So You Think You are Safe? Implications of Quality Uncertainty in Security Software

Research Areas: Policy, Law and Management

Principal Investigator: Karthik Kannan

The issue of information uncertainty in the context of information security is increasingly important. Many users lack the ability to correctly estimate the true quality of the security software they purchase, as evidenced by some anecdotes and even some academic research. Yet, most of the analytical research assumes otherwise. Hence, we were motivated to incorporate this "false sense of security" behavior into a game-theoretic model and study the implications on welfare parameters. Our model features two segments of consumers, well- and ill-informed, and the monopolistic software vendor. Well-informed consumers observe the true quality of the security software, while the ill-informed ones overestimate. While the proportion of both segments are known to the software vendor, consumers are uncertain about the segment they belong to. We find that, in fact, the level of the uncertainty is not necessarily harmful to society. Furthermore, there exist some extreme circumstances where society and consumers could be better off if the security software did not exist. Interestingly, we also find that the case where consumers know the information structure and weight their expectation accordingly does not always lead to optimal social welfare. These results contrast with the conventional wisdom and are crucially important in developing appropriate policies in this context.

Coming Up!

Our annual security symposium will take place on April 7th and 8th, 2020.
Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN

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