


## Modeling Deception In Information Security As A Hypergame - A Primer

Christopher N. Gutierrez, Mohammed H. Almeshekah, Jeff Avery, Saurabh Bagchi, and Eugene H. Spafford



### PROBLEM

In order to use deception as a viable information security defensive mechanism, one must properly analyze the conflict at hand. There is little work that analyzes the use of deception as a strategic defensive mechanism in computing systems. A hypergame is a game-theoretic conflict model where players may have misconceptions of assets, actions, and preferences of other players. We demonstrate that hypergames may provide strategic insights in designing deception into security






### Insider Threat Conflict



### Hypergame

Security Admin   
Insider 

### Actions

	Maintenance
	Bait
	Investigate
	Work
	Exfiltrate