP(\mathcal{P}')} \uparrow^i$. This case proceeds similarly to case (m2) above. \square

Proposition 3.6: *Given any \mathcal{P} , $\mathcal{R} = (\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{S})$, $A.r \in \text{Roles}(\mathcal{P})$, and $Z \in \text{Principals}(\mathcal{P}) \cup \{\top\}$, $UB(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}) \models ub(A, r, Z)$ if and only if there exists \mathcal{P}' such that $\mathcal{P} \xrightarrow{*}_{\mathcal{R}} \mathcal{P}'$ and $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(A, r, Z)$.*

PROOF. The “only if” part (Soundness): If $UB(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}) \models ub(A, r, Z)$, consider $\mathcal{P}' = \mathcal{P} \cup \{X.u \leftarrow Z \mid X.u \in \text{Roles}(\mathcal{P}) - \mathcal{G}\}$. We show by induction on i that if $ub(A, r, Z) \in T_{UB(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R})} \uparrow^i$, then $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(A, r, Z)$. The basis is trivial. In the step, $ub(A, r, Z) \in T_{UB(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R})} \uparrow^{i+1}$, one of the rules in $UB(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R})$ is used to derive this. Case (u) is impossible, as $A \neq \top$. Case (u0): $A.r \in \text{Roles}(\mathcal{P}) - \mathcal{G}$, by construction of \mathcal{P}' , $A.r \leftarrow Z \in \mathcal{P}'$. So $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(A, r, Z)$ follows immediately by (m1). Case (u1): $A.r \leftarrow Z \in \mathcal{P} \subseteq \mathcal{P}'$. In this case, $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(A, r, Z)$ also follows immediately by (m1).

Case (u2): $A.r \leftarrow B.r_1 \in \mathcal{P} \subseteq \mathcal{P}'$ and $ub(B, r_1, Z) \in T_{UB(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R})} \uparrow^i$. The induction assumption now gives us $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(B, r_1, Z)$, from which $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(A, r, Z)$ follows by (m2).

Case (u3): $A.r \leftarrow A.r_1.r_2 \in \mathcal{P} \subseteq \mathcal{P}'$ and $ub(A, r_1, B), ub(B, r_2, Z) \in T_{UB(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R})} \uparrow^i$ for some B . The induction assumption now gives us $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(A, r_1, B), m(B, r_2, Z)$, from which $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(A, r, Z)$ follows by (m3).

Case (u4): $A.r \leftarrow B_1.r_1 \cap B_2.r_2 \in \mathcal{P} \subseteq \mathcal{P}'$ and $ub(B_1, r_1, Z), ub(B_2, r_2, Z) \in T_{UB(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R})} \uparrow^i$. The induction assumption now gives us $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(B_1, r_1, Z), m(B_2, r_2, Z)$, from which $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(A, r, Z)$ follows by (m4).

The “if” part (Completeness): Suppose that there exists a reachable state \mathcal{P}' such that $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(A, r, Z)$. If $A.r \notin \mathcal{G}$, then $UB(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}) \models ub(A, r, Z)$ from (u0). For the case in which $A.r \in \mathcal{G}$, we use induction on i to show that if $m(A, r, Z) \in T_{SP(\mathcal{P}')} \uparrow^i$, then $UB(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}) \models ub(A, r, Z)$. The basis is trivial. In the step, there are four cases. Case (m1): $A.r \leftarrow Z \in \mathcal{P}'$. From $A.r \in \mathcal{G}$, we have $A.r \leftarrow Z \in \mathcal{P}$. So $UB(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}) \models ub(A, r, Z)$ follows by using (u1).

Case (m2): $A.r \leftarrow B.r_1 \in \mathcal{P}'$ and $m(B, r_1, Z) \in T_{SP(\mathcal{P}')} \uparrow^i$. The induction hypothesis gives us $UB(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}) \models ub(B, r_1, Z)$, from which we obtain the desired $UB(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}) \models ub(A, r, Z)$ by (u2).

Case (m3): $A.r \leftarrow A.r_1.r_2 \in \mathcal{P}'$ and $m(A, r_1, B), m(B, r_2, Z) \in T_{SP(\mathcal{P}')} \uparrow^i$ for some B . The induction hypothesis gives us $UB(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}) \models ub(A, r_1, B), ub(B, r_2, Z)$, from which we obtain the desired $UB(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}) \models ub(A, r, Z)$ by (u3).

Case (m4): $A.r \leftarrow B_1.r_1 \cap B_2.r_2 \in \mathcal{P}'$ and $m(B_1, r_1, Z), m(B_2, r_2, Z) \in T_{SP(\mathcal{P}')} \uparrow^i$. This case is similar to the ones above. \square

A.2 Proof of Lemma 4.1 and Proposition 4.2

We introduce the following terminology for the proof. The program $BCP(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R})$ has a stratification of two strata. Define BCP_1 to be the ground instantiation of clauses defining lb and fc in $BCP(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R})$, and BCP_2 to the ground instantiation of clauses defining nc . (We use BCP instead of $BCP(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R})$ for succinctness.) We write $BCP \models a$ if $a \in \Gamma_{BCP}^2$. When a is a ground instance of fc or lb , we write $BCP \models^i a$ if $a \in \Phi_{BCP_1, \emptyset} \uparrow^i$. When a is a ground instance of nc , we write $BCP \models^i a$ if $a \in \Phi_{BCP_1 \cup BCP_2, \Gamma_{BCP}^1} \uparrow^i$.

Lemma 4.1: *Given a $RT[\]$ state \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R} , two roles $X.u$ and $A.r$, if $BCP(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}) \models fc(X, u, A, r)$, then $X.u$ contains $A.r$. If $X.u$ contains $A.r$ and $A.r$ is g -unrestricted, then $BCP(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}) \models fc(X, u, A, r)$.*

PROOF. Soundness: If $BCP \models fc(X, u, A, r)$, then there exists an integer i such that $BCP \models^i fc(X, u, A, r)$. Induction on i . The basis is trivial, as $\Phi_{BCP_1, \emptyset} \uparrow^0 = \emptyset$. Consider the step; either c or $(c1)$ is used to deduce that $BCP \models^{i+1} fc(X, u, A, r)$. Case (c): it must be that $X.u = A.r$, so it is trivial that $X.u$ contains $A.r$. Case (c1): $X.u \leftarrow B.r_1 \in \mathcal{P}|_{\mathcal{R}}$ and $BCP \models^i fc(B, r_1, A, r)$. By induction hypothesis, $B.r_1$ contains $A.r$. Furthermore, $X.u \leftarrow B.r_1$ exists in every reachable state; therefore, $X.u$ contains $A.r$.

Completeness: Suppose $X.u$ contains $A.r$ and $A.r$ is g -unrestricted. Consider $\mathcal{P}' = \mathcal{P}|_{\mathcal{R}} \cup (A.r \leftarrow E)$, in which E does not occur in \mathcal{P} . Observe that $X.u$ includes $A.r$ is true, since \mathcal{P}' is reachable. Since $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(A, r, E)$, it must be that $m(X, u, E) \in T_{SP(\mathcal{P}')} \uparrow^i$ for some i . To complete the proof, we use induction on i to show that for each $Y.u$, if $m(Y, u, E) \in T_{SP(\mathcal{P}')} \uparrow^i$, then $BCP \models fc(Y, u, A, r)$. Basis is trivial. In the step, one of (m1) and (m2) is used to deduce that $m(Y, u, E) \in T_{SP(\mathcal{P}')} \uparrow^{i+1}$. Case (m1): $Y.u \leftarrow E \in \mathcal{P}'$, it must be that $Y.u = A.r$, since E does not occur in \mathcal{P} . From (c), $BCP \models fc(Y, u, A, r)$. Case (m2): $Y.u \leftarrow Y_1.u_1 \in \mathcal{P}'$, and $m(Y_1, u_1, E) \in T_{SP(\mathcal{P}')} \uparrow^i$. By definition of \mathcal{P}' , $Y.u \leftarrow Y_1.u_1 \in \mathcal{P}|_{\mathcal{R}}$. From (c1), $fc(Y, u, ?Z, ?w) :- fc(Y_1, u_1, ?Z, ?w) \in BCP$. By induction hypothesis, $BCP \models fc(Y_1, u_1, A, r)$, clearly $BCP \models fc(Y, u, A, r)$. \square

Before proving Proposition 4.2, we first prove two auxiliary lemmas. Readers may wish to read the main proof first and refer to the two lemmas when they needed. The following lemma is used to prove the soundness of (n1).

LEMMA A.1. Assume we are given \mathcal{P} in $\text{RT}[\cdot]$, \mathcal{R} , two roles $X.u$ and $A.r$, and a principal D such that $SP(\mathcal{P}|_{\mathcal{R}}) \not\models m(X, u, D)$. Let $\mathcal{P}' = \mathcal{P}|_{\mathcal{R}} \cup \{A.r \leftarrow D\}$. If $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(X, u, D)$, then $BCP \models fc(X, u, A, r)$.

PROOF. We use induction on i to prove that for any $Z.w$ such that $SP(\mathcal{P}|_{\mathcal{R}}) \not\models m(Z, w, D)$, if $m(Z, w, D) \in T_{SP(\mathcal{P}')} \uparrow^i$, then $BCP \models fc(Z, w, A, r)$.

The basis is trivial. In the step, one of (m1) and (m2) is used to derive $m(Z, w, D) \in T_{SP(\mathcal{P}')} \uparrow^{i+1}$. Case (m1): $Z.w \leftarrow D \in \mathcal{P}'$. It must be that $Z.w = A.r$, since it cannot be that $Z.w \leftarrow D \in \mathcal{P}|_{\mathcal{R}}$. By (c), $BCP \models fc(Z, w, A, r)$. Case (m2): $Z.w \leftarrow Z_1.w_1 \in \mathcal{P}'$ and $m(Z_1, w_1, D) \in T_{SP(\mathcal{P}')} \uparrow^i$. It follows that $Z.w \leftarrow Z_1.w_1 \in \mathcal{P}|_{\mathcal{R}}$, by definition of \mathcal{P}' . And it follows that $SP(\mathcal{P}|_{\mathcal{R}}) \not\models m(Z_1, w_1, D)$, since otherwise $SP(\mathcal{P}|_{\mathcal{R}}) \models m(Z, w, D)$, which is contradictory. Now, by induction hypothesis, $BCP \models fc(Z_1, w_1, A, r)$, so the desired result holds by (c1). \square

The following lemma says that (n2) is sound.

LEMMA A.2. Assume we are given a $\text{RT}[\cdot]$ state \mathcal{P} , \mathcal{R} , and three roles $X.u$, $A.r$, $B.r_1$, such that $A.r \leftarrow B.r_1 \in \mathcal{P}$, $BCP(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}) \not\models fc(X, u, A, r)$, and $X.u$ does not contain $B.r_1$. Then $X.u$ does not contain $A.r$.

PROOF. Since $X.u$ does not contain $B.r_1$, there exists a reachable state \mathcal{P}' and a principal E such that $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(B, r_1, E)$ and $SP(\mathcal{P}') \not\models m(X, u, E)$. We now construct a \mathcal{P}'' such that $SP(\mathcal{P}'') \models m(A, r, E)$ and $SP(\mathcal{P}'') \not\models m(X, u, E)$. \mathcal{P}'' is obtained from \mathcal{P}' by first removing any $Z.w \leftarrow Z_1.w_1 \in \mathcal{P}' - \mathcal{P}|_{\mathcal{R}}$ such that $SP(\mathcal{P}') \not\models m(Z_1, w_1, E)$, and then adding $A.r \leftarrow B.r_1$. Clearly, \mathcal{P}'' is reachable. By induction on how $m(A, r, E)$ is proven in $SP(\mathcal{P}')$, it is easy to show that $SP(\mathcal{P}'') \models m(A, r, E)$.

To prove that $SP(\mathcal{P}'') \not\models m(X, u, E)$, we use induction on i to prove that for any $Z.w$ such that $SP(\mathcal{P}') \not\models m(Z, w, E)$, if $m(Z, w, E) \in T_{SP(\mathcal{P}'')} \uparrow^i$, then $BCP \models fc(Z, w, A, r)$. The basis is trivial. In the step, one of (m1) and (m2) is used to derive $m(Z, w, E) \in T_{SP(\mathcal{P}'')} \uparrow^{i+1}$. Case (m1): $Z.w \leftarrow E \in \mathcal{P}''$. This is impossible, as this means that $Z.w \leftarrow E \in \mathcal{P}'$, which is contradictory with $SP(\mathcal{P}') \not\models m(Z, w, E)$. Case (m2): $Z.w \leftarrow Z_1.w_1 \in \mathcal{P}''$ and $m(Z_1, w_1, E) \in T_{SP(\mathcal{P}'')} \uparrow^i$. By definition of \mathcal{P}'' , either $Z.w = A.r$ and $Z_1.w_1 = B.r_1$, or $Z.w \leftarrow Z_1.w_1 \in \mathcal{P}'$. In the former case, $fc(Z, w, A, r)$ follows from (c). In the latter case, it follows that $SP(\mathcal{P}') \not\models m(Z_1, w_1, E)$, from $SP(\mathcal{P}') \not\models m(Z, w, E)$, and, by induction hypothesis, that $BCP \models fc(Z_1, w_1, A, r)$. Now the desired result holds by (c1), provided we have $Z.w \leftarrow Z_1.w_1 \in \mathcal{P}|_{\mathcal{R}}$. This follows from the construction of \mathcal{P}'' and the case assumption that $m(Z_1, w_1, E) \in T_{SP(\mathcal{P}'')} \uparrow^i$. \square

Proposition 4.2: Given a $\text{RT}[\cdot]$ state \mathcal{P} , \mathcal{R} , and two roles $X.u$ and $A.r$ in $\text{Roles}(\mathcal{P})$, $BCP(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}) \models nc(X, u, A, r)$ if and only if $X.u$ does not contain $A.r$.

PROOF. The “only if” part (Soundness): We use induction on i to show that if $BCP \models^i nc(X, u, A, r)$, then $X.u$ does not contain $A.r$. Basis is trivial. In the step, one of (n0), (n1), and (n2) is used to derive that $BCP \models^{i+1} nc(X, u, A, r)$. Case (n0): $A.r$ must be g-unrestricted, and $BCP \models \sim fc(X, u, A, r)$; therefore, $BCP \not\models fc(X, u, A, r)$. From Lemma 4.1, $X.u$ does not contain $A.r$. Case (n1): $A.r \leftarrow D \in \mathcal{P}$, $BCP \models \sim lb(X, u, D)$, and $BCP \models \sim fc(X, u, A, r)$. Then $SP(\mathcal{P}|_{\mathcal{R}}) \not\models m(X, u, D)$ by Fact 3.1. Let $\mathcal{P}' = \mathcal{P}|_{\mathcal{R}} \cup \{A.r \leftarrow D\}$. From Lemma A.1 it follows that $SP(\mathcal{P}') \not\models m(X, u, D)$; therefore $X.u$ does not contain $A.r$. Case (n2): $A.r \leftarrow B.r_1 \in \mathcal{P}$, $BCP \models^n nc(X, u, B, r_1)$,

and $BCP \models \sim fc(X, u, A, r)$. By induction hypothesis, $X.u$ does not contain $B.r_1$; from Lemma A.2, $X.u$ does not contain $A.r$.

The “if” part (Completeness): If $X.u$ does not contain $A.r$, then we show that $BCP \models nc(X, u, A, r)$. When $A.r$ is g-unrestricted. From Lemma 4.1, $BCP \not\models fc(X, u, A, r)$, and so $BCP \models \sim fc(X, u, A, r)$. From (n0), $BCP \models nc(X, u, A, r)$. In the rest of the proof, we only need to consider the case that $A.r$ is g-restricted. If $X.u$ does not contain $A.r$, then there exists a reachable state \mathcal{P}' and a principal E such that $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(A, r, E)$ and $SP(\mathcal{P}') \not\models m(X, u, E)$. We use induction on i to show that if $m(A, r, E) \in T_{SP(\mathcal{P}')} \uparrow^i$, then $BCP \models nc(X, u, A, r)$. First observe that, from Lemma 4.1, it follows that $BCP \not\models fc(X, u, A, r)$, and so $BCP \models \sim fc(X, u, A, r)$. The basis is trivial. In the step, one of (m1) and (m2) is used to deduce that $m(A, r, E) \in T_{SP(\mathcal{P}')} \uparrow^{i+1}$. Case (m1): $A.r \leftarrow E \in \mathcal{P}'$, $A.r \leftarrow E$ must be in \mathcal{P} since $A.r$ is g-restricted. From Proposition 3.2 and $SP(\mathcal{P}') \not\models m(X, u, E)$, $BCP \not\models lb(X, u, E)$, and so $BCP \models \sim lb(X, u, E)$. From (m1), $BCP(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}) \models nc(X, u, A, r)$. Case (m2): $A.r \leftarrow B.r_1 \in \mathcal{P}'$ and $m(B, r_1, E) \in T_{SP(\mathcal{P}')} \uparrow^i$. Since $A.r$ is g-restricted, $A.r \leftarrow B.r_1 \in \mathcal{P}$. By induction hypothesis, $BCP(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}) \models nc(X, u, B, r_1)$. Therefore, $BCP(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}) \models nc(X, u, Z, w)$ by an instance of (n2). \square

A.3 Proofs of Theorems 4.3 and 4.4

We first prove a lemma that will be used in establishing lower bounds on the complexity of containment analysis. The lemma says that if a containment does not hold, then there exists a counter-example state that only adds simple member statements to \mathcal{P} and only uses role names in \mathcal{P} .

LEMMA A.3. *Given \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{R} , two roles $X.u$ and $A.r$ in $\text{Roles}(\mathcal{P})$, if $X.u$ does not contain $A.r$, then there exists a \mathcal{P}' such that $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(A, r, E)$, $SP(\mathcal{P}') \not\models m(X, u, E)$, $\mathcal{P}' - \mathcal{P}$ only has simple member statements, and \mathcal{P}' only uses role names in \mathcal{P} .*

PROOF. If $X.u$ does not contain $A.r$, then there exists a \mathcal{P}' that $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(A, r, E)$ and $SP(\mathcal{P}') \not\models m(X, u, E)$. Given such a \mathcal{P}' , we first derive \mathcal{P}'' by replacing every statement $A.r \leftarrow e \in \mathcal{P}' - \mathcal{P}$, where e is a role, a linked role, or an intersection, with a set of statements $\{A.r \leftarrow Y \mid SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(A, r, Y)\}$. Using induction, it is straightforward to show that the resulting state computes the exact same role memberships.

Now $\mathcal{P}'' - \mathcal{P}$ consists of only simple member statements. From \mathcal{P}'' , we derive \mathcal{P}''' by removing all simple member statements that uses role names (not roles) not appearing in \mathcal{P} . For example, a statement $A.v \leftarrow D$ in \mathcal{P}'' , where v does not appear in \mathcal{P} , will not be in \mathcal{P}''' . Using induction, it is straightforward to show that, for roles in $\text{Roles}(\mathcal{P})$, \mathcal{P}''' computes exactly the same memberships as \mathcal{P}'' . Intuitively, $A.v \leftarrow D$ can affect members of roles in $\text{Roles}(\mathcal{P})$ unless the body of some statement refers to the role name v , which is impossible, since every statement in \mathcal{P}' that could have role names in its body is also in \mathcal{P} , and so do not use v . \square

Theorem 4.3: *Containment analysis in $\text{RT}[\cap]$ is coNP-complete.*

PROOF. To show coNP-hardness, we reduce the monotone 3SAT problem to the complement of the universal containment problem in $\text{RT}[\cap]$. Monotone 3SAT is 3SAT with each clause containing either only positive literals or only negative literals; it is known to be NP-complete [Garey and Johnson 1979].

Given an instance of monotone 3SAT: $\phi = c_1 \wedge \dots \wedge c_\ell \wedge \overline{c_{\ell+1}} \wedge \dots \wedge \overline{c_n}$, in which c_1, \dots, c_ℓ are positive clauses and $\overline{c_{\ell+1}}, \dots, \overline{c_n}$ are negative clauses. Let p_1, \dots, p_s be all the propositional variables in ϕ . For each negative clause $\overline{c_k} = (\neg p_{k_1} \vee \neg p_{k_2} \vee \neg p_{k_3})$, define $d_k = (p_{k_1} \wedge p_{k_2} \wedge p_{k_3})$, then $\overline{c_k} \Leftrightarrow \neg d_k$. Then $\phi \Leftrightarrow c_1 \wedge \dots \wedge c_m \wedge \neg(d_{\ell+1} \vee \dots \vee d_n)$. The formula ϕ is satisfiable if and only if $\psi = (c_1 \wedge \dots \wedge c_\ell) \rightarrow (d_{\ell+1} \vee \dots \vee d_n)$ is not valid. We now construct \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R} , with the goal that $A.d \sqsupseteq A.c$ is necessary if and only if ψ is valid. In the construction, we use the role $A.p_i$ to denote the propositional variable p_i , $A.c_j$ to denote the clause c_j , and $A.d_k$ to denote the clause d_k . Define $\mathcal{P} = \mathcal{P}_1 \cup \mathcal{P}_2 \cup \mathcal{P}_3 \cup \mathcal{P}_4$, in which

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{P}_1 &= \{A.c \leftarrow A.c_1 \cap A.c'_1, A.c'_1 \leftarrow A.c_2 \cap A.c'_2, \dots, A.c'_{\ell-1} \leftarrow A.c_{\ell-1} \cap A.c_\ell\}. \\ \mathcal{P}_2 &= \{A.c_j \leftarrow A.p_{j_1}, A.c_j \leftarrow A.p_{j_2}, A.c_j \leftarrow A.p_{j_3} \mid 1 \leq j \leq \ell, c_j = p_{j_1} \vee p_{j_2} \vee p_{j_3}\} \\ \mathcal{P}_3 &= \{A.d \leftarrow A.d_k \mid \ell + 1 \leq k \leq n\} \\ \mathcal{P}_4 &= \{A.d_k \leftarrow A.p_{k_1} \cap A.d'_k, A.d'_k \leftarrow A.p_{k_2} \cap A.p_{k_3} \mid \ell + 1 \leq k \leq n, d_k = p_{k_1} \wedge p_{k_2} \wedge p_{k_3}\} \end{aligned}$$

Define R to be the restriction rule such that all the $A.p_i$'s are g-unrestricted and s-restricted, and all other roles are g/s-restricted.

We now show that $A.d \sqsupseteq A.c$ is *not* necessary if and only if ψ is *not* valid. First, the “only if” part: If $A.d \sqsupseteq A.c$ is not necessary, then there exists a reachable state \mathcal{P}' and a principal E such that $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(A, c, E)$ and $SP(\mathcal{P}') \not\models m(A, d, E)$. Consider the truth assignment I defined as follows, for every i such that $1 \leq i \leq s$, $I(p_i) = \text{true}$ if $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(A, p_i, E)$, and $I(p_i) = \text{false}$ otherwise. Then under I , $(c_1 \wedge \dots \wedge c_\ell)$ is true and $d_{\ell+1} \vee \dots \vee d_n$ is false; therefore ψ is not valid. The “if” part: If ψ is not valid, then there exists a truth assignment I such that $(c_1 \wedge \dots \wedge c_\ell)$ is true and $(d_{\ell+1} \vee \dots \vee d_n)$ is false. Consider $\mathcal{P}' = \mathcal{P} \cup \{A.p_i \leftarrow Z \mid 1 \leq i \leq s \wedge I(p_i) = \text{true}\}$. \mathcal{P}' is reachable, and $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(A, c, Z)$ and $SP(\mathcal{P}') \not\models m(A, d, Z)$.

We now show that containment analysis in $\text{RT}[\cap]$ is in **coNP**. Given \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{R} , if $X.u$ does not contain $A.r$, then there exists a reachable state \mathcal{P}' and a principal E such that, $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(A, r, E)$ and $SP(\mathcal{P}') \not\models m(X, u, E)$. From Lemma A.3, we can assume, without loss of generality, that $\mathcal{P}' - \mathcal{P}$ consists of only simple member statements and \mathcal{P}' uses the same role names. From \mathcal{P}' , we construct \mathcal{P}'' as follows, let $\mathcal{P}'' = \mathcal{P}' \cap (\mathcal{P} \cup \{Z.w \leftarrow E \in \mathcal{P}' \mid Z.w \in \text{Roles}(\mathcal{P})\})$. Clearly, $\mathcal{P}'' \subseteq \mathcal{P}'$ and \mathcal{P}'' is reachable. By induction on how $m(A, r, E)$ is proven in $SP(\mathcal{P}')$, it is easy to see that $SP(\mathcal{P}'') \models m(A, r, E)$. The size of \mathcal{P}'' is polynomial in \mathcal{P} . This means that if a containment does not hold, then there exists a short (polynomial in the size of the input program \mathcal{P}) counterproof such that one can check in polynomial time. This shows that the problem is in **coNP**. The method we use to construct the counter example \mathcal{P}'' also yields an exponential algorithm for determining containment. \square

Theorem 4.4: *Containment analysis in $\text{RT}[\leftarrow]$ where all roles in $\text{Roles}(\mathcal{P})$ are g-restricted is **coNP**-complete.*

PROOF. Since one can nondeterministically guess a subset \mathcal{P}' of \mathcal{P} and verify that the containment does not hold, the problem is clearly in **coNP**. To prove **coNP**-hardness, we reduce the monotone 3SAT problem to the complement of universal role containment in $\text{RT}[\leftarrow]$, similar to that in the proof of Theorem 4.3. Given an instance ϕ of monotone

3SAT, we construct $\psi = (c_1 \wedge \dots \wedge c_\ell) \rightarrow (d_{\ell+1} \vee \dots \vee d_n)$ such that ϕ is satisfiable if and only if ψ is not valid.

We now construct \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R} , such that $A.d \sqsupseteq A.c$ is necessary if and only if ψ is valid.

Define \mathcal{P} to be $\mathcal{P}_1 \cup \mathcal{P}_2 \cup \mathcal{P}_3 \cup \mathcal{P}_4 \cup \mathcal{P}_5$, in which

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{P}_1 &= \{A.c \leftarrow A.c'_1.c_1, A.c'_1 \leftarrow A.c'_2.c_2, \dots, A.c'_{\ell-2} \leftarrow A.c'_{\ell-1}.c_{\ell-1}, A.c'_{\ell-1} \leftarrow \\ &A.c_\ell\} \\ \mathcal{P}_2 &= \{A.c_j \leftarrow A.p_{j_1}, A.c_j \leftarrow A.p_{j_2}, A.c_j \leftarrow A.p_{j_3} \mid 1 \leq j \leq \ell, c_j = \\ &p_{j_1} \vee p_{j_2} \vee p_{j_3}\} \\ \mathcal{P}_3 &= \{A.d \leftarrow A.d_k \mid \ell + 1 \leq k \leq n\} \\ \mathcal{P}_4 &= \{A.d_k \leftarrow A.d'_k.p_{k_1}, A.d'_k \leftarrow A.p_{k_2}.p_{k_3} \mid \ell + 1 \leq k \leq n, d_k = \\ &p_{k_1} \wedge p_{k_2} \wedge p_{k_3}\} \\ \mathcal{P}_5 &= \{A.p_i \leftarrow A \mid 1 \leq i \leq s\} \end{aligned}$$

Let R be the restriction rule such that all the $A.p_i$'s are g-restricted and s-unrestricted, and all other roles mentioned in \mathcal{P} are g/s-restricted.

In every reachable state, the definitions of some $A.p_i$'s are removed, which correspond to assigning false to some of the p_i 's. In every reachable state, $A.c$ and $A.d$ either includes only A or is empty. $A.c$ includes A if and only if the corresponding truth assignment makes $c_1 \wedge \dots \wedge c_m$ true, and $A.d$ includes A if and only if the corresponding truth assignment makes $(d_{m+1} \vee \dots \vee d_n)$ true. Therefore, $A.c$ contains $A.d$ if and only if ψ is valid. \square

A.4 Proof of Proposition 4.7

Proposition 4.7: *Given a set \mathcal{P} of $\text{RT}[\leftarrow]$ statements, $SP(\mathcal{P}) \models m(A, r, D)$ if and only if $\text{RS}[\mathcal{P}] \models A r \xrightarrow{*} D$.*

PROOF. We prove the only if part by using induction on i to show that if $m(A, r, D) \in T_{SP(\mathcal{P})} \uparrow^i$, then $\text{RS}[\mathcal{P}] \triangleright A r \xrightarrow{*} D$. The basis is trivially satisfied because $T_{SP(\mathcal{P})} \uparrow^0 = \emptyset$. In the step, $m(A, r, D) \in T_{SP(\mathcal{P})} \uparrow^{i+1}$, one of (m1), (m2), (m3) is used to derive this.

Case (m1): $A.r \leftarrow D \in SP(\mathcal{P})$, this means that $A r \mapsto D \in \mathcal{P}$. Clearly, $\text{RS}[\mathcal{P}] \triangleright A r \xrightarrow{*} D$.

Case (m2): $A.r \leftarrow B.r_1 \in SP(\mathcal{P})$, and $m(B, r_1, D) \in T_{SP(\mathcal{P})} \uparrow^i$. In this case, $A r \mapsto B r_1 \in \mathcal{P}$, and by induction hypothesis, $\text{RS}[\mathcal{P}] \triangleright B r_1 \xrightarrow{*} D$. Using rewriting rules in $\text{RS}[\mathcal{P}]$, one can rewrite $A r$ first to $B r_1$, and then to D ; so $\text{RS}[\mathcal{P}] \triangleright A r \xrightarrow{*} D$.

Case (m3): $A.r \leftarrow A.r_1.r_2 \in SP(\mathcal{P})$ and $m(A, r_1, E), m(E, r_2, D) \in T_{SP(\mathcal{P})} \uparrow^i$. By induction hypothesis, $\text{RS}[\mathcal{P}] \triangleright B r_1 \xrightarrow{*} E, E r_2 \xrightarrow{*} D$. Using rewriting rules in $\text{RS}[\mathcal{P}]$, one can rewrite $A r$ first to $A r_1 r_2$, then into $E r_2$, and finally into D .

We prove the if part by using induction on i to show that if using $\text{RS}[\mathcal{P}]$ one can rewrite $A r$ into D in i steps, then $SP(\mathcal{P}) \models m(A, r, D)$. Base case, $i = 1$ and $A.r \leftarrow D \in \mathcal{P}$, clearly $SP(\mathcal{P}) \models m(A, r, D)$. Consider the step, consider the first rewriting step. One of the following two cases apply.

Case one: $\text{cred}A.rB.r_1 \in \mathcal{P}$ is used in the first step. By induction hypothesis, $SP(\mathcal{P}) \models m(B, r_1, D)$. Furthermore, $m(A, r, ?X) :- m(B, r_1, ?X) \in SP(\mathcal{P})$; thus $SP(\mathcal{P}) \models m(A, r, D)$.

Case two: $\text{cred}A.rA.r_1.r_2 \in \mathcal{P}$ is used in the first step. There must exist a principal E such that $\text{RS}[\mathcal{P}] \triangleright A r_1 r_2 \xrightarrow{*} E.r_2 \xrightarrow{*} D$. By induction hypothesis, $SP(\mathcal{P}) \models m(A, r_1, E), m(E, r_2, D)$. Furthermore, $m(A, r, ?X) :- m(A, r_1, ?Y), m(?Y, r_2, ?X) \in$

$SP(\mathcal{P})$; thus $SP(\mathcal{P}) \models m(A, r, D)$.

□

A.5 Proof of Theorem 4.11

Theorem 4.11: *Containment analysis in $RT[\leftarrow, \cap]$ is in coNEXP .*

PROOF. Given \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{R} , if a query $X.u \sqsupseteq A.r$ is not necessary, i.e., $X.u$ does not contain $A.r$, then there exists a reachable state \mathcal{P}' and a principal E such that $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(A, r, E)$ and $SP(\mathcal{P}') \not\models m(X, u, E)$. From Lemma A.3, we can assume, without loss of generality, that $\mathcal{P}' - \mathcal{P}$ consists of only simple member statements and \mathcal{P}' uses the same role names as \mathcal{P} .

Given such a \mathcal{P}' and E , we show that one can construct another state \mathcal{P}'' that has size exponential in \mathcal{P} and $SP(\mathcal{P}'') \models m(A, r, E)$ and $SP(\mathcal{P}'') \not\models m(X, u, E)$. The way we construct \mathcal{P}'' is through collapsing equivalent principals in \mathcal{P}' into one, to be made precise as follows. Let $\text{SigRoles}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{P}', \mathcal{Q})$ be $\{X.u\} \cup \{A.r_1 \mid A.r \leftarrow A.r_1.r_2 \in \mathcal{P} \cap \mathcal{P}'\} \cup \{B_1.r_1, B_2.r_2 \mid A.r \leftarrow B_1.r_1 \cap B_2.r_2 \in \mathcal{P} \cap \mathcal{P}'\}$. Define a binary relation \equiv over the principals in \mathcal{P}' as follows: $Y_1 \equiv Y_2$ if one of the following two conditions are satisfied: (1) $Y_1 = Y_2$; (2) $Y_1, Y_2 \notin \text{Principals}(\mathcal{P})$ and for every role $Z.w \in \text{SigRoles}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{P}', \mathcal{Q})$, $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(Z, w, Y_1)$ if and only if $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(Z, w, Y_2)$. The relation \equiv is easily seen to be an equivalence relation. For each equivalence class, we pick one principal in it as a unique representative; for a given principal Y , we use $[Y]$ to denote the representative the equivalence class of Y . We assume that $[E] = E$. \mathcal{P}'' is constructed from \mathcal{P}' as follows: for each statement, replace all the principals with their representatives, then remove duplicate statements.

Given \mathcal{P} that has size N , clearly $\text{SigRoles}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{P}', \mathcal{Q})$ has $O(N)$ roles. Therefore, there are in total $M = O(2^{O(N)})$ principals in \mathcal{P}' , these principals will result in $O(M^2N)$ new simple member statements. Therefore, if a containment does not hold, there exists a counter-example state that has size exponential in \mathcal{P} . Once the state is guessed correctly, it can be verified in time polynomial in the size of the state. This shows that the problem is in coNEXP . An obvious algorithm that has double exponential time complexity is as follows: first collect $\text{SigRoles}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{Q})$ from $X.u$ and all simple inclusion and linking inclusion statements from \mathcal{P} , and add one principal for each subset of $\text{SigRoles}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{Q})$, then enumerate all reachable sub-states to see whether a containment holds.

It remains to prove that our construction of \mathcal{P}'' works, i.e., that $SP(\mathcal{P}'') \models m(A, r, E)$ and $SP(\mathcal{P}'') \not\models m(X, u, E)$.

To prove $SP(\mathcal{P}'') \models m(A, r, E)$, we use induction to prove the following claim: For any role $Z.w$ in $\text{Roles}(\mathcal{P}')$ and Y in \mathcal{P}' , if $m(Z, w, Y) \in T_{SP(\mathcal{P}')} \uparrow^i$, then $SP(\mathcal{P}'') \models m([Z], w, [Y])$. The basis is trivial, since $T_{SP(\mathcal{P}')} \uparrow^0 = \emptyset$. Now consider the step. One of (m1), (m2), (m3), and (m4) is used to derive $m(Z, w, Y) \in T_{SP(\mathcal{P}')} \uparrow^{i+1}$. Case (m1): $Z.w \leftarrow Y \in \mathcal{P}'$. By construction of \mathcal{P}'' , $[Z].w \leftarrow [Y] \in \mathcal{P}''$; therefore, $SP(\mathcal{P}'') \models m([Z], w, [Y])$. In the next three cases, a statement $A.r \leftarrow e$ that is not a simple member statement exists in \mathcal{P}' . It must also exist in \mathcal{P} , since $\mathcal{P}' - \mathcal{P}$ only has simple member statements; therefore, principals in $A.r \leftarrow e$ are each in their own equivalence class. The statement must also exist in \mathcal{P}'' , since the equivalence substitution for $A.r \leftarrow e$ will not change the statement. Case (m2): $Z.w \leftarrow Z_1.w_1 \in \mathcal{P}', \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{P}''$ and $m(Z_1, w_1, Y) \in T_{SP(\mathcal{P}')} \uparrow^i$. From induction hypothesis, $SP(\mathcal{P}'') \models$

$m([Z_1], w_1, [Y])$. It must be that $[Z_1] = Z_1$. The claim then follows from (m2). Case (m3): $Z.w \leftarrow Z.w_1.w_2 \in \mathcal{P}', \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{P}''$ and $m(Z, w_1, F), m(F, w_2, Y) \in T_{SP(\mathcal{P}'')} \uparrow^i$. It must be that $[Z] = Z$. By induction hypothesis, $SP(\mathcal{P}'') \models m([Z], w_1, [F])$, and $SP(\mathcal{P}'') \models m([F], w_2, [Y])$. The claim follows from (m3). Case (m4): $Z.w \leftarrow Z_1.w_1 \cap Z_2.w_2 \in \mathcal{P}', \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{P}''$ and $m(Z_1, w_1, Y), m(Z_2, w_2, Y) \in T_{SP(\mathcal{P}'')} \uparrow^i$. This case is similar to (m2).

We now prove that $SP(\mathcal{P}'') \not\models m(X, u, E)$, by proving the following claim: for any role $Z.w \in \text{Roles}(\mathcal{P}'')$ and any principal Y in $\text{Principals}(\mathcal{P}'')$, if $m(Z, w, Y) \in T_{SP(\mathcal{P}'')} \uparrow^i$, then there exists Z', Y' such that $[Z'] = Z$ and $[Y'] = Y$ and $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(Z', w, Y')$. Given this claim, if $SP(\mathcal{P}'') \models m(X, u, E)$, then there exists X' and E' in $\text{Principals}(\mathcal{P}')$ such that $[X'] = X$, $[E'] = E$, and $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(X', u, E')$. Since $X \in \text{Principals}(\mathcal{P})$, it must be that $X' = X$. And by definition of \equiv , $[E'] = E$ means that E is also a member of $X.u$, giving us a contradiction with our assumption on \mathcal{P}' .

We now use induction to prove the claim. The basis is trivial, since $T_{SP(\mathcal{P}'')} \uparrow^0 = \emptyset$. Now consider the step. One of (m1), (m2), (m3), and (m4) is used to derive $m(Z, w, Y) \in T_{SP(\mathcal{P}'')} \uparrow^{i+1}$. Case (m1): $Z.w \leftarrow Y \in \mathcal{P}''$. By definition of \mathcal{P}'' , there exists $Z'.w \leftarrow Y' \in \mathcal{P}'$ such that $[Z'] = Z$ and $[Y'] = Y$. From this we have $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(Z', w, Y')$ by (m1). In the following three cases, a non-simple-member statement $A.r \leftarrow e$ of \mathcal{P}'' is used; such a statement must be mapped from a non-simple-member statement in \mathcal{P}' . Since all such statements in \mathcal{P}' are also in \mathcal{P} and do not change in the mapping, $A.r \leftarrow e \in \mathcal{P} \cap \mathcal{P}'$. Case (m2): $Z.w \leftarrow Z_1.w_1 \in \mathcal{P}'', \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{P}'$ and $m(Z_1, w_1, Y) \in T_{SP(\mathcal{P}'')} \uparrow^i$. From induction hypothesis, $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(Z'_1, w_1, Y')$ and $[Z'_1] = Z_1$ and $[Y'] = Y$. Because $Z_1 \in \text{Principals}(\mathcal{P})$, it must be that $Z'_1 = Z_1$. The conclusion follows from (m2). Case (m3): $Z.w \leftarrow Z.w_1.w_2 \in \mathcal{P}'', \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{P}'$ and $m(Z, w_1, F), m(F, w_2, Y) \in T_{SP(\mathcal{P}'')} \uparrow^i$ for some principal F . By induction hypothesis, $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(Z, w_1, F'), m(F'', w_2, Y')$ and $[F'] = [F''] = F$. Since $Z.w_1 \in \text{SigRoles}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{P}', \mathcal{Q})$, by definition of \equiv applied to $F' \equiv F''$, $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(Z, w_1, F'')$. The claim follows from (m3). Case (m4): $Z.w \leftarrow Z_1.w_1 \cap Z_2.w_2 \in \mathcal{P}'', \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{P}'$ and $m(Z_1, w_1, Y), m(Z_2, w_2, Y) \in T_{SP(\mathcal{P}'')} \uparrow^i$. By induction hypothesis and the fact $Z_1, Z_2 \in \text{Principals}(\mathcal{P})$, $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(Z_1, w_1, Y'), m(Z_2, w_2, Y'')$ and $[Y'] = [Y''] = Y$. By definition of \equiv , $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(Z_2, w_2, Y')$. Therefore, $SP(\mathcal{P}') \models m(Z, w, Y')$. \square

Observe that in the proof, only roles in the body of linking inclusion and intersection inclusion statements need to be collected. This may be used to explain why containment in $\text{RT}[\]$ is efficiently decidable.

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