The Center for Education and Research in Information Assurance and Security

Likely Incapable

Has not dem-

onstrated the

resources or

organization

Cyber Conflict Capabilities Assessment: Islamic Republic of Iran

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Likely Capable

Has the resources,

be successful in at

least a limited ca-

pacity

willingness, and

organization to

Demonstratively Capable

Has demonstrated

the resources, will-

ingness, and has en-

gaged in cyber con-

flict activities with at

least limited success

Demonstratively Proficient

Has demonstrated the

advanced resources,

willingness, and suc-

cessful engagement of

cyber capabilities to a

high magnitude of ef-

Likely Immature

Has some de-

velopment of

the identified

resources and

formation of

organization

Abstract

The purpose of this study was to perform a topical OSINT analysis of Iran's capability to engage in cyber conflict. The capabilities were assessed on an ordinal Likert-type scale which seeks to independently grade a nation-state's cyber capabilities in a general way. The metrics used were intended to gauge both the offensive and defensive resources available to a country within the cyber domain. These metrics are as follows:

Because the information was gathered via OSINT, sources observed and used may introduce their own biases and at times the

fect and accuracy **Cyber Conflict Defined** The conduct of large scale, politically motivated conflict based on the use of offensive and defensive capabilities to disrupt digital systems, networks, and infrastructures, including the use of cyber-based weapons or tools by non-state/transnational actors in conjunction with other forces for political ends. [1] 1. References in Doctrine or Organization **Structure** (Asymmetric doctrine, cyber warfare specific doctrine, dedicated cyber warfare units or affiliates) [DOC] 2. Areas of Gov't/Military Spending (In particular Education, Technology Research, ICT, EMS weapons, conventional weapons, and defense spending as a percentage of GDP) [BGT] Stuxnet 3. Development of Operational Assets IR 33000 (Number of university programs studying 1D IN AZ PK 10000 5500 2000 1000 relevant fields, number of collegiate students, number of ICT companies/special-Flame ists) [EDU] 4. Number of ICT assets/assets per capita (Overall attack surface and cultural acceptance of technology) [ICT] **In Context** 5. Number/Severity of Cyber Security In-Mahdi cidents (both offensive and defensive) [CYB] provenance of the information could not be independently verified. Offensive Defensive **Iranian Cyber Events** 2007 2005 2006 2008 2012 2009 2011 2007 2006 2008 2009 2010 2012 2005 2011



[1] Mulvenon, J. & Rattray, G. (2012) Addressing cyber instability. Cyber Conflict Studies Association. Retrieved from http://www. cyberconflict.org/storage/CCSA%20-%20Addressing%20Cyber%20Instability.pdf





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