This White Paper explains key elements of the Clinton Administration\‘s policy on critical infrastructure protection. It is intended for dissemination to all interested parties in both the private and public sectors. It will also be used in U.S. Government professional education institutions, such as the National Defense University and the National Foreign Affairs Training Center, for coursework and exercises on iteragency practices and procedures. Wide dissemination of this unclassified White Paper is encouraged by all agencies of the U.S. Government.

The growth of managed care and integrated delivery systems has created a new commodity, health information and the technology that it requires. Surveys by Deloitte and Touche indicate that over half of the hospitals in the US are in the process of implementing electronic patient record (EPR) systems. The National Research Counsil has established that industry spends as much as $15 billion on information technology (IT), an amount that is xpanding by 20% per year. The importance of collecting, electronically storing, and using the information is undisputed. This information is needed by consumers to make informed choices; by physicians to provide appropriate quality clinical care; and by health plans to assess outcomes, control costs and monitor quality. The collection, storage and communication of a large variety of personal patient data, however, present a major dilemma. How can we provide the data required by the new forms of health care delivery and at the same time protect the personal privacy of patients? Recent debates concerning medical privacy legislation, software regulation, and telemedicin suggest that this dilemma eill not be easily resolved. The problem is systematic and arises out of the routine use and flow of information throughout the health industry. Health care information is primarily transferred among authorized users. Not only is the information used for patient care and financial reimbursement, secondary users of the information include medical, nursing, and allied health education, research, social services, public health, regulation, litigation, and commercial purposes such as the development of new medical technology and marketing. The main threats to privacy and confidentiality arise from within the institutions that provide patient care as well as institutions that have access to patient data for secondary purposes.

Denial of Service (DoS) attack is a serious threat for the Internet. DoS attack can consume memory, CPU, and network resources and damage or shutdown the operation of the resource under attack (victim). A common DoS attack floods a network with bogus traffic so that legitimate users may not be able to communicate. There are several proposals to {\\em traceback} the network attack path to identify the source that causes the DoS attack. This is an effective solution to trace the attacker but it is not preventive in nature. {\\em Ingress filtering} and {\\em Route-based filtering} are two proactive approaches to stop DoS attacks. These solutions check source addresses of incoming packets to ensure they are coming from legitimate sources or traversing through proper routes.  We study several existing schemes that deal with DoS attacks. We describe several network monitoring approaches to detect service violations and DoS attacks. In addition, we propose a new distributed scheme to reduce monitoring overhead. Finally, a quantitative comparison among all schemes is conducted, in which, we highlight the merits of each scheme and estimate the overhead (both computation and communication) introduced by it. The comparison provides guidelines for selecting the appropriate scheme, or a combination of schemes, based on the requirements and how much overhead can be tolerated.

AODV (Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector) is one of the hottest routing protocols under research for Ad Hoc networks. In this technical report, we study both the strong points and vulnerabilities of AODV under internal attacks from security perspective. On the strong points, we focus on the features of combination of multicast and unicast, fast expiration of reverse route and freshness of routing information. For the vulnerabilities, we take a thorough look at various problems related to spurious RREP (Route REPly) with false distance vector and destination sequence number, malicious RREQ (Route REQuest) flooding and forge Route Error (RERR). The impacts of these vulnerabilities are simulated using NS2 and the results are shown. Among all of the vulnerabilities, the attack to destination sequence is the worst. We design and implement a protocol called Reverse Labeling Restriction Protocol (RLRP) to detect and protect the Ad Hoc network from this attack. The effectiveness of RLRP is analyzed and simulated using NS2. The results show that the protocol could effectively identify the compromised site and impressively increase the performance of the Ad Hoc network with limited overhead. We also examine the robustness of RLRP to other attacks.