A Network Audit System for Host-based Intrusion Detection (NASHID)
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Author
Tom Daniels, Eugene Spafford
Tech report number
CERIAS TR 1999-10
Abstract
Recent work has shown that conventional operating system audit trails are insufficient to detect low-level network attacks. Because audit are typically based upon system calls or application sources, operations in the network protocol stack go unaudited. In our earlier work, we determined the audit data needed to detect low-level network attacks. in this paper we describe an implementation of an audit system which collects this data and analyze th issues that guided th implementation. Finally, we report the performance impact on th systm and the rat of audit data accumulation in a test network.
Institution
Purdue University
Publication Date
0000-00-00
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