


A New Foundation in Cryptographic Hashing

By William R. Speirs II

Traditional Cryptographic Hash Functions


A traditional cryptographic hash function takes a message of any size and computes a fixed size digest of the message.

Hash functions are used in a number of cryptographic protocols. The most common use for a hash function is in digital signatures. Integrity of a message is the other most common use for a hash function. The digest of a message can be considered a unique identifier for the message.



Dynamic Cryptographic Hash Functions


A dynamic cryptographic hash function takes a message of any size and the desired digest size, and then computes a digest of the requested size of the message.



Requirements For Security


1) Preimage Resistance

For essentially all pre-specified outputs, it is computationally infeasible to find any input which hashes to that output, i.e., to find any preimage x' such that $h(x') = y$ when given any y for which a corresponding input is not known.




2) Second Preimage Resistance

It is computationally infeasible to find any second input which has the same output as any specified input, i.e., given x , to find a 2nd-preimage $x' \neq x$ such that $h(x) = h(x')$.



3) Collision Resistance

It is computationally infeasible to find any two distinct inputs x, x' which hash to the same output, i.e., such that $h(x) = h(x')$. (Note that here there is a free choice of both inputs.)



Current Attacks*

Practical

HAVAL
MD2
MD4
MD5
N-Hash
RIPEMD
SHA-0
SMASH
Snefru

Theoretical

HAVAL
PANAMA
SHA-1
StepRightUp

No Known

RIPEMD-160
SHA-2 Family
Tiger
WHIRLPOOL

Requirements For Security


1) Preimage Resistance

2) Second Preimage Resistance

3) Collision Resistance


4) Digest-Size Preimage Resistance

Producing the preimage of $h(x, n)$ given only $h(x, n)$ is computationally equivalent to producing the preimage of $h(x, n)$ when given $\{h(x, 1), h(x, 2), \dots\}$. Essentially, given different size digests of the same message does not decrease the computational effort to invert a dynamic cryptographic hash function.




5) Digest-Size Resistance

Given $\{h(x, 1), \dots, h(x, n-1), h(x, n+1), \dots\}$ only, does not allow one to create $h(x, n)$. Essentially, one cannot construct the n -bit digest of a message from other size digests.



6) Digest-Size Collision Resistance

Given two messages x and x' , where $x \neq x'$ and $h(x, n) = h(x', n)$; knowing this collision does not reduce the computational complexity of creating two messages y and y' , where $y \neq y'$ and $h(y, m) = h(y', m)$ where $m \neq n$.



*Attack information taken from: <http://paginas.terra.com.br/informatica/paulobarreto/hflounge.html>

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