Principal Investigator: Saurabh Bagchi
Ad hoc wireless networks are becoming important platforms in several application domains, including military warfare and mission-critical sensor networks. However, the open nature of the wireless communication channels and the lack of infrastructure, have made these networks vulnerable to a wide range of security attacks. Securing such networks is particularly challenging due to two reasons. First, the adversary can physically compromise a node and acquire its private keys, rendering cryptographic mechanisms insufficient. Second, the adversary may have much stronger computation/communication capabilities than the legitimate ad hoc network nodes, and the malicious nodes can collude among themselves. This has created an imbalance in securing ad hoc networks—defense is hard and resource-consuming while attack is often easy and cheap.
In this project, we are developing a provably assurable ad hoc network protocol suite to invert this imbalance. By provably assurable, we mean that the system designer will be able to reason about provable security guarantees under specific limits on the fraction of the network that is compromised (say, no more than 30% of the nodes can get compromised). Such reasoning will be valid in the presence of a wide, and rigorously quantifiable, range of adversarial behaviors. In particular, our solution seeks to achieve the following goals.
We are using two major approaches to achieve these goals.
(See under “Intelligent Ad-Hoc Wireless Networks”)
Other PIs: Xiaojun Lin (Purdue University)
Other Faculty:
Students: Jinkyu Koo (Ph.D. Student) DongHoon Shin (Ph.D. Student) Matthew Tan Creti (Ph.D. Student)
Keywords: ad hoc networks, formal methods, Malware