The Center for Education and Research in Information Assurance and Security, or CERIAS, is the world's foremost University center for multidisciplinary research and education in areas of information security. Our areas of research include computer, network, and communications security as well as information assurance.

This site's design is only visible in a graphical browser that supports web standards, but its content is accessible to any browser or Internet device. (Why?)

Center for Education and Research in Information Assurance and Security

COAST Security Archive Logo Category Index: /pub/Purdue


No Pointing!

This WWW page was generated automatically. Link makers should not point their links to this page. If you must, please make a link to the search entry point.

Mark Crosbie, Detect a SATAN scan of your system
Keywords: SATAN scan detector, network monitoring
Abstract: A simple PERL script that will detect a heavy SATAN scan by monitoring the output of the TCP wrappers package. You must have TCP wrappers (/pub/tools/unix/tcp_wrappers) installed to use this.

Steve Chapin, Papers by Steve Chapin of Purdue University
Abstract: Papers by Steve Chapin from Purdue University, Indiana.

Gene H. Kim, Papers by Gene H. Kim
Abstract: Papers by Gene H. Kim from Purdue University, Indiana. Reports on Tripwire and experiences with Tripwire.

Ivan Krsul, Papers by Ivan Krsul (COAST Lab) of Purdue University
Abstract: Papers by Ivan Krsul from Purdue University, Indiana. Includes Master's thesis on Authorship Analysis.

Sandeep Kumar, Papers by Sandeep Kumar (COAST Lab) of Purdue University
Abstract: Papers by Sandeep Kumar from Purdue University, Indiana. Includes a paper on portable virus scanners and intrusion detection by pattern matching.

Mark Crosbie, Papers by Mark Crosbie (COAST Lab( of Purdue University
Abstract: Papers by Mark Crosbie on using Autonomous Agents to defend computer systems.

Christoph L. Schuba, Papers by Christoph L. Schuba (COAST Lab) of Purdue University
Abstract: Papers by Christoph L. Schuba from Purdue University, Indiana. Includes Master's thesis on spoofing DNS servers and a paper on this.

Christoph Schuba, Bryan Lyles, A Reference Model for Firewall technology and its implications for connection signaling (A related WWW homepage exists for this item)
Keywords: firewall, signaling, model
Abstract: This paper concentrates on one particular aspect of providing communication security: firewalls between domains of trust. We argue that signaling support for providing scalable security services is a design requirement. On this basis we outline a reference model for firewall technology. It captures the current state of the art and proves suitable for connection-oriented high-performance networksThe architecture is an improvement in network management and provides a controlled exposure of the internal network structure to the outside, and transparency to the user. Its components are endpoint authentication, call admission control, connection authentication, audit, and a distributed architecture with centralized policy. The paper discusses implications of this reference model for the design of signaling protocols.

Christoph L. Schuba, Berry Kercheval, Eugene H. Spafford, Classical IP and ARP over ATM
Abstract: This paper gives a self-contained description of classical IP (internet protocol) and ARP (address resolution protocol) over ATM (asynchronous transfer mode) and describes a model facilitating the implementation of the switched virtual circuit-based local area network ATM subnet model. Its contents are distilled from the design and implementation of a prototype of a device driver for this particular subnet model. The work was conducted at the Computer Science Laboratory (CSL) at the Xerox Palo Alto Research Center (PARC).

Christoph L. Schuba, Eugene H. Spafford, Countering Abuse of Name--Based Authentication in the Domain Name System
Abstract: Authentication in distributed systems is usually based on the identity of participating entities. In some communications systems, identities are partially or wholly resolved using hostnames or machine addresses in the underlying protocol suite. If no cryptographic capabilities are used that identify subject--object interactions, host identification can be part of the authentication. A crucial link in the chain of authentication is therefore the association between hostnames and their respective protocol addresses. The validity of the authentication can be trusted only as much as the binding process itself. In the Internet this name resolution is provided by a widely--implemented distributed database system: the Domain Name System (DNS). Dynamic configuration behavior, system efficiency, and volume of binding requests demand late binding between hostnames and addresses, and caching of the mappings. This paper describes problems of name--based authentication requiring late binding that may result in the spoofing of hostnames. Attacks based on the discussed vulnerabilities have already been observed. This paper states the problem in an abstract way and in the concrete case of the DNS. It analyzes the conditions that facilitate the exploitation of the problem and explains the weaknesses that are present. Some possible solutions are explained, with emphasis on a DNS protocol extension that utilizes cryptographic methods in the name resolution process. This paper motivates the necessity to migrate to secure name resolution as soon as possible.

Eugene H. Spafford, Papers by Gene Spafford (COAST Lab) of Purdue University
Abstract: Papers by Gene Spafford (COAST Lab director) from Purdue University, Indiana. Includes papers on software forensics, spoofing DNS servers, authorship analysis, COPS integrity checker, Tripwire file integrity checker, OPUS password checker, a paper on Viruses as Artificial Life and material on the Internet Worm.

Stephen Weeber, Papers by Stephen Weeber of Purdue University
Abstract: Papers by Stephen Weeber from Purdue University, Indiana. Includes a paper with Eugene H. Spafford on Software Forensics.

_____

O Built by Mark Crosbie and Ivan Krsul.

Security Archive Page Security Archive Homepage.

COAST Homepage COAST Project (CERIAS)Page.

Purdue CS Homepage Purdue CS Dept page.


security-archive@cerias.purdue.edu (COAST Security Archive)